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From: "Gupta, Pankaj" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
To: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>,
	luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	jgross@suse.com, tiala@microsoft.com, kirill@shutemov.name,
	jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	ashish.kalra@amd.com, srutherford@google.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, anshuman.khandual@arm.com,
	pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
	daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
	alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, sandipan.das@amd.com,
	ray.huang@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, venu.busireddy@oracle.com,
	sterritt@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	samitolvanen@google.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH V2 18/18] x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths from #HV exception
Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 08:37:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <29c7aac6-3995-0a9f-929d-a2865aededb5@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221119034633.1728632-19-ltykernel@gmail.com>


> Add checks in interrupt exit code paths in case of returns
> to user mode to check if currently executing the #HV handler
> then don't follow the irqentry_exit_to_user_mode path as
> that can potentially cause the #HV handler to be
> preempted and rescheduled on another CPU. Rescheduled #HV
> handler on another cpu will cause interrupts to be handled
> on a different cpu than the injected one, causing
> invalid EOIs and missed/lost guest interrupts and
> corresponding hangs and/or per-cpu IRQs handled on
> non-intended cpu.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/kernel/sev.c           | 30 +++++++++++++++
>   2 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> index 652fea10d377..45b47132be7c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> @@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
>   
>   #include <asm/irq_stack.h>
>   
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> +noinstr void irqentry_exit_hv_cond(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t state);

For linux host, CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT also gets enabled at host side 
(for SME) and 'irqentry_exit_hv_cond' gets called. So, we need to handle 
the below cases even when host CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled?

Thanks,
Pankaj

> +#endif
> +
>   /**
>    * DECLARE_IDTENTRY - Declare functions for simple IDT entry points
>    *		      No error code pushed by hardware
> @@ -176,6 +180,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
>   #define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_IRQ(vector, func)				\
>   	DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(vector, func)
>   
> +#ifndef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>   /**
>    * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IRQ - Emit code for device interrupt IDT entry points
>    * @func:	Function name of the entry point
> @@ -205,6 +210,26 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs,			\
>   }									\
>   									\
>   static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector)
> +#else
> +
> +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IRQ(func)					\
> +static void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector);		\
> +									\
> +__visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs,			\
> +			    unsigned long error_code)			\
> +{									\
> +	irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);			\
> +	u32 vector = (u32)(u8)error_code;				\
> +									\
> +	instrumentation_begin();					\
> +	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();					\
> +	run_irq_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs, vector);		\
> +	instrumentation_end();						\
> +	irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state);				\
> +}									\
> +									\
> +static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector)
> +#endif
>   
>   /**
>    * DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC - Declare functions for system vector entry points
> @@ -221,6 +246,7 @@ static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector)
>   #define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(vector, func)				\
>   	DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)
>   
> +#ifndef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>   /**
>    * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC - Emit code for system vector IDT entry points
>    * @func:	Function name of the entry point
> @@ -245,6 +271,26 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs)			\
>   }									\
>   									\
>   static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +#else
> +
> +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(func)					\
> +static void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs);				\
> +									\
> +__visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs)			\
> +{									\
> +	irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);			\
> +									\
> +	instrumentation_begin();					\
> +	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();					\
> +	run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs);			\
> +	instrumentation_end();						\
> +	irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state);				\
> +}									\
> +									\
> +static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>   
>   /**
>    * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC_SIMPLE - Emit code for simple system vector IDT
> @@ -274,6 +320,26 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs)			\
>   }									\
>   									\
>   static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +#else
> +
> +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC_SIMPLE(func)				\
> +static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs);		\
> +									\
> +__visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs)			\
> +{									\
> +	irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);			\
> +									\
> +	instrumentation_begin();					\
> +	__irq_enter_raw();						\
> +	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();					\
> +	__##func(regs);						\
> +	__irq_exit_raw();						\
> +	instrumentation_end();						\
> +	irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state);				\
> +}									\
> +									\
> +static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +#endif
>   
>   /**
>    * DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB - Declare functions for XEN HV callback entry point
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 5a2f59022c98..ef6a123c50fe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ struct sev_hv_doorbell_page {
>   
>   struct sev_snp_runtime_data {
>   	struct sev_hv_doorbell_page hv_doorbell_page;
> +	/*
> +	 * Indication that we are currently handling #HV events.
> +	 */
> +	bool hv_handling_events;
>   };
>   
>   static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_snp_runtime_data*, snp_runtime_data);
> @@ -206,6 +210,8 @@ static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs)
>   	union hv_pending_events pending_events;
>   	u8 vector;
>   
> +	this_cpu_read(snp_runtime_data)->hv_handling_events = true;
> +
>   	while (sev_hv_pending()) {
>   		asm volatile("cli" : : : "memory");
>   
> @@ -244,6 +250,8 @@ static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs)
>   
>   		asm volatile("sti" : : : "memory");
>   	}
> +
> +	this_cpu_read(snp_runtime_data)->hv_handling_events = false;
>   }
>   
>   void check_hv_pending(struct pt_regs *regs)
> @@ -2541,3 +2549,25 @@ static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void)
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   device_initcall(snp_init_platform_device);
> +
> +noinstr void irqentry_exit_hv_cond(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t state)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Check whether this returns to user mode, if so and if
> +	 * we are currently executing the #HV handler then we don't
> +	 * want to follow the irqentry_exit_to_user_mode path as
> +	 * that can potentially cause the #HV handler to be
> +	 * preempted and rescheduled on another CPU. Rescheduled #HV
> +	 * handler on another cpu will cause interrupts to be handled
> +	 * on a different cpu than the injected one, causing
> +	 * invalid EOIs and missed/lost guest interrupts and
> +	 * corresponding hangs and/or per-cpu IRQs handled on
> +	 * non-intended cpu.
> +	 */
> +	if (user_mode(regs) &&
> +	    this_cpu_read(snp_runtime_data)->hv_handling_events)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/* follow normal interrupt return/exit path */
> +	irqentry_exit(regs, state);
> +}


