From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B8A66C43381 for ; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 13:44:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88904206BA for ; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 13:44:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727561AbfCKNop (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Mar 2019 09:44:45 -0400 Received: from mout.kundenserver.de ([212.227.17.13]:60699 "EHLO mout.kundenserver.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727320AbfCKNoo (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Mar 2019 09:44:44 -0400 Received: from orion.localdomain ([95.115.159.19]) by mrelayeu.kundenserver.de (mreue107 [212.227.15.183]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 1Miqzy-1gXav80WTE-00evdi; Mon, 11 Mar 2019 14:44:42 +0100 From: "Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] secuirty: integrity: ima: pedantic formatting Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 14:44:40 +0100 Message-Id: <1552311880-20569-1-git-send-email-info@metux.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:PsHHcT4Tpa1S4Vp1mNpHDxzDVtgQPUCgfsiTZSN4jJBgt9YenZE ksR2TurPmxv7DIv6ihGGK+HaZLN8HrFO+d/yx4xCWGae8LmJz5PiCmAHoyOTakdPwPpde7v +lEfJFspf0A4Fmfk+HfI/IHqkf/2u1PK1sBNQvm0Dy7mnfAaFnxIew+SC8VrENYWE2qX1L2 OyR6CJqUaphAAffPueE6g== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:qoXUpY55EHM=:ekEH1NgvYyNTz25aP03c0Z L4PeFrFfaPm2p6LSESUzi6Xf3e8+tBow4QSM21U4/pIcGElfKrt6qVXfSgtyFq49Ri9MnRd4u ncASwAkCu6zcgfDwyIa+RA5zw4BMhwcFEbRrvyqrRAtJa+ZydKSKOdSAK9a0xlZFVd5VTqgyF cjyb9ETv4lJPqCps0XmPKH1EvuxVAkvuIQSsp5pI2dgqPFIS65rsYooFdFQ5OBiB1uSQya9Tt 9WTUYuSXjkmrznImj0RrULKGi8Lwy0LhSQPPfsRysL/IM2xjDpVgis96DX0qKNTjN7gnadyuE FGBLHnQpcT+1T+ITab5uCG6bSiImQHvXt2g0swFLxTWwMa67hSSqIJOZUAJ2z9ldM7f8iFBXy FYmy3gPujw/WX2y86rQFkOaH6hL3vMVIX3yVbnqJbUa27cKIRZ70CC5qg60HU0ZWauq5DzrIx z/uA4Q8lZ0zZoElzszFvWEol/gjDe9dmykUCG2obcylxJup7RyewD3GFTudgcS21vJ9U0V+xL HKlrkgOw0AWalsJTvo6L7YBBp6Wv+K/S2wBVbbkux1X4PW0T2gYnAAzbRBzQgSZacwhJpAuLA TKX9sK1CkE7zGvlvuaa1gYSz6S/Vo+VC3gka9doZ/XJpko4vVBDXbHVg2A7en0cXdGRbN22lA zq+vnUTpAS/QmL+L6IkT8lPpAzzWqwYO0GCRq82alzuzNFVbdUCpIpTdYT0qen/U0zZ94BqSs 0PtsEbW7+buU3Sx+c5wxSqq3KaDKqonSbhtJJA== Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Formatting of Kconfig files doesn't look so pretty, so let the Great White Handkerchief come around and clean it up. Signed-off-by: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index a18f8c6..416b724 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -34,12 +34,12 @@ config IMA_KEXEC depends on IMA && TCG_TPM && HAVE_IMA_KEXEC default n help - TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate - a TPM's quote after a soft boot, the IMA measurement list of the - running kernel must be saved and restored on boot. + TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate + a TPM's quote after a soft boot, the IMA measurement list of the + running kernel must be saved and restored on boot. - Depending on the IMA policy, the measurement list can grow to - be very large. + Depending on the IMA policy, the measurement list can grow to + be very large. config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX int @@ -91,10 +91,10 @@ choice default IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 depends on IMA help - Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement - list, integrity appraisal and audit log. The compiled default - hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command - line 'ima_hash=' option. + Select the default hash algorithm used for the measurement + list, integrity appraisal and audit log. The compiled default + hash algorithm can be overwritten using the kernel command + line 'ima_hash=' option. config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 bool "SHA1 (default)" @@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ config IMA_READ_POLICY default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY help - It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is - even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. - This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. + It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is + even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. + This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. config IMA_APPRAISE bool "Appraise integrity measurements" @@ -158,12 +158,12 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE If unsure, say N. config IMA_ARCH_POLICY - bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy" - depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG || IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - default n - help - This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy - based on run time secure boot flags. + bool "Enable loading an IMA architecture specific policy" + depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG || IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + default n + help + This option enables loading an IMA architecture specific policy + based on run time secure boot flags. config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY bool "IMA build time configured policy rules" @@ -238,10 +238,10 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING default y help - This option requires that all keys added to the .ima - keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring. + This option requires that all keys added to the .ima + keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring. - This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in or secondary CA cert (EXPERIMENTAL)" @@ -266,32 +266,32 @@ config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING default n help - This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all - revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If - the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and - an error is returned to the caller. + This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all + revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If + the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and + an error is returned to the caller. config IMA_LOAD_X509 bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring" depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING default n help - File signature verification is based on the public keys - loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are - X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the - .system keyring. This option enables X509 certificate - loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring. + File signature verification is based on the public keys + loaded on the .ima trusted keyring. These public keys are + X509 certificates signed by a trusted key on the + .system keyring. This option enables X509 certificate + loading from the kernel onto the '.ima' trusted keyring. config IMA_X509_PATH string "IMA X509 certificate path" depends on IMA_LOAD_X509 default "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der" help - This option defines IMA X509 certificate path. + This option defines IMA X509 certificate path. config IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT bool "Require signed user-space initialization" depends on IMA_LOAD_X509 default n help - This option requires user-space init to be signed. + This option requires user-space init to be signed. -- 1.9.1