From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.7 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B58AC433DF for ; Thu, 28 May 2020 15:46:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3EEAD207F5 for ; Thu, 28 May 2020 15:46:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2404646AbgE1PqD (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 May 2020 11:46:03 -0400 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233]:47054 "EHLO out03.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2404511AbgE1PqB (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 May 2020 11:46:01 -0400 Received: from in01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.51]) by out03.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jeKjH-0003Zc-Mm; Thu, 28 May 2020 09:45:59 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in01.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1jeKjF-0006q8-Rr; Thu, 28 May 2020 09:45:59 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Linus Torvalds , Oleg Nesterov , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Greg Ungerer , Rob Landley , Bernd Edlinger , , Al Viro , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Casey Schaufler , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andy Lutomirski References: <87h7wujhmz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87sgga6ze4.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9l4zyla.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <877dx822er.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87k10wysqz.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 10:42:06 -0500 In-Reply-To: <87k10wysqz.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Thu, 28 May 2020 10:38:28 -0500") Message-ID: <878shcyskx.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1jeKjF-0006q8-Rr;;;mid=<878shcyskx.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in01.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+Bo5/YnCMJYnYnBAcEfoRXNYXUapdUns8= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com Subject: [PATCH 02/11] exec: Introduce active_per_clear the per file version of per_clear X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org When the credentials have been recomputed per file the per_clear status has not been recomputed. Update the per file calcuations to recompute per_clear on a per file basis in a separate variable and to combine that variable into the final per_clear value. This makes which personality bits are clear not depend on the permissions of shell scripts with interpreters, but instead only on the final bprm->file that bprm_fill_uid and security_bprm_repopulate_creds are called upon. History Tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git Fixes: 1bb0fa189c6a ("[PATCH] NX: clean up legacy binary support") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- fs/exec.c | 7 ++++--- include/linux/binfmts.h | 3 +++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 51fab62b9fca..221d12dcaa3e 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD | PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY); flush_thread(); - if (bprm->per_clear) + if (bprm->per_clear || bprm->active_per_clear) me->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; /* @@ -1629,12 +1629,12 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return; if (mode & S_ISUID) { - bprm->per_clear = 1; + bprm->active_per_clear = 1; bprm->cred->euid = uid; } if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { - bprm->per_clear = 1; + bprm->active_per_clear = 1; bprm->cred->egid = gid; } } @@ -1655,6 +1655,7 @@ static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* Recompute parts of bprm->cred based on bprm->file */ bprm->active_secureexec = 0; + bprm->active_per_clear = 0; bprm_fill_uid(bprm); retval = security_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm); if (retval) diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h index e7959a6a895a..89231a689957 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ struct linux_binprm { unsigned long p; /* current top of mem */ unsigned long argmin; /* rlimit marker for copy_strings() */ unsigned int + /* Does bprm->file warrant clearing personality bits? */ + active_per_clear:1, + /* Should unsafe personality bits be cleared? */ per_clear:1, diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 0ca68ad53592..62e60e55cb99 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ * transitions between security domains). * The hook must set @bprm->active_secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to * request libc enable secure mode. - * The hook must set @bprm->per_clear to 1 if the dangerous personality + * The hook must set @bprm->active_per_clear to 1 if the dangerous personality * bits must be cleared from current->personality. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 48b556046483..0b72d7bf23e1 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) - bprm->per_clear = 1; + bprm->active_per_clear = 1; /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. -- 2.25.0