      reply	other threads:[~2022-12-13  7:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-19  3:46 [RFC PATCH V2 00/18] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 01/18] x86/sev: Pvalidate memory gab for decompressing kernel Tianyu Lan
2022-11-29 12:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-29 14:42     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-29 15:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-28 19:15       ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-06  9:16   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-12-08 13:04     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 02/18] x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest specific config Tianyu Lan
2022-12-12 17:56   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-13  9:58     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 03/18] x86/hyperv: apic change for sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2022-12-12 19:00   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 04/18] x86/hyperv: Decrypt hv vp assist page in " Tianyu Lan
2022-12-12 19:41   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-13 15:21     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 05/18] x86/hyperv: Get Virtual Trust Level via hvcall Tianyu Lan
2022-12-12 23:41   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 06/18] x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement hvcall in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2022-12-13 17:19   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-14 16:02     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-09  7:24   ` Dexuan Cui
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 07/18] clocksource: hyper-v: decrypt hyperv tsc page " Tianyu Lan
2022-12-13 17:30   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-14 16:05     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 08/18] x86/hyperv: decrypt vmbus pages for " Tianyu Lan
2022-12-13 18:08   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-26  4:19     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 09/18] x86/hyperv: set target vtl in the vmbus init message Tianyu Lan
2022-12-14 18:12   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 10/18] drivers: hv: Decrypt percpu hvcall input arg page in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2022-12-08 21:52   ` Dexuan Cui
2022-12-09  2:26     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-12-14 18:16   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-26  7:26     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 11/18] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Decrypt vmbus ring buffer Tianyu Lan
2022-12-14 18:25   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-12-26  7:59     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 12/18] x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2022-12-28 17:07   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 13/18] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest Tianyu Lan
2022-12-28 18:14   ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 14/18] x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific hadling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 15/18] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler Tianyu Lan
2023-01-10 12:47   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-01-10 13:43     ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-12  7:43       ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 16/18] x86/sev: Initialize #HV doorbell and handle interrupt requests Tianyu Lan
2022-11-21 15:05   ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-11-22 13:46     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-22 19:17       ` Kalra, Ashish
2022-11-23 18:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2022-11-25  3:36     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-25 11:49   ` Christophe de Dinechin
2022-11-28  5:47     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-12-07 14:13   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-12-08 14:21     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-12-08 14:36       ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-12-08 11:47   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2022-12-08 14:25     ` Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 17/18] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception Tianyu Lan
2022-11-19  3:46 ` [RFC PATCH V2 18/18] x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths " Tianyu Lan
2022-12-13  7:37   ` Gupta, Pankaj [this message]

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