From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 12/30] integrity: implement get and set acl hook
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2022 15:14:42 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSxr-aUj7mqKo05B5Oj=5FWeajx_mNjR_EszzpYR1YozA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220929153041.500115-13-brauner@kernel.org>
On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 11:33 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
> xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
> interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
> userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
> understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
> making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
> building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
> operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
> easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
>
> So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and
> integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the
> void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl
> representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is
> obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the
> vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper
> security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in
> their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void
> pointer stored in the uapi format.
>
> I spent considerate time in the security module and integrity
> infrastructure and audited all codepaths. EVM is the only part that
> really has restrictions based on the actual posix acl values passed
> through it. Before this dedicated hook EVM used to translate from the
> uapi posix acl format sent to it in the form of a void pointer into the
> vfs format. This is not a good thing. Instead of hacking around in the
> uapi struct give EVM the posix acls in the appropriate vfs format and
> perform sane permissions checks that mirror what it used to to in the
> generic xattr hook.
>
> IMA doesn't have any restrictions on posix acls. When posix acls are
> changed it just wants to update its appraisal status.
>
> The removal of posix acls is equivalent to passing NULL to the posix set
> acl hooks. This is the same as before through the generic xattr api.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
> ---
>
> Notes:
> /* v2 */
> unchanged
>
> /* v3 */
> Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>:
> - Add get, and remove acl hook
>
> /* v4 */
> unchanged
>
> include/linux/evm.h | 23 +++++++++
> include/linux/ima.h | 21 ++++++++
> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 9 ++++
> security/security.c | 21 +++++++-
> 5 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 23d484e05e6f..7904786b610f 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
> *
> * File: evm_main.c
> * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr,
> - * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
> + * evm_inode_removexattr, evm_verifyxattr, and evm_inode_set_acl.
> */
>
> #define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
> @@ -670,6 +670,74 @@ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
> return evm_protect_xattr(mnt_userns, dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
> }
>
> +static int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
> + struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> + struct posix_acl *kacl)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
> + int rc;
> +
> + umode_t mode;
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> +
> + if (!kacl)
> + return 1;
> +
> + rc = posix_acl_update_mode(mnt_userns, inode, &mode, &kacl);
> + if (rc || (inode->i_mode != mode))
> + return 1;
> +#endif
> + return 0;
> +}
I'm not too bothered by it either way, but one might consider pulling
the #ifdef outside the function definition, for example:
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
static int evm_inode_foo(...)
{
/* ... stuff ... */
}
#else
static int evm_inode_foo(...)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index bde74fcecee3..698a8ae2fe3e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -770,6 +770,15 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
> return result;
> }
>
> +int ima_inode_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry,
> + const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
> +{
> + if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name))
> + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
While the ima_inode_set_acl() implementation above looks okay for the
remove case, I do see that the ima_inode_setxattr() function has a
call to validate_hash_algo() before calling
ima_reset_appraise_flags(). IANAIE (I Am Not An Ima Expert), but it
seems like we would still want that check in the ACL case.
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-29 19:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-29 15:30 [PATCH v4 00/30] acl: add vfs posix acl api Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 01/30] orangefs: rework posix acl handling when creating new filesystem objects Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 02/30] fs: pass dentry to set acl method Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 03/30] fs: rename current get " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 04/30] fs: add new " Christian Brauner
2022-09-30 8:53 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-09-30 9:09 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-30 9:43 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-09-30 10:05 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-30 12:24 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-09-30 12:49 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-30 13:01 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-09-30 13:51 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-04 19:53 ` Steve French
2022-10-05 7:15 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-06 6:31 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-10-06 7:40 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-06 9:07 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 05/30] cifs: implement " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 06/30] cifs: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 07/30] 9p: implement get " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 08/30] 9p: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 09/30] security: add get, remove and set acl hook Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 19:15 ` Paul Moore
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 10/30] selinux: implement get, set and remove " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 19:15 ` Paul Moore
2022-09-30 8:38 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 11/30] smack: " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 19:15 ` Paul Moore
2022-09-30 8:40 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 12/30] integrity: implement get and set " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 19:14 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2022-09-30 3:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-30 14:11 ` Paul Moore
2022-09-30 8:11 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 13/30] evm: add post " Christian Brauner
2022-09-30 1:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-30 2:51 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-30 8:44 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-30 11:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-04 7:04 ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 14/30] internal: add may_write_xattr() Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 15/30] acl: add vfs_set_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 16/30] acl: add vfs_get_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 17/30] acl: add vfs_remove_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 18/30] ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 19/30] ecryptfs: implement get acl method Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 20/30] ecryptfs: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 21/30] ovl: implement get " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 22/30] ovl: implement set " Christian Brauner
2022-10-06 12:39 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 23/30] ovl: use posix acl api Christian Brauner
2022-10-06 12:50 ` Miklos Szeredi
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 24/30] xattr: " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 25/30] evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change() Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 26/30] ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 27/30] ovl: " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 28/30] cifs: " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 29/30] 9p: " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 30/30] acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers Christian Brauner
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