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From: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
To: Johannes Thumshirn <jth@kernel.org>, David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>,
	Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] btrfs: add authentication support
Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 17:43:32 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bcd4e839-36ac-9be5-e5e7-613124385177@gmx.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200428105859.4719-2-jth@kernel.org>


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On 2020/4/28 下午6:58, Johannes Thumshirn wrote:
> From: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
> 
> Add authentication support for a BTRFS file-system.
> 
> This works, because in BTRFS every meta-data block as well as every
> data-block has a own checksum. For meta-data the checksum is in the
> meta-data node itself. For data blocks, the checksums are stored in the
> checksum tree.
> 
> When replacing the checksum algorithm with a keyed hash, like HMAC(SHA256),
> a key is needed to mount a verified file-system. This key also needs to be
> used at file-system creation time.
> 
> We have to used a keyed hash scheme, in contrast to doing a normal
> cryptographic hash, to guarantee integrity of the file system, as a
> potential attacker could just replay file-system operations and the
> changes would go unnoticed.
> 
> Having a keyed hash only on the topmost Node of a tree or even just in the
> super-block and using cryptographic hashes on the normal meta-data nodes
> and checksum tree entries doesn't work either, as the BTRFS B-Tree's Nodes
> do not include the checksums of their respective child nodes, but only the
> block pointers and offsets where to find them on disk.
> 
> Also note, we do not need a incompat R/O flag for this, because if an old
> kernel tries to mount an authenticated file-system it will fail the
> initial checksum type verification and thus refuses to mount.
> 
> The key has to be supplied by the kernel's keyring and the method of
> getting the key securely into the kernel is not subject of this patch.
> 
> Example usage:
> Create a file-system with authentication key 0123456
> mkfs.btrfs --csum hmac-sha256 --auth-key 0123456 /dev/disk
> 
> Add the key to the kernel's keyring as keyid 'btrfs:foo'
> keyctl add logon btrfs:foo 0123456 @u
> 
> Mount the fs using the 'btrfs:foo' key
> mount -t btrfs -o auth_key=btrfs:foo /dev/disk /mnt/point
> 
> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>

Looks pretty straight forward, and has the basic protection against
re-writing all csum attack.

So looks good to me.

But still I have one question around the device scan part.

Since now superblock can only be read after verified the csum, it means
without auth_key mount option, device scan won't even work properly.

Do you assume that all such hmac protected multi-device btrfs must be
mounted using device= mount option along with auth_key?
If so, a lot of users won't be that happy afaik.

Thanks,
Qu

> ---
>  fs/btrfs/ctree.c                |  3 ++-
>  fs/btrfs/ctree.h                |  2 ++
>  fs/btrfs/disk-io.c              | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  fs/btrfs/super.c                | 24 ++++++++++++++++---
>  include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h |  1 +
>  5 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
> index 6c28efe5b14a..76418b5b00a6 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
> @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static void del_ptr(struct btrfs_root *root, struct btrfs_path *path,
>  
>  static const struct btrfs_csums {
>  	u16		size;
> -	const char	name[10];
> +	const char	name[12];
>  	const char	driver[12];
>  } btrfs_csums[] = {
>  	[BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_CRC32] = { .size = 4, .name = "crc32c" },
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static const struct btrfs_csums {
>  	[BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_SHA256] = { .size = 32, .name = "sha256" },
>  	[BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_BLAKE2] = { .size = 32, .name = "blake2b",
>  				     .driver = "blake2b-256" },
> +	[BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256] = { .size = 32, .name = "hmac(sha256)" }
>  };
>  
>  int btrfs_super_csum_size(const struct btrfs_super_block *s)
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
> index c79e0b0eac54..b692b3dc4593 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
> @@ -719,6 +719,7 @@ struct btrfs_fs_info {
>  	struct rb_root swapfile_pins;
>  
>  	struct crypto_shash *csum_shash;
> +	char *auth_key_name;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Number of send operations in progress.
> @@ -1027,6 +1028,7 @@ static inline u32 BTRFS_MAX_XATTR_SIZE(const struct btrfs_fs_info *info)
>  #define BTRFS_MOUNT_NOLOGREPLAY		(1 << 27)
>  #define BTRFS_MOUNT_REF_VERIFY		(1 << 28)
>  #define BTRFS_MOUNT_DISCARD_ASYNC	(1 << 29)
> +#define BTRFS_MOUNT_AUTH_KEY		(1 << 30)
>  
>  #define BTRFS_DEFAULT_COMMIT_INTERVAL	(30)
>  #define BTRFS_DEFAULT_MAX_INLINE	(2048)
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
> index d10c7be10f3b..fe403fb62178 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
>  #include <linux/error-injection.h>
>  #include <linux/crc32c.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
> +#include <keys/user-type.h>
>  #include <asm/unaligned.h>
>  #include <crypto/hash.h>
>  #include "ctree.h"
> @@ -339,6 +340,7 @@ static bool btrfs_supported_super_csum(u16 csum_type)
>  	case BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_XXHASH:
>  	case BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_SHA256:
>  	case BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_BLAKE2:
> +	case BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256:
>  		return true;
>  	default:
>  		return false;
> @@ -2187,6 +2189,9 @@ static int btrfs_init_csum_hash(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u16 csum_type)
>  {
>  	struct crypto_shash *csum_shash;
>  	const char *csum_driver = btrfs_super_csum_driver(csum_type);
> +	struct key *key;
> +	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
> +	int err = 0;
>  
>  	csum_shash = crypto_alloc_shash(csum_driver, 0, 0);
>  
> @@ -2198,7 +2203,53 @@ static int btrfs_init_csum_hash(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u16 csum_type)
>  
>  	fs_info->csum_shash = csum_shash;
>  
> -	return 0;
> +	/*
> +	 * if we're not doing authentication, we're done by now. Still we have
> +	 * to validate the possible combinations of BTRFS_MOUNT_AUTH_KEY and
> +	 * keyed hashes.
> +	 */
> +	if (csum_type == BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256 &&
> +	    !btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, AUTH_KEY)) {
> +		crypto_free_shash(fs_info->csum_shash);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	} else if (btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, AUTH_KEY)
> +		   && csum_type != BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256) {
> +		crypto_free_shash(fs_info->csum_shash);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	} else if (!btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, AUTH_KEY)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * This is the normal case, if noone want's authentication and
> +		 * doesn't have a keyed hash, we're done.
> +		 */
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	key = request_key(&key_type_logon, fs_info->auth_key_name, NULL);
> +	if (IS_ERR(key))
> +		return PTR_ERR(key);
> +
> +	down_read(&key->sem);
> +
> +	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
> +	if (!ukp) {
> +		btrfs_err(fs_info, "");
> +		err = -EKEYREVOKED;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	err = crypto_shash_setkey(fs_info->csum_shash, ukp->data, ukp->datalen);
> +	if (err)
> +		btrfs_err(fs_info, "error setting key %s for verification",
> +			  fs_info->auth_key_name);
> +
> +out:
> +	if (err)
> +		crypto_free_shash(fs_info->csum_shash);
> +
> +	up_read(&key->sem);
> +	key_put(key);
> +
> +	return err;
>  }
>  
>  static int btrfs_replay_log(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c
> index 7932d8d07cff..2645a9cee8d1 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c
> @@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ enum {
>  	Opt_treelog, Opt_notreelog,
>  	Opt_usebackuproot,
>  	Opt_user_subvol_rm_allowed,
> +	Opt_auth_key,
>  
>  	/* Deprecated options */
>  	Opt_alloc_start,
> @@ -401,6 +402,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
>  	{Opt_notreelog, "notreelog"},
>  	{Opt_usebackuproot, "usebackuproot"},
>  	{Opt_user_subvol_rm_allowed, "user_subvol_rm_allowed"},
> +	{Opt_auth_key, "auth_key=%s"},
>  
>  	/* Deprecated options */
>  	{Opt_alloc_start, "alloc_start=%s"},
> @@ -910,7 +912,8 @@ int btrfs_parse_options(struct btrfs_fs_info *info, char *options,
>   * All other options will be parsed on much later in the mount process and
>   * only when we need to allocate a new super block.
>   */
> -static int btrfs_parse_device_options(const char *options, fmode_t flags,
> +static int btrfs_parse_device_options(struct btrfs_fs_info *info,
> +				      const char *options, fmode_t flags,
>  				      void *holder)
>  {
>  	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> @@ -939,7 +942,8 @@ static int btrfs_parse_device_options(const char *options, fmode_t flags,
>  			continue;
>  
>  		token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
> -		if (token == Opt_device) {
> +		switch (token) {
> +		case Opt_device:
>  			device_name = match_strdup(&args[0]);
>  			if (!device_name) {
>  				error = -ENOMEM;
> @@ -952,6 +956,18 @@ static int btrfs_parse_device_options(const char *options, fmode_t flags,
>  				error = PTR_ERR(device);
>  				goto out;
>  			}
> +			break;
> +		case Opt_auth_key:
> +			info->auth_key_name = match_strdup(&args[0]);
> +			if (!info->auth_key_name) {
> +				error = -ENOMEM;
> +				goto out;
> +			}
> +			btrfs_info(info, "doing authentication");
> +			btrfs_set_opt(info->mount_opt, AUTH_KEY);
> +			break;
> +		default:
> +			break;
>  		}
>  	}
>  
> @@ -1394,6 +1410,8 @@ static int btrfs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry)
>  #endif
>  	if (btrfs_test_opt(info, REF_VERIFY))
>  		seq_puts(seq, ",ref_verify");
> +	if (btrfs_test_opt(info, AUTH_KEY))
> +		seq_printf(seq, ",auth_key=%s", info->auth_key_name);
>  	seq_printf(seq, ",subvolid=%llu",
>  		  BTRFS_I(d_inode(dentry))->root->root_key.objectid);
>  	seq_puts(seq, ",subvol=");
> @@ -1542,7 +1560,7 @@ static struct dentry *btrfs_mount_root(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
>  	}
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&uuid_mutex);
> -	error = btrfs_parse_device_options(data, mode, fs_type);
> +	error = btrfs_parse_device_options(fs_info, data, mode, fs_type);
>  	if (error) {
>  		mutex_unlock(&uuid_mutex);
>  		goto error_fs_info;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h b/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h
> index a02318e4d2a9..bfaf127b37fd 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h
> @@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ enum btrfs_csum_type {
>  	BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_XXHASH	= 1,
>  	BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_SHA256	= 2,
>  	BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_BLAKE2	= 3,
> +	BTRFS_CSUM_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256 = 32,
>  };
>  
>  /*
> 


