From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from namei.org ([65.99.196.166]:34642 "EHLO namei.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725936AbeJBCyl (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Oct 2018 22:54:41 -0400 Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 06:14:46 +1000 (AEST) From: James Morris To: =?ISO-8859-15?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= cc: Jann Horn , cyphar@cyphar.com, jlayton@kernel.org, Bruce Fields , Al Viro , Arnd Bergmann , shuah@kernel.org, David Howells , Andy Lutomirski , christian@brauner.io, "Eric W. Biederman" , Tycho Andersen , kernel list , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, dev@opencontainers.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-security-module , Kees Cook , Linux API Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] namei: implement various scoping AT_* flags In-Reply-To: <0ca12a6e-a86b-5d50-40b9-e76c1a4bc6a0@digikod.net> Message-ID: References: <20180929103453.12025-1-cyphar@cyphar.com> <39d64180-73d5-6f27-e455-956143a5b5d3@digikod.net> <0ca12a6e-a86b-5d50-40b9-e76c1a4bc6a0@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="1665246916-1069902232-1538424886=:14406" Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text, while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools. --1665246916-1069902232-1538424886=:14406 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT On Mon, 1 Oct 2018, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Another way to apply a security policy could be to tied it to a file > descriptor, similarly to Capsicum, which could enable to create > programmable (real) capabilities. This way, it would be possible to > "wrap" a file descriptor with a Landlock program and use it with > FD-based syscalls or pass it to other processes. This would not require > changes to the FS subsystem, but only the Landlock LSM code. This isn't > done yet but I plan to add this new way to restrict operations on file > descriptors. Very interesting! This could possibly be an LSM which stacks/integrates with other LSMs to enforce MAC of object capabilities. > > Anyway, for the use case you mentioned, the AT_BENEATH flag(s) should be > simple to use and enough for now. We must be careful of the hardcoded > policy though. > > > > > >> On 9/29/18 12:34, Aleksa Sarai wrote: > >>> The need for some sort of control over VFS's path resolution (to avoid > >>> malicious paths resulting in inadvertent breakouts) has been a very > >>> long-standing desire of many userspace applications. This patchset is a > >>> revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[1] patchset with a few additions. > >>> > >>> The most obvious change is that AT_NO_JUMPS has been split as dicussed > >>> in the original thread, along with a further split of AT_NO_PROCLINKS > >>> which means that each individual property of AT_NO_JUMPS is now a > >>> separate flag: > >>> > >>> * Path-based escapes from the starting-point using "/" or ".." are > >>> blocked by AT_BENEATH. > >>> * Mountpoint crossings are blocked by AT_XDEV. > >>> * /proc/$pid/fd/$fd resolution is blocked by AT_NO_PROCLINKS (more > >>> correctly it actually blocks any user of nd_jump_link() because it > >>> allows out-of-VFS path resolution manipulation). > >>> > >>> AT_NO_JUMPS is now effectively (AT_BENEATH|AT_XDEV|AT_NO_PROCLINKS). At > >>> Linus' suggestion in the original thread, I've also implemented > >>> AT_NO_SYMLINKS which just denies _all_ symlink resolution (including > >>> "proclink" resolution). > >>> > >>> An additional improvement was made to AT_XDEV. The original AT_NO_JUMPS > >>> path didn't consider "/tmp/.." as a mountpoint crossing -- this patch > >>> blocks this as well (feel free to ask me to remove it if you feel this > >>> is not sane). > >>> > >>> Currently I've only enabled these for openat(2) and the stat(2) family. > >>> I would hope we could enable it for basically every *at(2) syscall -- > >>> but many of them appear to not have a @flags argument and thus we'll > >>> need to add several new syscalls to do this. I'm more than happy to send > >>> those patches, but I'd prefer to know that this preliminary work is > >>> acceptable before doing a bunch of copy-paste to add new sets of *at(2) > >>> syscalls. > >>> > >>> One additional feature I've implemented is AT_THIS_ROOT (I imagine this > >>> is probably going to be more contentious than the refresh of > >>> AT_NO_JUMPS, so I've included it in a separate patch). The patch itself > >>> describes my reasoning, but the shortened version of the premise is that > >>> continer runtimes need to have a way to resolve paths within a > >>> potentially malicious rootfs. Container runtimes currently do this in > >>> userspace[2] which has implicit race conditions that are not resolvable > >>> in userspace (or use fork+exec+chroot and SCM_RIGHTS passing which is > >>> inefficient). AT_THIS_ROOT allows for per-call chroot-like semantics for > >>> path resolution, which would be invaluable for us -- and the > >>> implementation is basically identical to AT_BENEATH (except that we > >>> don't return errors when someone actually hits the root). > >>> > >>> I've added some selftests for this, but it's not clear to me whether > >>> they should live here or in xfstests (as far as I can tell there are no > >>> other VFS tests in selftests, while there are some tests that look like > >>> generic VFS tests in xfstests). If you'd prefer them to be included in > >>> xfstests, let me know. > >>> > >>> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/784221/ > >>> [2]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin > >>> > >>> Aleksa Sarai (3): > >>> namei: implement O_BENEATH-style AT_* flags > >>> namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution > >>> selftests: vfs: add AT_* path resolution tests > >>> > >>> fs/fcntl.c | 2 +- > >>> fs/namei.c | 158 ++++++++++++------ > >>> fs/open.c | 10 ++ > >>> fs/stat.c | 15 +- > >>> include/linux/fcntl.h | 3 +- > >>> include/linux/namei.h | 8 + > >>> include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 20 +++ > >>> include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 10 ++ > >>> tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/.gitignore | 1 + > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/Makefile | 13 ++ > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/at_flags.h | 40 +++++ > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/common.sh | 37 ++++ > >>> .../selftests/vfs/tests/0001_at_beneath.sh | 72 ++++++++ > >>> .../selftests/vfs/tests/0002_at_xdev.sh | 54 ++++++ > >>> .../vfs/tests/0003_at_no_proclinks.sh | 50 ++++++ > >>> .../vfs/tests/0004_at_no_symlinks.sh | 49 ++++++ > >>> .../selftests/vfs/tests/0005_at_this_root.sh | 66 ++++++++ > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/vfs_helper.c | 154 +++++++++++++++++ > >>> 19 files changed, 707 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/.gitignore > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/Makefile > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/at_flags.h > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/common.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0001_at_beneath.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0002_at_xdev.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0003_at_no_proclinks.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0004_at_no_symlinks.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0005_at_this_root.sh > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/vfs_helper.c > >>> > >> > > > > > > -- James Morris --1665246916-1069902232-1538424886=:14406--