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From: (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Linux Containers <>
	Seth Forshee <>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <>,
	Christian Brauner <>,
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH v2 3/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes
Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 18:41:29 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Wed, 23 May 2018 18:25:35 -0500")

Allow users with CAP_SYS_CHOWN over the superblock of a filesystem to
chown files when inode owner is invalid.  Ordinarily the
capable_wrt_inode_uidgid check is sufficient to allow access to files
but when the underlying filesystem has uids or gids that don't map to
the current user namespace it is not enough, so the chown permission
checks need to be extended to allow this case.

Calling chown on filesystem nodes whose uid or gid don't map is
necessary if those nodes are going to be modified as writing back
inodes which contain uids or gids that don't map is likely to cause
filesystem corruption of the uid or gid fields.

Once chown has been called the existing capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
checks are sufficient to allow the owner of a superblock to do anything
the global root user can do with an appropriate set of capabilities.

An ordinary filesystem mountable by a userns root will limit all uids
and gids in s_user_ns or the INVALID_UID and INVALID_GID to flag all
others.  So having this added permission limited to just INVALID_UID
and INVALID_GID is sufficient to handle every case on an ordinary filesystem.

Of the virtual filesystems at least proc is known to set s_user_ns to
something other than &init_user_ns, while at the same time presenting
some files owned by GLOBAL_ROOT_UID.  Those files the mounter of proc
in a user namespace should not be able to chown to get access to.
Limiting the relaxation in permission to just the minimum of allowing
changing INVALID_UID and INVALID_GID prevents problems with cases like

The original version of this patch was written by: Seth Forshee.  I
have rewritten and rethought this patch enough so it's really not the
same thing (certainly it needs a different description), but he
deserves credit for getting out there and getting the conversation
started, and finding the potential gotcha's and putting up with my
semi-paranoid feedback.

Inspired-by: Seth Forshee <>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <>

Sigh.  In simplifying this change so it would not require a change to
proc (or any other similar filesystem) I accidentally introduced some
badly placed semicolons.  The kbuild test robot was very nice and found
those for me.  Resend with those unnecessary semicolons removed.

 fs/attr.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 12ffdb6fb63c..d0b4d34878fb 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -18,6 +18,32 @@
 #include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+static bool chown_ok(const struct inode *inode, kuid_t uid)
+	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
+	    uid_eq(uid, inode->i_uid))
+		return true;
+	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+		return true;
+	if (uid_eq(inode->i_uid, INVALID_UID) &&
+	    ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+static bool chgrp_ok(const struct inode *inode, kgid_t gid)
+	if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) &&
+	    (in_group_p(gid) || gid_eq(gid, inode->i_gid)))
+		return true;
+	if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+		return true;
+	if (gid_eq(inode->i_gid, INVALID_GID) &&
+	    ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_CHOWN))
+		return true;
+	return false;
  * setattr_prepare - check if attribute changes to a dentry are allowed
  * @dentry:	dentry to check
@@ -52,17 +78,11 @@ int setattr_prepare(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 		goto kill_priv;
 	/* Make sure a caller can chown. */
-	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) &&
-	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
-	     !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) &&
-	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && !chown_ok(inode, attr->ia_uid))
 		return -EPERM;
 	/* Make sure caller can chgrp. */
-	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) &&
-	    (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) ||
-	    (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) &&
-	    !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN))
+	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && !chgrp_ok(inode, attr->ia_gid))
 		return -EPERM;
 	/* Make sure a caller can chmod. */

  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-23 23:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-23 23:22 [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/6] vfs: Don't allow changing the link count of an inode with an invalid uid or gid Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 12:58   ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 22:30     ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/6] vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 13:55   ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 16:55     ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 17:22       ` Seth Forshee
2018-05-24 19:12   ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to replace invalid owners of inodes Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-23 23:41   ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2018-05-24 22:30     ` [REVIEW][PATCH v2 " Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 4/6] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:58   ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-24 16:45     ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 17:28       ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 5/6] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:57   ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-23 23:25 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 6/6] fs: Allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in s_user_ns to freeze and thaw filesystems Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 15:59   ` Christian Brauner
2018-05-24 21:46 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/6] Wrapping up the vfs support for unprivileged mounts Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-05-24 23:23   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-25  3:57     ` Dave Chinner
2018-05-25  4:06       ` Darrick J. Wong
2018-05-29 13:12       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-29 22:17         ` Dave Chinner
2018-05-30  2:34           ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-30  4:34             ` Dave Chinner
2018-05-29 15:40 ` Dongsu Park

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