From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DBD97C64E75 for ; Fri, 27 Nov 2020 13:05:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 548DA2224C for ; Fri, 27 Nov 2020 13:05:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="QUyskmOA" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729592AbgK0NFM (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 Nov 2020 08:05:12 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48410 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725865AbgK0NFM (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 Nov 2020 08:05:12 -0500 Received: from mail-io1-xd44.google.com (mail-io1-xd44.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d44]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E1EBDC0613D1; Fri, 27 Nov 2020 05:05:11 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-io1-xd44.google.com with SMTP id s10so4759585ioe.1; Fri, 27 Nov 2020 05:05:11 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=/aCfQfU+2NxErOuM6SBa5QT3V1nalBKQFOreo5Hzh9M=; b=QUyskmOA4jrVRCDiEEaw/xep3qOSEwiJOzF5wkZqQJ5/IU5vX86Gtg8l6TJXWoYt6I 5Y5AHGhR2V6+jQX/lmtsWDKiGkynWmimvQzbqKDUD4d2msWTYRpi+89ahnASVLVYJilp hWOhwA8q0uFDT8pnSz4pfTaMupMG7T25comj3rVGKw58aPWh64PZeUPqYak4ZFkIwv6c IwxnruDEjL/7MJ0DfTCNofqZNpcqhttmRodC9B8gnLUBBrlENU2JSbAKmjn0HharHtjV auK8Hhn5NEsfj9I+ZAynv/SWJjPoY7eMT+XbUdUGXL6lvvf7sBiWmP/A93ZOuFO6ETuZ sxTg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=/aCfQfU+2NxErOuM6SBa5QT3V1nalBKQFOreo5Hzh9M=; b=rLSynWAvFZZRt3Ht/nbXoIDxad0AprtICQxE8QuSNCgEarbuvdR6Kacg6skftnMQUP 2R9qbnMgIr7koGGUimJbcS7Duhr/h2IkIfVXVzJH3T+UI0PVFB3x4Am4rp5Sg8kofKZt 9rR0Jzd3Y+cWA5IpkhAcfFo/DRVsqWX9FOl7YolToX7b7dDYqu5YBSbBSiDLRwXoqnz3 U6ks5hNGs7KnU0DGkvsiCjEGKQEYw+YtGzMPiyp/mobc8DdI7hwrXC6sQY4znmU9Mghk Xg40iYpuWKMC9UMlF0QgP9BpCajwg6rx2DZ4FNRRwYcEY/wtARK5cJ2YvnIesJgvcH2b OFlA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532eKLfxNS0lYG/8C9uSJ4Z7vyeSZeMOKFy4MYF59AX6tLE1E27C Ch2r0CKkuKkjGqJRiNJnk9uIne4ytVrsWSmcxT4= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyOqC/zPrxlOuXVupO3nkYt6H58mtxUArgl0z5u7cunUAUWf6a9Q4tAIzMFNEp8f8LoszQYvTaQD/LB/ejt5d0= X-Received: by 2002:a02:ccd6:: with SMTP id k22mr7375006jaq.93.1606482311192; Fri, 27 Nov 2020 05:05:11 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20201127092058.15117-1-sargun@sargun.me> <20201127092058.15117-4-sargun@sargun.me> In-Reply-To: <20201127092058.15117-4-sargun@sargun.me> From: Amir Goldstein Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2020 15:04:59 +0200 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] overlay: Add the ability to remount volatile directories when safe To: Sargun Dhillon Cc: overlayfs , Miklos Szeredi , Alexander Viro , Giuseppe Scrivano , Vivek Goyal , Daniel J Walsh , linux-fsdevel , David Howells Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Nov 27, 2020 at 11:21 AM Sargun Dhillon wrote: > > Overlayfs added the ability to setup mounts where all syncs could be > short-circuted in (2a99ddacee43: ovl: provide a mount option "volatile"). > > A user might want to remount this fs, but we do not let the user because > of the "incompat" detection feature. In the case of volatile, it is safe > to do something like[1]: > > $ sync -f /root/upperdir > $ rm -rf /root/workdir/incompat/volatile > > There are two ways to go about this. You can call sync on the underlying > filesystem, check the error code, and delete the dirty file if everything > is clean. If you're running lots of containers on the same filesystem, or > you want to avoid all unnecessary I/O, this may be suboptimal. > > Alternatively, you can blindly delete the dirty file, and "hope for the > best". > > This patch introduces transparent functionality to check if it is > (relatively) safe to reuse the upperdir. It