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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
	Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>,
	"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>,
	Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 06/82] overflow: Reintroduce signed and unsigned overflow sanitizers
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:26:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240123002814.1396804-6-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240122235208.work.748-kees@kernel.org>

Effectively revert commit 6aaa31aeb9cf ("ubsan: remove overflow
checks"), to allow the kernel to be built with the "*-overflow"
sanitizers again. This gives developers a chance to experiment[1][2][3]
with the instrumentation again, while dealing with the impact of
-fno-strict-oveflow.

Notably, the naming of the options is adjusted to use the name "WRAP"
instead of "OVERFLOW". In the strictest sense, arithmetic "overflow"
happens when a result exceeds the storage of the type, and is considered
by the C standard and compilers to be undefined behavior for signed
and pointer types (without -fno-strict-overflow). Unsigned arithmetic
overflow is defined as always wrapping around.

Because the kernel is built with -fno-strict-overflow, signed and pointer
arithmetic is defined to always wrap around instead of "overflowing"
(which would either be elided due to being undefined behavior or would
wrap around, which led to very weird bugs in the kernel).

So, the config options are added back as CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP and
CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP. Since the kernel has several places that
explicitly depend on wrap-around behavior (e.g. counters, atomics, etc),
also introduce the __signed_wrap and __unsigned_wrap function attributes
for annotating functions where wrapping is expected and should not
be caught. This will allow us to distinguish in the kernel between
intentional and unintentional cases of arithmetic wrap-around.

Additionally keep these disabled under CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST for now.

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [1]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/27 [2]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/344 [3]
Cc: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>
Cc: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Documentation/process/deprecated.rst |  4 ++
 include/linux/compiler_types.h       | 14 +++++-
 lib/Kconfig.ubsan                    | 19 ++++++++
 lib/test_ubsan.c                     | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/ubsan.c                          | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/ubsan.h                          |  4 ++
 scripts/Makefile.ubsan               |  2 +
 7 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
index 270f3af13b86..aebd7c6cd2fc 100644
--- a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
+++ b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
@@ -141,6 +141,10 @@ replaced with a type max subtraction test instead::
 	...
 	if (INT_MAX - var < offset) ...
 
+For inline helpers that are performing wrapping arithmetic, the entire
+function can be annotated as intentionally wrapping by adding the
+`__signed_wrap` or `__unsigned_wrap` function attribute.
+
 simple_strtol(), simple_strtoll(), simple_strtoul(), simple_strtoull()
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
 The simple_strtol(), simple_strtoll(),
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler_types.h b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
index d27b58fddfaa..d24f43fc79c6 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
@@ -282,11 +282,23 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
 #define __no_sanitize_or_inline __always_inline
 #endif
 
+/* Allow wrapping arithmetic within an annotated function. */
+#ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP
+# define __signed_wrap __attribute__((no_sanitize("signed-integer-overflow")))
+#else
+# define __signed_wrap
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP
+# define __unsigned_wrap __attribute__((no_sanitize("unsigned-integer-overflow")))
+#else
+# define __unsigned_wrap
+#endif
+
 /* Section for code which can't be instrumented at all */
 #define __noinstr_section(section)					\
 	noinline notrace __attribute((__section__(section)))		\
 	__no_kcsan __no_sanitize_address __no_profile __no_sanitize_coverage \
-	__no_sanitize_memory
+	__no_sanitize_memory __signed_wrap __unsigned_wrap
 
 #define noinstr __noinstr_section(".noinstr.text")
 
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
index 59e21bfec188..a7003e5bd2a1 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
@@ -116,6 +116,25 @@ config UBSAN_UNREACHABLE
 	  This option enables -fsanitize=unreachable which checks for control
 	  flow reaching an expected-to-be-unreachable position.
 
