From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
"Christian Heimes" <christian@python.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Deven Bowers" <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Eric Chiang" <ericchiang@google.com>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Lakshmi Ramasubramanian" <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
"Miklos Szeredi" <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
"Philippe Trébuchet" <philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Scott Shell" <scottsh@microsoft.com>,
"Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Steve Dower" <steve.dower@python.org>,
"Steve Grubb" <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
"Thibaut Sautereau" <thibaut.sautereau@clip-os.org>,
"Vincent Strubel" <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Thibaut Sautereau" <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2)
Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2020 08:28:15 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d216615b48c093ebe9349a9dab3830b646575391.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200908075956.1069018-2-mic@digikod.net>
Hi Mickael,
On Tue, 2020-09-08 at 09:59 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index 9af548fb841b..879bdfbdc6fa 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -405,9 +405,13 @@ static long do_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode, int fla
> if (mode & ~S_IRWXO) /* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - if (flags & ~(AT_EACCESS | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH))
> + if (flags & ~(AT_EACCESS | AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH |
> + AT_INTERPRETED))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /* Only allows X_OK with AT_INTERPRETED for now. */
> + if ((flags & AT_INTERPRETED) && !(mode & S_IXOTH))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
> lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
> if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
> @@ -426,7 +430,30 @@ static long do_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode, int fla
>
> inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
>
> - if ((mode & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
> + if ((flags & AT_INTERPRETED)) {
> + /*
> + * For compatibility reasons, without a defined security policy
> + * (via sysctl or LSM), using AT_INTERPRETED must map the
> + * execute permission to the read permission. Indeed, from
> + * user space point of view, being able to execute data (e.g.
> + * scripts) implies to be able to read this data.
> + *
> + * The MAY_INTERPRETED_EXEC bit is set to enable LSMs to add
> + * custom checks, while being compatible with current policies.
> + */
> + if ((mode & MAY_EXEC)) {
Why is the ISREG() test being dropped? Without dropping it, there
would be no reason for making the existing test an "else" clause.
> + mode |= MAY_INTERPRETED_EXEC;
> + /*
> + * For compatibility reasons, if the system-wide policy
> + * doesn't enforce file permission checks, then
> + * replaces the execute permission request with a read
> + * permission request.
> + */
> + mode &= ~MAY_EXEC;
> + /* To be executed *by* user space, files must be readable. */
> + mode |= MAY_READ;
After this change, I'm wondering if it makes sense to add a call to
security_file_permission(). IMA doesn't currently define it, but
could.
Mimi
> + }
> + } else if ((mode & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
> /*
> * MAY_EXEC on regular files is denied if the fs is mounted
> * with the "noexec" flag.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-08 19:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-08 7:59 [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC) Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-08 7:59 ` [RFC PATCH v8 1/3] fs: Introduce AT_INTERPRETED flag for faccessat2(2) Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-08 12:28 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-09-08 12:43 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-08 12:50 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-09-08 12:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-09-08 13:29 ` Mimi Zohar
[not found] ` <CAEjxPJ5evWDSv-T-p=4OX29Pr584ZRAsnYoxSRd4qFDoryB+fQ@mail.gmail.com>
2020-09-08 14:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-08 15:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-09-08 15:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-09-08 15:44 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-08 16:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-09-08 17:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-08 7:59 ` [RFC PATCH v8 2/3] fs,doc: Enable to configure exec checks for AT_INTERPRETED Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-08 7:59 ` [RFC PATCH v8 3/3] selftest/interpreter: Add tests for AT_INTERPRETED enforcing Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-08 18:50 ` [RFC PATCH v8 0/3] Add support for AT_INTERPRETED (was O_MAYEXEC) Al Viro
2020-09-09 7:19 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-09 17:08 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-09 17:55 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-10 9:26 ` Thibaut Sautereau
2020-09-09 17:13 ` Al Viro
2020-09-09 17:56 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-09-12 0:16 ` James Morris
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=d216615b48c093ebe9349a9dab3830b646575391.camel@linux.ibm.com \
--to=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=christian.brauner@ubuntu.com \
--cc=christian@python.org \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=cyphar@cyphar.com \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
--cc=ericchiang@google.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=mic@linux.microsoft.com \
--cc=mjg59@google.com \
--cc=mszeredi@redhat.com \
--cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
--cc=nramas@linux.microsoft.com \
--cc=penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp \
--cc=philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr \
--cc=scottsh@microsoft.com \
--cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=sgrubb@redhat.com \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
--cc=steve.dower@python.org \
--cc=thibaut.sautereau@clip-os.org \
--cc=thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr \
--cc=vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).