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From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: agk@redhat.com, axboe@kernel.dk, snitzer@redhat.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, paul@paul-moore.com, eparis@redhat.com,
	jannh@google.com, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, sashal@kernel.org,
	jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com, mdsakib@microsoft.com,
	nramas@linux.microsoft.com, pasha.tatashin@soleen.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 06/11] dm-verity: move signature check after tree validation
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 16:55:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a5534f1c-8979-0cfd-3989-2567f4a29dbc@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200728215041.GF4053562@gmail.com>



On 7/28/2020 2:50 PM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 28, 2020 at 02:36:06PM -0700, Deven Bowers wrote:
>> The CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG introduced by Jaskaran was
>> intended to be used to allow an LSM to enforce verifications for all
>> dm-verity volumes.
>>
>> However, with it's current implementation, this signature verification
>> occurs after the merkel-tree is validated, as a result the signature can
>> pass initial verification by passing a matching root-hash and signature.
>> This results in an unreadable block_device, but that has passed signature
>> validation (and subsequently, would be marked as verified).
>>
>> This change moves the signature verification to after the merkel-tree has
>> finished validation.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>>   drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c     |  44 ++++------
>>   drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>>   drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h |  24 +++--
>>   drivers/md/dm-verity.h            |   2 +-
>>   4 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
>> index eec9f252e935..fabc173aa7b3 100644
>> --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
>> +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c
>> @@ -471,9 +471,9 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
>>   	struct bvec_iter start;
>>   	unsigned b;
>>   	struct crypto_wait wait;
>> +	int r;
>>   
>>   	for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) {
>> -		int r;
>>   		sector_t cur_block = io->block + b;
>>   		struct ahash_request *req = verity_io_hash_req(v, io);
>>   
>> @@ -530,6 +530,16 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io)
>>   			return -EIO;
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	/*
>> +	 * At this point, the merkel tree has finished validating.
>> +	 * if signature was specified, validate the signature here.
>> +	 */
>> +	r = verity_verify_root_hash(v);
>> +	if (r < 0) {
>> +		DMERR_LIMIT("signature mismatch");
>> +		return r;
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
> 
> This doesn't make any sense.
> 
> This just moves the signature verification to some random I/O.
> 
> The whole point of dm-verity is that data is verified on demand.  You can't know
> whether any particular data or hash block is consistent with the root hash or
> not until it is read and verified.
> 
> When the first I/O completes it might have just checked one block of a billion.
> 
> Not to mention that you didn't consider locking at all.
> 
> - Eric
> 

I appear to have dangerously misunderstood how dm-verity works under the
covers. What I thought was happening here was that *this* would be where
the first I/O that completes validation and has been verified - the root
hash signature could then be checked against the root hash, and then
no-op for remaining blocks, provided the signature validates.

The reason why I was proposing moving the signature check, is that I was 
afraid of the block_device being created in dm-verity with a root-hash 
that belongs to a different device + a signature that verifies that
root-hash, would get past verity_ctr, as despite the root hash not
matching the hash tree, the signature and the root hash will be 
verified. At this point, a block_device structure would be resident in
the kernel with the security attributes I propose in the next patch in 
the series. This device would never be read successfully, but the
structure with the attribute would exist.

This felt odd because there would be a structure in the kernel with an
attribute that says it passed a security check, but the block_device is
effectively invalid.

I realize now that that's a pretty ridiculous situation because the 
theoretical attack with access to manipulate the kernel memory in such a 
way to make it viable could just override whatever is needed to make the 
exploit work, and isn't unique to dm-verity.

I'm going to drop this patch in the next iteration of this series.



  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-28 23:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-28 21:36 [RFC PATCH v5 00/11] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/11] scripts: add ipe tooling to generate boot policy Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/11] security: add ipe lsm evaluation loop and audit system Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/11] security: add ipe lsm policy parser and policy loading Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/11] ipe: add property for trust of boot volume Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/11] fs: add security blob and hooks for block_device Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 22:22   ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-28 22:40     ` Al Viro
2020-07-28 23:55       ` Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/11] dm-verity: move signature check after tree validation Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:50   ` Eric Biggers
2020-07-28 23:55     ` Deven Bowers [this message]
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/11] dm-verity: add bdev_setsecurity hook for dm-verity signature Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/11] ipe: add property for signed dmverity volumes Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/11] dm-verity: add bdev_setsecurity hook for root-hash Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/11] documentation: add ipe documentation Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/12] ipe: add property for dmverity roothash Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/11] cleanup: uapi/linux/audit.h Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/12] documentation: add ipe documentation Deven Bowers
2020-07-28 21:36 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/12] cleanup: uapi/linux/audit.h Deven Bowers
2020-08-02 11:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/11] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Pavel Machek
2020-08-02 14:03   ` Sasha Levin
2020-08-02 14:31     ` Pavel Machek
2020-08-02 16:43       ` [dm-devel] " James Bottomley
2020-08-04 16:07         ` Deven Bowers
2020-08-05 15:01           ` James Bottomley
2020-08-05 16:59             ` James Morris
2020-08-05 18:15               ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-05 23:51                 ` James Morris
2020-08-06 14:33                   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-07 16:41                     ` James Morris
2020-08-07 17:31                       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-07 18:40                         ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-10 20:29                           ` James Morris
2020-08-08 17:47                 ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-09 17:16                   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-10 15:35                     ` James Bottomley
2020-08-10 16:35                       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-10 17:13                         ` James Bottomley
2020-08-10 17:57                           ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-10 23:36                       ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-11  5:43                         ` James Bottomley
2020-08-11 14:48                           ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-11 15:32                             ` James Bottomley
2020-08-11 19:30                               ` Pavel Machek
2020-08-12 14:45                               ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-11 15:53                             ` James Bottomley
2020-08-12 14:15                               ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-12 15:51                                 ` James Bottomley
2020-08-13 14:42                                   ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-13 15:10                                     ` James Bottomley
2020-08-14 14:21                                       ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-11 18:28                             ` James Bottomley
2020-08-12 13:56                               ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-12 15:42                                 ` James Bottomley
2020-08-13 14:21                                   ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-13 14:42                                     ` James Bottomley
2020-08-13 14:56                                       ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-11 21:03                   ` James Morris
2020-08-12 14:18                     ` Chuck Lever
2020-08-12 17:07                       ` Deven Bowers

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