ensures that the filesystem > hasn't been remounted, the system hasn't been rebooted, nor has the > overlayfs code changed. Since the structure is explicitly not meant to be > used between different versions of the code, its stability does not matter > so much. > > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/CAOQ4uxhKr+j5jFyEC2gJX8E8M19mQ3CqdTYaPZOvDQ9c0qLEzw@mail.gmail.com/T/#m6abe713e4318202ad57f301bf28a414e1d824f9c > > Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon > Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org > Cc: Miklos Szeredi > Cc: Amir Goldstein > Cc: Vivek Goyal You may add: Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein > --- > Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst | 18 +++-- > fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 37 +++++++++- > fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- > fs/overlayfs/super.c | 73 +++++++++++++----- > fs/overlayfs/util.c | 2 + > 5 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst > index c6e30c1bc2f2..b485fdb65b85 100644 > --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst > +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst > @@ -579,13 +579,17 @@ example, upon detecting a fault, ext4 can be configured to panic. > The advantage of mounting with the "volatile" option is that all forms of > sync calls to the upper filesystem are omitted. > > -When overlay is mounted with "volatile" option, the directory > -"$workdir/work/incompat/volatile" is created. During next mount, overlay > -checks for this directory and refuses to mount if present. This is a strong > -indicator that user should throw away upper and work directories and create > -fresh one. In very limited cases where the user knows that the system has > -not crashed and contents of upperdir are intact, The "volatile" directory > -can be removed. > +When overlay is mounted with the "volatile" option, the directory > +"$workdir/work/incompat/volatile" is created. This acts as a indicator > +that the user should throw away upper and work directories and create fresh > +ones. In some cases, the overlayfs can detect if the upperdir can be > +reused safely in a subsequent volatile mounts, and mounting will proceed as > +normal. If the filesystem is unable to determine if this is safe (due to a > +reboot, upgraded kernel code, or loss of checkpoint, etc...), the user may > +bypass these safety checks and remove the "volatile" directory if they know > +the system did not encounter a fault and the contents of the upperdir are > +intact. Then, the user can remount the filesystem as normal. > + > > Testsuite > --------- > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h > index f8880aa2ba0e..de694ee99d7c 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h > @@ -32,8 +32,13 @@ enum ovl_xattr { > OVL_XATTR_NLINK, > OVL_XATTR_UPPER, > OVL_XATTR_METACOPY, > + OVL_XATTR_VOLATILE, > }; > > +#define OVL_INCOMPATDIR_NAME "incompat" > +#define OVL_VOLATILEDIR_NAME "volatile" > +#define OVL_VOLATILE_DIRTY_NAME "dirty" > + > enum ovl_inode_flag { > /* Pure upper dir that may contain non pure upper entries */ > OVL_IMPURE, > @@ -57,6 +62,31 @@ enum { > OVL_XINO_ON, > }; > > +/* > + * This is copied into the volatile xattr, and the user does not interact with > + * it. There is no stability requirement, as a reboot explicitly invalidates > + * a volatile workdir. It is explicitly meant not to be a stable api. > + * > + * Although this structure isn't meant to be stable it is exposed to potentially > + * unprivileged users. We don't do any kind of cryptographic operations with > + * the structure, so it could be tampered with, or inspected. Don't put > + * kernel memory pointers in it, or anything else that could cause problems, > + * or