+config UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP
+	bool "Perform checking for signed arithmetic wrap-around"
+	default UBSAN
+	depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+	depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow)
+	help
+	  This option enables -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow which checks
+	  for wrap-around of any arithmetic operations with signed integers.
+
+config UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP
+	bool "Perform checking for unsigned arithmetic wrap-around"
+	depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow)
+	depends on !X86_32 # avoid excessive stack usage on x86-32/clang
+	depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+	help
+	  This option enables -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow which checks
+	  for wrap-around of any arithmetic operations with unsigned integers. This
+	  currently causes x86 to fail to boot.
+
 config UBSAN_BOOL
 	bool "Perform checking for non-boolean values used as boolean"
 	default UBSAN
diff --git a/lib/test_ubsan.c b/lib/test_ubsan.c
index 2062be1f2e80..84d8092d6c32 100644
--- a/lib/test_ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/test_ubsan.c
@@ -11,6 +11,51 @@ typedef void(*test_ubsan_fp)(void);
 			#config, IS_ENABLED(config) ? "y" : "n");	\
 	} while (0)
 
+static void test_ubsan_add_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = INT_MAX;
+	volatile unsigned int uval = UINT_MAX;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP);
+	val += 2;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP);
+	uval += 2;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_sub_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = INT_MIN;
+	volatile unsigned int uval = 0;
+	volatile int val2 = 2;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP);
+	val -= val2;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP);
+	uval -= val2;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_mul_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = INT_MAX / 2;
+	volatile unsigned int uval = UINT_MAX / 2;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP);
+	val *= 3;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP);
+	uval *= 3;
+}
+
+static void test_ubsan_negate_overflow(void)
+{
+	volatile int val = INT_MIN;
+
+	UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP);
+	val = -val;
+}
+
 static void test_ubsan_divrem_overflow(void)
 {
 	volatile int val = 16;
@@ -90,6 +135,10 @@ static void test_ubsan_misaligned_access(void)
 }
 
 static const test_ubsan_fp test_ubsan_array[] = {
+	test_ubsan_add_overflow,
+	test_ubsan_sub_overflow,
+	test_ubsan_mul_overflow,
+	test_ubsan_negate_overflow,
 	test_ubsan_shift_out_of_bounds,
 	test_ubsan_out_of_bounds,
 	test_ubsan_load_invalid_value,
diff --git a/lib/ubsan.c b/lib/ubsan.c
index df4f8d1354bb..5fc107f61934 100644
--- a/lib/ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/ubsan.c
@@ -222,6 +222,74 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
 	check_panic_on_warn("UBSAN");
 }
 
+static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
+			void *rhs, char op)
+{
+
+	struct type_descriptor *type = data->type;
+	char lhs_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
+	char rhs_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
+
+	if (suppress_report(&data->location))
+		return;
+
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, type_is_signed(type) ?
+			"signed-integer-overflow" :
+			"unsigned-integer-overflow");
+
+	val_to_string(lhs_val_str, sizeof(lhs_val_str), type, lhs);
+	val_to_string(rhs_val_str, sizeof(rhs_val_str), type, rhs);
+	pr_err("%s %c %s cannot be represented in type %s\n",
+		lhs_val_str,
+		op,
+		rhs_val_str,
+		type->type_name);
+
+	ubsan_epilogue();
+}
+
+void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(void *data,
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
+{
+
+	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '+');
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_add_overflow);
+
+void __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow(void *data,
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
+{
+	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '-');
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_sub_overflow);
+
+void __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow(void *data,
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
+{
+	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '*');
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_mul_overflow);
+
+void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(void *_data, void *old_val)
+{
+	struct overflow_data *data = _data;
+	char old_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
+
+	if (suppress_report(&data->location))
+		return;
+
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "negation-overflow");
+
+	val_to_string(old_val_str, sizeof(old_val_str), data->type, old_val);
+
+	pr_err("negation of %s cannot be represented in type %s:\n",
+		old_val_str, data->type->type_name);
+
+	ubsan_epilogue();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow);
+
+
 void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(void *_data, void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	struct overflow_data *data = _data;
diff --git a/lib/ubsan.h b/lib/ubsan.h
index 5d99ab81913b..0abbbac8700d 100644
--- a/lib/ubsan.h
+++ b/lib/ubsan.h
@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ typedef s64 s_max;
 typedef u64 u_max;
 #endif
 
