From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4031FC67863 for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:38:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAAC720779 for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:37:59 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="MfgBB49v" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org EAAC720779 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=HansenPartnership.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727350AbeJVPzU (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Oct 2018 11:55:20 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:49652 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726843AbeJVPzU (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Oct 2018 11:55:20 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5C9DA8EE0FC; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:37:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id P-8npeWKPZWo; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:37:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [172.20.48.127] (unknown [62.232.21.219]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B32768EE02B; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:37:57 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1540193879; bh=uixT70AYpUKFVZtbVrW8Jp5Bhw+31o3X62lFXZHTEWM=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=MfgBB49vO2JF4qV+aNJRjK+J0yCZfbJSRQFqKqihv2VFtkfB8o1eae05uHi3HgqVe I1jnkwgil75qkkxVgS6AuvuIXH1BGXuPhHvy6xSDMeOP+Zaw0rkI+38xkzyrzlvhmL f/pYSMELK2i3PcgNyqeDGKPssHfUoUTXtQmwvHYU= Message-ID: <1540193875.3202.12.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: [PATCH v4 4/7] tpm2: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Ard Biesheuvel Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2018 08:37:55 +0100 In-Reply-To: <1540193596.3202.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com> References: <1540193596.3202.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.26.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org If some entity is snooping the TPM bus, they can see the random numbers we're extracting from the TPM and do prediction attacks against their consumers. Foil this attack by using response encryption to prevent the attacker from seeing the random sequence. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- v3: add error handling to sessions and redo to be outside loop --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 332b34b347f1..22f1c7bee173 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -266,7 +266,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count, return rc; } - struct tpm2_get_random_out { __be16 size; u8 buffer[TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA]; @@ -293,21 +292,32 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) int total = 0; int retries = 5; u8 *dest_ptr = dest; + struct tpm2_auth *auth; if (!num_bytes || max > TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA) return -EINVAL; - err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0); + err = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip, &auth); if (err) return err; + err = tpm_buf_init(&buf, 0, 0); + if (err) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(auth); + return err; + } + do { - tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM); + tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT + | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, + NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, NULL, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, - offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, - buffer), + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth); + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, + PAGE_SIZE, TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 2, 0, "attempting get random"); + err = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, err); if (err) goto out; @@ -327,6 +337,8 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) } while (retries-- && total < max); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(auth); + return total ? total : -EIO; out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); -- 2.16.4