information disclosure. > + */ > +struct ovl_volatile_info { > + /* > + * This uniquely identifies a boot, and is reset if overlayfs itself > + * is reloaded. Therefore we check our current / known boot_id > + * against this before looking at any other fields to validate: > + * 1. Is this datastructure laid out in the way we expect? (Overlayfs > + * module, reboot, etc...) > + * 2. Could something have changed (like the s_instance_id counter > + * resetting) > + */ > + uuid_t ovl_boot_id; /* Must stay first member */ > + u64 s_instance_id; > +} __packed; > + > /* > * The tuple (fh,uuid) is a universal unique identifier for a copy up origin, > * where: > @@ -422,8 +452,8 @@ void ovl_cleanup_whiteouts(struct dentry *upper, struct list_head *list); > void ovl_cache_free(struct list_head *list); > void ovl_dir_cache_free(struct inode *inode); > int ovl_check_d_type_supported(struct path *realpath); > -int ovl_workdir_cleanup(struct inode *dir, struct vfsmount *mnt, > - struct dentry *dentry, int level); > +int ovl_workdir_cleanup(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct inode *dir, > + struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, int level); > int ovl_indexdir_cleanup(struct ovl_fs *ofs); > > /* inode.c */ > @@ -520,3 +550,6 @@ int ovl_set_origin(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *lower, > > /* export.c */ > extern const struct export_operations ovl_export_operations; > + > +/* super.c */ > +extern uuid_t ovl_boot_id; > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c > index 01620ebae1bd..7b66fbb20261 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c > @@ -1080,10 +1080,78 @@ int ovl_check_d_type_supported(struct path *realpath) > > return rdd.d_type_supported; > } > +static int ovl_verify_volatile_info(struct ovl_fs *ofs, > + struct dentry *volatiledir) > +{ > + int err; > + struct ovl_volatile_info info; > + > + if (!volatiledir->d_inode) > + return 0; > + > + if (!ofs->config.ovl_volatile) { > + pr_debug("Mount is not volatile; upperdir is marked volatile\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + err = ovl_do_getxattr(ofs, volatiledir, OVL_XATTR_VOLATILE, &info, > + sizeof(info)); > + if (err < 0) { > + pr_debug("Unable to read volatile xattr: %d\n", err); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + if (err != sizeof(info)) { > + pr_debug("%s xattr on-disk size is %d expected to read %zd\n", > + ovl_xattr(ofs, OVL_XATTR_VOLATILE), err, sizeof(info)); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + if (!uuid_equal(&ovl_boot_id, &info.ovl_boot_id)) { > + pr_debug("boot id has changed (reboot or module reloaded)\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + if (volatiledir->d_sb->s_instance_id != info.s_instance_id) { > + pr_debug("workdir has been unmounted and remounted\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + return 1; > +} > > -#define OVL_INCOMPATDIR_NAME "incompat" > +/* > + * ovl_check_incompat checks this specific incompat entry for incompatibility. > + * If it is found to be incompatible -EINVAL will be returned. > + * > + * If the directory should be preserved, then this function returns 1. > + */ > +static int ovl_check_incompat(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_cache_entry *p, > + struct path *path) > +{ > + int err = -EINVAL; > + struct dentry *d; > + > + if (!strcmp(p->name, OVL_VOLATILEDIR_NAME)) { > + d = lookup_one_len(p->name, path->dentry, p->len); > + if (IS_ERR(d)) > + return PTR_ERR(d); > + > + err = ovl_verify_volatile_info(ofs, d); > + dput(d); > + } > + > + if (err == -EINVAL) > + pr_err("incompat feature '%s' cannot be mounted\n", p->name); > + else > + pr_debug("incompat '%s' handled: %d\n", p->name, err); > + > + dput(d); Letfover. Thanks, Amir.