linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: lsf-pc@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
	"Schofield, Alison" <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	"Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@oracle.com>,
	Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [LSF/MM TOPIC] Memory Encryption on top of filesystems
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 07:51:12 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a9b9af61-d4cb-46c2-8e98-256565dcf389@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcyv4g4vF84Ufrdv8ocwfW3hrvUJ_GaF65AbZyXzaZJQVMjEw@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/12/19 7:31 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> Thanks, yes, fscrypt needs a closer look. As far I can see at a quick
> glance fscrypt has the same physical block inputs for the encryption
> algorithm as MKTME so it seems it could be crafted as a drop in
> accelerator for fscrypt for pmem block devices.

One bummer is that we have the platform tweak offsets to worry about.
As far as I know, those are opaque to software and practically prevent
us from replicating the MKTME hardware's encryption/decryption in software.

Unless we can get around that, I think it rules out being a drop-in
replacement for any software-driven encryption.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-02-13 15:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-12 16:55 [LSF/MM TOPIC] Memory Encryption on top of filesystems Dave Hansen
2019-02-12 23:51 ` Dave Chinner
2019-02-13  0:27   ` Dan Williams
2019-02-13  2:13     ` Dave Chinner
2019-02-13  3:31       ` Dan Williams
2019-02-13 15:43         ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-02-13 15:51         ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2019-02-13 20:21           ` Dave Chinner
2019-02-13 20:29             ` Dave Hansen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=a9b9af61-d4cb-46c2-8e98-256565dcf389@intel.com \
    --to=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=alison.schofield@intel.com \
    --cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=darrick.wong@oracle.com \
    --cc=david@fromorbit.com \
    --cc=hch@infradead.org \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=jaegeuk@kernel.org \
    --cc=kirill.shutemov@intel.com \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=lsf-pc@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).