From: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> To: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>, Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, vkuznets <vkuznets@redhat.com>, "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>, "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>, "linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org>, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "stable@kernel.org" <stable@kernel.org>, KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>, Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>, Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others() Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2020 14:58:51 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201005145851.hdyaeqo3celt2wtr@liuwe-devbox-debian-v2> (raw) In-Reply-To: <MW2PR2101MB105242653A8D5C7DD9DF1062D70E0@MW2PR2101MB1052.namprd21.prod.outlook.com> On Sat, Oct 03, 2020 at 05:40:15PM +0000, Michael Kelley wrote: > From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 6:04 AM > > > > On Thu, Oct 01, 2020 at 11:53:59AM +0000, Wei Liu wrote: > > >On Thu, Oct 01, 2020 at 11:40:04AM +0200, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote: > > >> Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> writes: > > >> > > >> > cpumask can change underneath us, which is generally safe except when we > > >> > call into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(): if cpumask ends up empty we pass > > >> > num_cpu_possible() into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(), causing it to read > > >> > garbage. As reported by KASAN: > > >> > > > >> > [ 83.504763] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hyperv_flush_tlb_others > > (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112) > > >> > [ 83.908636] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888267c01370 by task kworker/u8:2/106 > > >> > [ 84.196669] CPU: 0 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.4.60 #1 > > >> > [ 84.196669] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, > > BIOS 090008 12/07/2018 > > >> > [ 84.196669] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:0) > > >> > [ 84.196669] Call Trace: > > >> > [ 84.196669] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:120) > > >> > [ 84.196669] print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:375) > > >> > [ 84.196669] __kasan_report.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:507) > > >> > [ 84.196669] kasan_report (arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h:71 > > mm/kasan/common.c:635) > > >> > [ 84.196669] hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 > > arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112) > > >> > [ 84.196669] flush_tlb_mm_range (arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:68 > > arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:798) > > >> > [ 84.196669] ptep_clear_flush (arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h:586 mm/pgtable- > > generic.c:88) > > >> > > > >> > Fixes: 0e4c88f37693 ("x86/hyper-v: Use cheaper > > HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_{LIST,SPACE} hypercalls when possible") > > >> > Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> > > >> > Cc: stable@kernel.org > > >> > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> > > >> > --- > > >> > arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c | 4 +++- > > >> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > >> > > > >> > diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c > > >> > index 5208ba49c89a9..b1d6afc5fc4a3 100644 > > >> > --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c > > >> > +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c > > >> > @@ -109,7 +109,9 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask > > *cpus, > > >> > * must. We will also check all VP numbers when walking the > > >> > * supplied CPU set to remain correct in all cases. > > >> > */ > > >> > - if (hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(cpumask_last(cpus)) >= 64) > > >> > + int last = cpumask_last(cpus); > > >> > + > > >> > + if (last < num_possible_cpus() && hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(last) >= > > 64) > > >> > goto do_ex_hypercall; > > >> > > >> In case 'cpus' can end up being empty (I'm genuinely suprised it can) > > > > I was just as surprised as you and spent the good part of a day > > debugging this. However, a: > > > > WARN_ON(cpumask_empty(cpus)); > > > > triggers at that line of code even though we check for cpumask_empty() > > at the entry of the function. > > What does the call stack look like when this triggers? I'm curious about > the path where the 'cpus' could be changing while the flush call is in > progress. > > I wonder if CPUs could ever be added to the mask? Removing CPUs can > be handled with some care because an unnecessary flush doesn't hurt > anything. But adding CPUs has serious correctness problems. > The cpumask_empty check is done before disabling irq. Is it possible the mask is modified by an interrupt? If there is a reliable way to trigger this bug, we may be able to test the following patch. diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c index 5208ba49c89a..23fa08d24c1a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c @@ -66,11 +66,13 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpus, if (!hv_hypercall_pg) goto do_native; - if (cpumask_empty(cpus)) - return; - local_irq_save(flags); + if (cpumask_empty(cpus)) { + local_irq_restore(flags); + return; + } + flush_pcpu = (struct hv_tlb_flush **) this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-05 14:58 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-10-01 1:38 Sasha Levin 2020-10-01 9:40 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov 2020-10-01 11:53 ` Wei Liu 2020-10-01 13:04 ` Sasha Levin 2020-10-03 17:40 ` Michael Kelley 2020-10-05 14:58 ` Wei Liu [this message] 2021-01-05 16:59 ` Michael Kelley 2021-01-05 17:10 ` Wei Liu 2021-01-08 15:22 ` Sasha Levin 2020-10-01 13:10 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [not found] <VI1PR0401MB24150B31A1D63176BBB788D2F1F19@VI1PR0401MB2415.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com> 2021-08-05 18:08 ` Michael Kelley [not found] <CA+qYZY3a-FHfWNL2=na6O8TRJYu9kaeyp80VNDxaDTi2EBGoog@mail.gmail.com> 2021-08-06 10:43 ` Michael Kelley 2021-08-06 17:35 ` David Mozes [not found] ` <CAHkVu0-ZCXDRZL92d_G3oKpPuKvmY=YEbu9nbx9vkZHnhHFD8Q@mail.gmail.com> 2021-08-06 21:51 ` Michael Kelley 2021-08-07 5:00 ` David Moses 2021-08-17 9:16 ` David Mozes 2021-08-17 11:29 ` Wei Liu 2021-08-19 11:05 ` David Mozes [not found] ` <CA+qYZY1U04SkyHo7X+rDeE=nUy_X5nxLfShyuLJFzXnFp2A6uw@mail.gmail.com> [not found] ` <VI1PR0401MB24153DEC767B0126B1030E07F1C09@VI1PR0401MB2415.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com> 2021-08-22 15:24 ` Wei Liu 2021-08-22 16:25 ` David Mozes 2021-08-22 17:32 ` Wei Liu
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