From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Deter exploit bruteforcing
Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2015 23:53:55 +0100 (CET)
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Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>,
	DaeSeok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, vdavydov@parallels.com,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
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On Fri, 2 Jan 2015, Jiri Kosina wrote:

> > > You also want to protect against binaries that are evil on purpose,
> > > right?
> > 
> > Umm. No. Not by default. We don't want to break crashme or trinity by
> > default.
> 
> I thought trinity is issuing syscalls directly (would make more sense than 
> going through glibc, wouldn't it?) ... haven't checked the source though.

Okay, I checked, it is. Now I get your point. Seems like "too much pain 
for little gain" though. So it really should be optional, so that 
potentially exposed systems (such as hosting servers, where things like 
trinity are not expected to be run) could turn it on voluntarily.

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs