From: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
To: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>,
Linux Kernel Mailinglist <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux FSDEVEL Mailinglist <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/open: Fix most outstanding security bugs
Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2019 17:14:20 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d117fb1a-45e4-a553-082e-36112dfbbf8a@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190401090113.22946-1-jthumshirn@suse.de>
On 1.04.19 г. 12:01 ч., Johannes Thumshirn wrote:
> Over the last 20 years, the Linux kernel has accumulated hundreds if not
> thousands of security vulnerabilities.
>
> One common pattern in most of these security related reports is processes
> called "syzkaller", "trinity" or "syz-executor" opening files and then
> abuse kernel interfaces causing kernel crashes or even worse threats using
> memory overwrites or by exploiting race conditions.
>
> Hunting down these bugs has become time consuming and very expensive, so
> I've decided to put an end to it.
>
> If one of the above mentioned processes tries opening a file, return -EPERM
> indicating this process does not have the permission to open files on Linux
> anymore.
>
> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Ack-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
> ---
> fs/open.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index f1c2f855fd43..3a3b460beccd 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -1056,6 +1056,20 @@ long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
> struct open_flags op;
> int fd = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
> struct filename *tmp;
> + char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
> + int i;
> + static const char * const list[] = {
> + "syzkaller",
> + "syz-executor,"
> + "trinity",
> + NULL
> + };
> +
> + get_task_comm(comm, current);
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(list); i++)
> + if (!strncmp(comm, list[i], strlen(list[i])))
> + return -EPERM;
>
> if (fd)
> return fd;
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-01 14:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-01 9:01 [PATCH] fs/open: Fix most outstanding security bugs Johannes Thumshirn
2019-04-01 11:22 ` Matthew Wilcox
2019-04-01 11:48 ` Johannes Thumshirn
2019-04-01 11:53 ` Mukesh Ojha
2019-04-01 13:04 ` Torsten Duwe
2019-04-01 14:14 ` Nikolay Borisov [this message]
2019-04-01 17:28 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-04-01 21:27 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-01 17:38 ` Eric Biggers
2019-04-01 20:35 ` Darrick J. Wong
2019-04-02 7:56 ` Jessica Yu
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