From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24D40C43334 for ; Wed, 1 Jun 2022 20:57:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230409AbiFAU5g (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Jun 2022 16:57:36 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46746 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230393AbiFAU5e (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Jun 2022 16:57:34 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D1D3E217603; Wed, 1 Jun 2022 13:57:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8F931B81C87; Wed, 1 Jun 2022 20:57:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8BA62C34119; Wed, 1 Jun 2022 20:57:29 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="W1hGuE+Z" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1654117047; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=JHmJzQ6KWsGuyagW7BSdOmTThtw2XY0PLg0NtkYD4to=; b=W1hGuE+ZEiX+I+VOckbOPx01nOpIsJC8xb6ufXiukgi50fSqw+kcApWuA7APMd6+J7ipqP Ydzp+RjAaJF48I2koNRAmp5tzOiVHZsB+yvMxWP3c266F80jYw37VHbH0VpcC8UwqvksWS 3HojZvTvf4weY3ZvHfTBupqE3Kz2+og= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id 908c7efb (TLSv1.3:AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Wed, 1 Jun 2022 20:57:27 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Dominik Brodowski , PaX Team , Emese Revfy Subject: [PATCH] random: always mix cycle counter in add_latent_entropy() Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2022 22:56:24 +0200 Message-Id: <20220601205624.92387-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org add_latent_entropy() is called every time a process forks, in kernel_clone(). This in turn calls add_device_randomness() using the latent entropy global state. add_device_randomness() does two things: 2) Mixes into the input pool the latent entropy argument passed; and 1) Mixes in a cycle counter, a sort of measurement of when the event took place, the high precision bits of which are presumably difficult to predict. (2) is impossible without CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=y. But (1) is always possible. However, currently CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=n disables both (1) and (2), instead of just (2). This commit causes the CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=n case to still do (1) by passing NULL (len 0) to add_device_randomness() when add_latent_ entropy() is called. Cc: Dominik Brodowski Cc: PaX Team Cc: Emese Revfy Fixes: 38addce8b600 ("gcc-plugins: Add latent_entropy plugin") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- include/linux/random.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index fae0c84027fd..5880da3f5b5b 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -19,14 +19,14 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy); -#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { +#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy)); -} #else -static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { } + add_device_randomness(NULL, 0); #endif +} #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID) void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len); -- 2.35.1