From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C7575C433FE for ; Wed, 23 Feb 2022 17:45:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S243486AbiBWRqI (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Feb 2022 12:46:08 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35728 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S243478AbiBWRqH (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Feb 2022 12:46:07 -0500 Received: from mga09.intel.com (mga09.intel.com [134.134.136.24]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3AFC241331; Wed, 23 Feb 2022 09:45:40 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1645638340; x=1677174340; h=message-id:date:mime-version:subject:to:cc:references: from:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=aeb0qt4wCCz7I/mFg9ArXVeLtAeRSHAS90P4rnXgYoM=; b=IUOYbsZyWf1EQ8t/DZKZsUQGBm4pOgCkBYU7SWXnYKBXY0BBV4O1hbTf E5+NufXT+Ohz7qsqAV0Y7Qn0oFvSNWmCVo4g6xRC3TOxWcnq5E/in6pQY E+QK/VNbpiIUCUIiviEckaajJR4/YGD2NAYwHmXYmGHAm6e9WCQVBSVYX LybPuRDAVjakFr+5EO3lYwtsZfO7apQGva61WPSKbFzUvZR/1Zhu3jfY2 gPtRC+ISd64H3uY1KtM+wdqkERoxHqqHkWhr79CFqiIpwr8jL1XMh1Xng u4pScKU7A9LbhBdmqoStVM4b3NXhe+zfc6o0wRUL7yqHKAmysKdzs+zej g==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10267"; a="251774224" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,391,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="251774224" Received: from orsmga003.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.27]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 23 Feb 2022 09:45:17 -0800 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,391,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="491292157" Received: from chakanog-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.212.198.215]) ([10.212.198.215]) by orsmga003-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 23 Feb 2022 09:45:17 -0800 Message-ID: <04080c88-3e69-b4e6-0af2-0690accaa02f@intel.com> Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 09:45:12 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.5.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Content-Language: en-US To: Ross Philipson , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com References: <1645070085-14255-1-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com> From: Dave Hansen In-Reply-To: <1645070085-14255-1-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On 2/16/22 19:54, Ross Philipson wrote: > The larger focus of the TrenchBoot project (https://github.com/TrenchBoot) is to > enhance the boot security and integrity in a unified manner. The first area of > focus has been on the Trusted Computing Group's Dynamic Launch for establishing > a hardware Root of Trust for Measurement, also know as DRTM (Dynamic Root of > Trust for Measurement). The project has been and continues to work on providing > a unified means to Dynamic Launch that is a cross-platform (Intel and AMD) and > cross-architecture (x86 and Arm), with our recent involvment in the upcoming > Arm DRTM specification. The order of introducing DRTM to the Linux kernel > follows the maturity of DRTM in the architectures. Intel's Trusted eXecution > Technology (TXT) is present today and only requires a preamble loader, e.g. a > boot loader, and an OS kernel that is TXT-aware. AMD DRTM implementation has > been present since the introduction of AMD-V but requires an additional > component that is AMD specific and referred to in the specification as the > Secure Loader, which the TrenchBoot project has an active prototype in > development. Finally Arm's implementation is in specification development stage > and the project is looking to support it when it becomes available. What problem is this patch series solving? Is the same problem solved in a different way in the kernel today? What is wrong with that solution? What effects will end users see if they apply this series?