From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D9BEC10F00 for ; Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:20:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5FEDC20684 for ; Wed, 6 Mar 2019 16:20:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="QwPXtqZX" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727302AbfCFQUo (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Mar 2019 11:20:44 -0500 Received: from mail-lf1-f68.google.com ([209.85.167.68]:37253 "EHLO mail-lf1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726933AbfCFQUo (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Mar 2019 11:20:44 -0500 Received: by mail-lf1-f68.google.com with SMTP id u2so2412444lfd.4 for ; Wed, 06 Mar 2019 08:20:41 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=pjz51UU6GXQYL+16XKU/iiGTsNEYSn0tEhxGlYS0vdE=; b=QwPXtqZXvCp9vswSrO4WW1Ty6hS97gqr/JXonLffEsta4mW0YmYrJcx7nNifVDbclu UZzBbIryPUYyPMSv8a617ZOo6uj0bBGhznSR+rYJxFL/w2j1IciZOuaPxG2c6LvU2YZM ty9AfQ6XRscNlwSRQi0eyEqwwlAKqiIj5tu95wMoSMD+uiKf/d/uPPqd5/GPmj/jfxJM SBiaDur4hC98cYgQYWYLd8ehOIkkqTErVKw3TRD5T/N1AFroiAmi0TDntfCRj0e1NLZ3 RqSH+JJeajOKuoAAIMHvOrLg7KJGfld2Z9wtJCBUOc86fhsV/u+piQbANjqwdtNriMBt xawA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=pjz51UU6GXQYL+16XKU/iiGTsNEYSn0tEhxGlYS0vdE=; b=STX+r3ObeTocIGAaET/P8Fus+UJvMVsIFkVTabsa/IOPmz/DifMZhV00QPtWPnwjip X3PH/KvhhtKAqT1Q52fLdTx+5LGMwuNY06Km4aRe0uc9aJFd+x1K3ydlmyqPhokqemTy +Avk5WkB5vmHxwIMYLdI8Rb300vm9v0U5BOZJwL8Bww1Yn0zTl4ayhl5m8pkGMWa4G2x 7RMbSPHyoYoGcTH5D+kVEPCnvIWS5cOWVVRlB1jZmv7t5+EbMyNFZjqHlsJN0z2kkGbu +Qds8bpAQ2CqPmRZgnaWfsJXerTQzbK2ABSMwKDFhT3YD/FtFQxY6Q+lFxYGZSVjwtNV fXsQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUnpPTYcX8sHyX/iDT8w0vy89TUuB2/Ge43sCgSgu6oMY3sV6Aq Q4eBfiMlsPcYQP+7pR2cu+tU3TW8JUG7HdOjh1bt X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxo1of1MchxnVzRpTaZj7cG9minfK+eA7RA0YF97+o5lPUADLNPFHqKXcz3ksOnjtgNDIZwlE12Vv7WJc7+bo0= X-Received: by 2002:a19:7512:: with SMTP id y18mr4255061lfe.105.1551889240785; Wed, 06 Mar 2019 08:20:40 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20190222145718.5740-1-omosnace@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: From: Paul Moore Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 11:20:29 -0500 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/7] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent To: Ondrej Mosnacek Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley , Linux Security Module list , Tejun Heo , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , James Morris , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 10:54 AM Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 3:57 PM Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > > TL;DR: > > This series adds a new security hook that allows to initialize the security > > context of kernfs properly, taking into account the parent context (and > > possibly other attributes). Kernfs nodes require special handling here, since > > they are not bound to specific inodes/superblocks, but instead represent the > > backing tree structure that is used to build the VFS tree when the kernfs > > tree is mounted. > > > > Changes in v7: > > - simplify the new security hook's interface > > - rather than trying to extract kernfs data into common structures, just > > pass the kernfs nodes themselves and add helper functions to > > for accessing their security xattrs > > - in case other LSMs need more kernfs node attributes than the file mode > > (uid/gid/...), they can simply add new helpers to as > > needed > > - refactor "kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes" to keep using > > a single common simple_xattrs structure > > - turns out having two separate simple_xattrs wouldn't work right (see > > the definition of simple_xattr_list() in fs/xattr.c) > > - drop unnecessary initializations from inode_doinit_use_xattr() > > - move the IOP_XATTR check out of inode_doinit_use_xattr() > > - add two kernfs cleanup patches > > - these could be applied independently, but the rest of the patches depend on > > them, so I'd rather they stay bundled with the rest to avoid cross-tree > > conflicts > > > > v6: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20190214095015.16032-1-omosnace@redhat.com/T/ > > Changes in v6: > > - remove copy-pasted duplicate macro definition > > > > v5: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20190205110638.30782-1-omosnace@redhat.com/T/ > > Changes in v5: > > - fix misplaced semicolon detected by 0day robot > > > > v4: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20190205085915.5183-1-omosnace@redhat.com/T/ > > Changes in v4: > > - reorder and rename hook arguments > > - avoid allocating kernfs_iattrs unless needed > > > > v3: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20190130114150.27807-1-omosnace@redhat.com/T/ > > Changes in v3: > > - rename the hook to "kernfs_init_security" > > - change the hook interface to simply pass pointers to struct iattr and > > struct simple_xattrs of both the new node and its parent > > - add full security xattr support to kernfs (and fixup SELinux behavior > > to handle it properly) > > > > v2: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20190109162830.8309-1-omosnace@redhat.com/T/ > > Changes in v2: > > - add docstring for the new hook in union security_list_options > > - initialize *ctx to NULL and *ctxlen to 0 in case the hook is not > > implemented > > > > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20190109091028.24485-1-omosnace@redhat.com/T/ > > > > The kernfs nodes initially do not store any security context and rely on > > the LSM to assign some default context to inodes created over them. Kernfs > > inodes, however, allow setting an explicit context via the *setxattr(2) > > syscalls, in which case the context is stored inside the kernfs node's > > internal structure. > > > > SELinux (and possibly other LSMs) initialize the context of newly created > > FS objects based on the parent object's context (usually the child inherits > > the parent's context, unless the policy dictates otherwise). This is done > > by hooking the creation of the new inode corresponding to the newly created > > file/directory via security_inode_init_security() (most filesystems always > > create a fresh inode when a new FS object is created). However, kernfs nodes > > can be created "behind the scenes" while the filesystem is not mounted > > anywhere and thus no inodes can exist for them yet. > > > > Therefore, to allow maintaining similar behavior for kernfs nodes, a new > > LSM hook is needed, which will allow initializing the kernfs node's > > security context based on its own attributes and those of the parent's > > node. > > > > The main motivation for this change is that the userspace users of cgroupfs > > (which is built on kernfs) expect the usual security context inheritance > > to work under SELinux (see [1] and [2]). This functionality is required for > > better confinement of containers under SELinux. > > > > Patch 1/7 simplifies the kernfs_iattrs structure and patch 2/7 optimizes > > kernfs to not allocate kernfs_iattrs when getting the value of an xattr. > > > > Patch 3/7 changes SELinux to fetch security context from extended > > attributes on kernfs filesystems, falling back to genfs-defined context > > if that fails. Without this patch the 4/7 would be a regression for > > SELinux (due to the removal of ...notifysecctx() call. > > > > Patch 4/7 implements full security xattr support in kernfs using > > simple_xattrs; patch 5/7 adds the new LSM hook; patch 6/7 implements the > > new hook in SELinux; and patch 7/7 modifies kernfs to call the new hook > > on new node creation. > > > > Testing: > > - passed the reproducer from the commit message of the last patch > > - passed SELinux testsuite on Fedora Rawhide (x86_64) when applied on top > > of current Rawhide kernel (5.0.0-0.rc7.git2.1) [3] > > - including the new proposed selinux-testsuite subtest [4] (adapted > > from the reproducer) > > > > [1] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/39 > > [2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1553803 > > [3] https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=32963825 > > [4] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/pull/48 > > > > Ondrej Mosnacek (7): > > kernfs: clean up struct kernfs_iattrs > > kernfs: do not alloc iattrs in kernfs_xattr_get > > selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems > > kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes > > LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization > > selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook > > kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes > > > > fs/kernfs/dir.c | 28 ++-- > > fs/kernfs/inode.c | 166 +++++++++------------ > > fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 8 +- > > fs/kernfs/symlink.c | 4 +- > > include/linux/kernfs.h | 15 ++ > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 ++ > > include/linux/security.h | 9 ++ > > security/security.c | 6 + > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 223 +++++++++++++++++++--------- > > security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + > > 10 files changed, 290 insertions(+), 183 deletions(-) > > > > -- > > 2.20.1 > > Ping about this series... Casey, are you OK with this new version? We've got two weeks, well one and a half weeks, to decide as the earliest I would merge this would be after the merge window closes :) -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com