+void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(void *data, void *lhs, void *rhs);
+void __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow(void *data, void *lhs, void *rhs);
+void __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow(void *data, void *lhs, void *rhs);
+void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(void *_data, void *old_val);
 void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(void *_data, void *lhs, void *rhs);
 void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, void *ptr);
 void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(void *_data, void *ptr);
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
index 4749865c1b2c..de4fc0ae448a 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS)	+= -fsanitize=local-bounds
 ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT)		+= -fsanitize=shift
 ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO)		+= -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero
 ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE)	+= -fsanitize=unreachable
+ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP)	+= -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow
+ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNSIGNED_WRAP)	+= -fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow
 ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL)		+= -fsanitize=bool
 ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM)		+= -fsanitize=enum
 ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP)		+= -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-23  0:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 163+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-23  0:26 [PATCH 00/82] overflow: Refactor open-coded arithmetic wrap-around Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 01/82] overflow: Expand check_add_overflow() for pointer addition Kees Cook
2024-01-26 22:52   ` Justin Stitt
2024-01-26 22:57     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 02/82] overflow: Introduce add_would_overflow() Kees Cook
2024-01-23  8:03   ` Rasmus Villemoes
2024-01-23 21:38     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 03/82] overflow: Introduce add_wrap() Kees Cook
2024-01-23  8:14   ` Rasmus Villemoes
2024-01-23 21:51     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  9:22   ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-23 21:52     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 04/82] docs: deprecated.rst: deprecate open-coded arithmetic wrap-around Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 05/82] cocci: Refactor " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-01-23  2:24   ` [PATCH 06/82] overflow: Reintroduce signed and unsigned overflow sanitizers Miguel Ojeda
2024-01-23  4:45     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23 11:20       ` Miguel Ojeda
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 07/82] overflow: Introduce CONFIG_UBSAN_POINTER_WRAP Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 08/82] iov_iter: Avoid wrap-around instrumentation in copy_compat_iovec_from_user Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 09/82] select: Avoid wrap-around instrumentation in do_sys_poll() Kees Cook
2024-01-23 18:00   ` Jan Kara
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 10/82] locking/atomic/x86: Silence intentional wrapping addition Kees Cook
2024-01-23  9:27   ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-23 21:54     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 11/82] arm64: atomics: lse: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  9:53   ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 12/82] ipv4: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 13/82] btrfs: Refactor intentional wrap-around calculation Kees Cook
2024-01-23  1:45   ` David Sterba
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 14/82] smb: client: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 15/82] dma-buf: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 16/82] drm/nouveau/mmu: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 17/82] drm/vc4: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 18/82] ext4: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 19/82] fs: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 18:01   ` Jan Kara
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 20/82] fpga: dfl: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 21/82] drivers/fsi: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 22/82] x86/sgx: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  9:15   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 23/82] KVM: " Kees Cook
2024-01-24 16:25   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-23  0:26 ` [PATCH 24/82] KVM: arm64: vgic: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 10:49   ` Marc Zyngier
2024-01-24 15:13     ` Eric Auger
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 25/82] KVM: SVM: " Kees Cook
2024-01-24 16:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 26/82] buildid: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 27/82] m68k: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  2:29   ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-01-23  8:13   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2024-01-23 13:29     ` Eero Tamminen
2024-01-23 13:42       ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 28/82] niu: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 29/82] rds: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 30/82] s390/kexec_file: " Kees Cook
2024-01-31 14:22   ` Alexander Gordeev
2024-01-31 14:40     ` Sven Schnelle
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 31/82] ARC: dw2 unwind: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 32/82] vringh: " Kees Cook
2024-01-26 19:31   ` Eugenio Perez Martin
2024-01-26 19:42     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 33/82] mm/vmalloc: " Kees Cook
2024-01-30 18:55   ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-01-30 19:54     ` Uladzislau Rezki
2024-01-30 21:57       ` Kees Cook
