From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>,
DaeSeok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
vdavydov@parallels.com, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Deter exploit bruteforcing
Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2015 23:53:55 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1501022351570.16297@pobox.suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1501022348070.16297@pobox.suse.cz>
On Fri, 2 Jan 2015, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> > > You also want to protect against binaries that are evil on purpose,
> > > right?
> >
> > Umm. No. Not by default. We don't want to break crashme or trinity by
> > default.
>
> I thought trinity is issuing syscalls directly (would make more sense than
> going through glibc, wouldn't it?) ... haven't checked the source though.
Okay, I checked, it is. Now I get your point. Seems like "too much pain
for little gain" though. So it really should be optional, so that
potentially exposed systems (such as hosting servers, where things like
trinity are not expected to be run) could turn it on voluntarily.
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-01-02 22:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-12-24 21:39 [PATCH] [RFC] Deter exploit bruteforcing Richard Weinberger
2014-12-30 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2014-12-30 18:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-12-30 18:50 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-02 5:11 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 11:00 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-02 19:46 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 21:40 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-02 22:29 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 22:32 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-01-02 22:46 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 22:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-01-02 22:53 ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2015-01-02 22:54 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-02 23:00 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-02 23:08 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-03 9:45 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-03 22:36 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-03 22:44 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-03 23:01 ` Pavel Machek
2015-01-03 23:07 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-03 23:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-01-03 23:19 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-01-05 22:56 ` Kees Cook
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