From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] Show /proc/self/net only for CAP_NET_ADMIN
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 11:29:36 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87blk0ncpb.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200727141411.203770-3-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> (Alexey Gladkov's message of "Mon, 27 Jul 2020 16:14:11 +0200")
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> writes:
> Show /proc/self/net only for CAP_NET_ADMIN if procfs is mounted with
> subset=pid option in user namespace. This is done to avoid possible
> information leakage.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/proc_net.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_net.c b/fs/proc/proc_net.c
> index dba63b2429f0..11fa2c4b3529 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/proc_net.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/proc_net.c
> @@ -275,6 +275,12 @@ static struct net *get_proc_task_net(struct inode *dir)
> struct task_struct *task;
> struct nsproxy *ns;
> struct net *net = NULL;
> + struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(dir->i_sb);
> +
> + if ((fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON) &&
> + (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) &&
> + !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
> + return net;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> task = pid_task(proc_pid(dir), PIDTYPE_PID);
Hmm.
I see 3 options going forward.
1) We just make PROC_PIDONLY_ON mean the net directory does not exist.
No permission checks just always fail.
2) Move the permission checks into opendir/readdir and whichever
is the appropriate method there and always allow the dentries
to be cached.
3) Simply cache the mounters credentials and make access to the
net directories contingent of the permisions of the mounter of
proc. Something like the code below.
static struct net *get_proc_task_net(struct inode *dir)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct nsproxy *ns;
struct net *net = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid_task(proc_pid(dir), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (task != NULL) {
task_lock(task);
ns = task->nsproxy;
if (ns != NULL)
net = get_net(ns->net_ns);
task_unlock(task);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if ((fs_info->pidonly == PROC_PIDONLY_ON) &&
!security_capable(fs_info->mounter_cred,
net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
CAP_OPT_NONE)) {
put_net(net);
net = NULL;
}
return net;
}
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-27 16:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-27 14:14 [PATCH v1 0/2] proc: Relax check of mount visibility Alexey Gladkov
2020-07-27 14:14 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] " Alexey Gladkov
2020-07-27 14:14 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] Show /proc/self/net only for CAP_NET_ADMIN Alexey Gladkov
2020-07-27 16:29 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2020-07-28 13:54 ` Alexey Gladkov
2020-07-31 16:10 ` [PATCH v2 " Alexey Gladkov
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