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-05  9:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-28 10:58 [PATCH v2 0/2] Add file-system authentication to BTRFS Johannes Thumshirn
2020-04-28 10:58 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] btrfs: add authentication support Johannes Thumshirn
2020-04-29  7:23   ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-29 11:46   ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-01  5:39   ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-01  6:30     ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-04  8:38       ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-05 22:33         ` David Sterba
2020-05-06  8:10           ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-04 10:09     ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-04 20:59       ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-05  8:11         ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-05  9:26           ` Qu Wenruo
2020-05-05  9:59             ` Qu Wenruo
2020-05-05 22:32               ` David Sterba
2020-05-05 23:55                 ` Qu Wenruo
2020-05-06 20:40             ` btree [was Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] btrfs: add authentication support] Goffredo Baroncelli
2020-05-05 22:19           ` [PATCH v2 1/2] btrfs: add authentication support David Sterba
2020-05-05 22:37           ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-06  8:30             ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-05 22:14         ` David Sterba
2020-05-05 22:31           ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-05 22:46             ` David Sterba
2020-05-05 23:31               ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-06  0:29                 ` David Sterba
2020-05-06  0:44                   ` Eric Biggers
2020-05-04 21:37       ` Richard Weinberger
2020-05-05  7:46         ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-05 11:56           ` Richard Weinberger
2020-05-04 21:59   ` Richard Weinberger
2020-05-05  7:55     ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-05 12:36       ` Jeff Mahoney
2020-05-05 12:39         ` Qu Wenruo
2020-05-05 12:41           ` Jeff Mahoney
2020-05-05 12:48             ` Qu Wenruo
2020-05-05 23:02           ` David Sterba
2020-05-06 21:24         ` Goffredo Baroncelli
2020-05-05 23:00     ` David Sterba
2020-05-05  9:43   ` Qu Wenruo [this message]
2020-05-06 20:59     ` Goffredo Baroncelli
2020-04-28 10:58 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] btrfs: rename btrfs_parse_device_options back to btrfs_parse_early_options Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-01  6:03 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] Add file-system authentication to BTRFS Eric Biggers
2020-05-04  8:39   ` Johannes Thumshirn
2020-05-05 23:16   ` David Sterba
2020-05-01 21:26 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2020-05-05 23:38   ` David Sterba

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