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charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 6:28 PM Tycho Andersen wrote: > On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 12:03:58PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:34 AM Tycho Andersen wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 11:29:05AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 10:57 AM Tycho Andersen wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Apr 08, 2019 at 11:39:09PM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > > > It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier. > > > > > > A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier. > > > > > > > > > > ... > > > > > > > > > > > /** > > > > > > + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid > > > > > > + * @contid: contid value > > > > > > + * > > > > > > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. > > > > > > + * > > > > > > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). > > > > > > + */ > > > > > > +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > > > > > > +{ > > > > > > + u64 oldcontid; > > > > > > + int rc = 0; > > > > > > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > > > > > > + uid_t uid; > > > > > > + struct tty_struct *tty; > > > > > > + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; > > > > > > + > > > > > > + task_lock(task); > > > > > > + /* Can't set if audit disabled */ > > > > > > + if (!task->audit) { > > > > > > + task_unlock(task); > > > > > > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > > > > > > + } > > > > > > + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task); > > > > > > + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); > > > > > > + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ > > > > > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > > > > > + rc = -EINVAL; > > > > > > + /* if we don't have caps, reject */ > > > > > > + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) > > > > > > + rc = -EPERM; > > > > > > + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ > > > > > > + else if (!list_empty(&task->children)) > > > > > > + rc = -EBUSY; > > > > > > + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) > > > > > > + rc = -EALREADY; > > > > > > + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > > > > > > + if (!rc) > > > > > > + task->audit->contid = contid; > > > > > > + task_unlock(task); > > > > > > + > > > > > > + if (!audit_enabled) > > > > > > + return rc; > > > > > > > > > > ...but it is allowed to change it (assuming > > > > > capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL), of course)? Seems like this might be more > > > > > immediately useful since we still live in the world of majority > > > > > privileged containers if we didn't allow changing it, in addition to > > > > > un-setting it. > > > > > > > > The idea is that only container orchestrators should be able to > > > > set/modify the audit container ID, and since setting the audit > > > > container ID can have a significant effect on the records captured > > > > (and their routing to multiple daemons when we get there) modifying > > > > the audit container ID is akin to modifying the audit configuration > > > > which is why it is gated by CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. The current thinking > > > > is that you would only change the audit container ID from one > > > > set/inherited value to another if you were nesting containers, in > > > > which case the nested container orchestrator would need to be granted > > > > CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL (which everyone to date seems to agree is a workable > > > > compromise). > > > > > > But then don't you want some kind of ns_capable() instead (probably > > > not the obvious one, though...)? With capable(), you can't really nest > > > using the audit-id and user namespaces together. > > > > You want capable() and not ns_capable() because you want to ensure > > that the orchestrator has the rights in the init_ns as changes to the > > audit container ID could have an auditing impact that spans the entire > > system. > > Ok but, > > > > > The current thinking > > > > is that you would only change the audit container ID from one > > > > set/inherited value to another if you were nesting containers, in > > > > which case the nested container orchestrator would need to be granted > > > > CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL (which everyone to date seems to agree is a workable > > > > compromise). > > won't work in user namespaced containers, because they will never be > capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL); so I don't think this will work for > nesting as is. But maybe nobody cares :) That's fun :) To be honest, I've never been a big fan of supporting nested containers from an audit perspective, so I'm not really too upset about this. The k8s/cri-o folks seem okay with this, or at least I haven't heard any objections; lxc folks, what do you have to say? -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com