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From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
	Ju-Hyoung Lee <juhlee@microsoft.com>,
	"x86\@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"linux-hyperv\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Subject: RE: hv_hypercall_pg page permissios
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 11:29:33 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87blljicjm.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <HK0P153MB0322EB3EE51073CC021D4AEABF9C0@HK0P153MB0322.APCP153.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>

Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> writes:

>> From: linux-hyperv-owner@vger.kernel.org
>> <linux-hyperv-owner@vger.kernel.org> On Behalf Of Dexuan Cui
>> Sent: Monday, June 15, 2020 10:42 AM
>> > >
>> > > Hi hch,
>> > > The patch is merged into the mainine recently, but unluckily we noticed
>> > > a warning with CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y
>> > >
>> > > Should we revert this patch, or figure out a way to ask the DEBUG_WX
>> > > code to ignore this page?
>> >
>> > Are you sure it is hv_hypercall_pg?
>> Yes, 100% sure. I printed the value of hv_hypercall_pg and and it matched the
>> address in the warning line " x86/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at
>> address".
>
> I did this experiment:
>   1. export vmalloc_exec and ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx.
>   2. write a test module that calls them.
>   3. It turns out that every call of vmalloc_exec() triggers such a warning.
>
> vmalloc_exec() uses PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, which is defined as
>    (__PP|__RW|   0|___A|   0|___D|   0|___G)
>
> It looks the logic in note_page() is: for_each_RW_page, if the NX bit is unset,
> then report the page as an insecure W+X mapping. IMO this explains the
> warning?

Yea, bummer.

it seems we need something like PAGE_KERNEL_READONLY_EXEC but we don't
seem to have one on x86. Hypercall page is special in a way that the
guest doesn't need to write there at all. vmalloc_exec() seems to have
only one other user on x86: module_alloc() and it has other needs. On
ARM, alloc_insn_page() does the following:

arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c:     page = vmalloc_exec(PAGE_SIZE);
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c-     if (page) {
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c-             set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c-             set_vm_flush_reset_perms(page);
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c-     }

What if we do the same? (almost untested):

diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
index e2137070386a..31aadfea589b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
 #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
 #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
 
 void *hv_hypercall_pg;
@@ -383,6 +384,8 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)
                wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID, 0);
                goto remove_cpuhp_state;
        }
+       set_memory_ro((unsigned long)hv_hypercall_pg, 1);
+       set_vm_flush_reset_perms(hv_hypercall_pg);
 
        rdmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL, hypercall_msr.as_uint64);
        hypercall_msr.enable = 1;

-- 
Vitaly


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-16  9:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-07  6:55 hv_hypercall_pg page permissios Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-07  7:28 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-04-07  7:38   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-07 21:01     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-12  7:48       ` Dexuan Cui
2020-06-15  8:35         ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-06-15 17:41           ` Dexuan Cui
2020-06-15 19:49             ` Dexuan Cui
2020-06-16  7:23               ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16 10:18                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-16 10:23                   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16 10:24                     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16 10:31                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-16 10:33                         ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16 10:40                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-16 10:42                             ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16 10:52                               ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16 11:24                                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-16 14:39                                   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16  9:29               ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2020-06-16  9:33                 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16  9:55                   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16 10:08                     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-06-16 10:50                       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-06-16 10:20                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-07 18:10   ` Dexuan Cui
2020-04-07 20:42     ` Wei Liu

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