2024-01-31  9:44         ` Uladzislau Rezki
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 34/82] ipc: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  1:07   ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-23  1:38     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23 18:06       ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-23 19:00         ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 35/82] ACPI: custom_method: Refactor intentional wrap-around test Kees Cook
2024-01-24 19:52   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2024-01-24 20:16     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 36/82] agp: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 37/82] aio: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 15:30   ` Christian Brauner
2024-01-23 18:03   ` Jan Kara
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 38/82] arm: 3117/1: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  9:56   ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-23 22:41     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 39/82] crypto: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 40/82] arm64: stacktrace: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  9:58   ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 41/82] wil6210: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  6:36   ` Kalle Valo
2024-01-23 11:50   ` Kalle Valo
2024-01-23 22:52     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 42/82] bcachefs: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  6:36   ` Kent Overstreet
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 43/82] bpf: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  4:00   ` Yonghong Song
2024-01-23  4:07     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  5:13       ` Yonghong Song
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 44/82] btrfs: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 18:00   ` David Sterba
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 45/82] cifs: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 46/82] crypto: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  3:07   ` Eric Biggers
2024-01-23  3:29     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 47/82] dm verity: " Kees Cook
2024-01-30 18:58   ` Mike Snitzer
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 48/82] drm/nouveau/mmu: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 49/82] drm/i915: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 50/82] drm/vc4: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 51/82] ext4: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 52/82] f2fs: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 53/82] fs: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 18:02   ` Jan Kara
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 54/82] hpfs: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 55/82] kasan: " Kees Cook
2024-01-25 22:35   ` Andrey Konovalov
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 56/82] usercopy: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 57/82] KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 10:50   ` Marc Zyngier
2024-01-24 15:12   ` Eric Auger
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 58/82] s390/mm: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 59/82] lib/scatterlist: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 60/82] powerpc: " Kees Cook
2024-02-12  5:38   ` Michael Ellerman
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 61/82] scsi: mpt3sas: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 62/82] mwifiex: pcie: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  6:36   ` Kalle Valo
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 63/82] mm: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 64/82] netfilter: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 18:03   ` Florian Westphal
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 65/82] nios2: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 13:15   ` Dinh Nguyen
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 66/82] fs/ntfs3: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 67/82] ocfs2: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 68/82] PCI: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 69/82] perf tools: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  6:21   ` Adrian Hunter
2024-01-23 21:31     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 70/82] remoteproc: " Kees Cook
2024-02-06 18:55   ` Bjorn Andersson
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 71/82] s390/mm: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 72/82] scsi: sd_zbc: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 73/82] sh: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  7:31   ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 74/82] ARC: dw2 unwind: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 75/82] timekeeping: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  1:06   ` John Stultz
2024-01-24 19:34   ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 76/82] udf: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23 17:14   ` Jan Kara
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 77/82] virtio: " Kees Cook
2024-01-26 19:33   ` Eugenio Perez Martin
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 78/82] mm/vmalloc: " Kees Cook
2024-01-30 18:56   ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 79/82] staging: vme_user: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 80/82] xen-netback: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  7:55   ` Jan Beulich
2024-01-23 21:32     ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 81/82] lib: zstd: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  0:27 ` [PATCH 82/82] mqueue: " Kees Cook
2024-01-23  2:22 ` [PATCH 00/82] overflow: Refactor open-coded arithmetic wrap-around Kent Overstreet
2024-01-23  2:51   ` Kees Cook
2024-01-23  9:46 ` Mark Rutland
2024-01-23 21:56   ` Kees Cook
2024-01-29  6:27   ` Kees Cook

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