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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 3/8] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 04:11:43 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <00325dff8292a18212bbdaa3fd81cebee2a60bc2.camel@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200507231147.27025-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>

On Thu, 2020-05-07 at 16:11 -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number.  The spec actually
> recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
> hash as the authorization.  Because the spec doesn't require this
> hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
> number.  For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
> passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
> keys for ease of use.  Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
> into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.
> 
> so before
> 
> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f"
> 
> after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
> directly supplied password:
> 
> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001"
> 
> Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct
> password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator
> for which form is input.
> 
> Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix.  The TPM
> 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty
> authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in
> 20 bytes of zeros.  A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the
> Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch
> makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys.
> 
> Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips")
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

Have not checked yet the tail. Probably won't check before PR for v5.8
is out.

Just wondering would it hurt to merge everything up until this patch?


/Jarkko


  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-14  1:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-07 23:11 [PATCH v9 0/8] TPM 2.0 trusted keys with attached policy James Bottomley
2020-05-07 23:11 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] lib: add ASN.1 encoder James Bottomley
2020-05-17  8:17   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2020-05-07 23:11 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2020-05-07 23:11 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations James Bottomley
2020-05-14  1:11   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2020-05-14  1:12     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-14  1:41       ` James Bottomley
2020-05-14 11:19         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-07 23:11 ` [PATCH v9 4/8] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2020-05-17  8:18   ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2020-05-07 23:11 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
2020-05-07 23:11 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2020-05-07 23:11 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2020-05-07 23:11 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2020-05-14 14:31 ` [PATCH v9 0/8] TPM 2.0 trusted keys with attached policy Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15  2:22   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15  3:44     ` James Bottomley
2020-05-15  8:47       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15  9:30         ` Jerry Snitselaar
2020-05-15 18:48           ` James Bottomley
2020-05-16 12:24             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-16  9:59           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-15 19:17         ` Jerry Snitselaar
2020-05-15 19:34           ` James Bottomley
2020-05-15 19:50             ` Mimi Zohar
2020-05-15 20:10             ` James Bottomley
2020-05-15 21:03               ` Kayaalp, Mehmet
2020-05-15 22:19                 ` James Bottomley
2020-05-15 23:23                   ` James Bottomley
2020-05-16 21:44                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-05-16 13:01               ` Sakkinen, Jarkko
2020-05-16 12:33           ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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