From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3CDEC04AB7 for ; Tue, 14 May 2019 23:54:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ACF85206B7 for ; Tue, 14 May 2019 23:54:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="dZV9RO/I"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="dZV9RO/I" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726362AbfENXyP (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 May 2019 19:54:15 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:53400 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726265AbfENXyP (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 May 2019 19:54:15 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58BE08EE109; Tue, 14 May 2019 16:54:14 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1557878054; bh=j9GFywY1HLyNTdpWDqU6DRZqFaBO1GawDh8yt+cMaqU=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=dZV9RO/IA1wL58RbfktzvhF4K1xZl/4zGz3TLRxcm5GlTLjC8covABFSucBWREaS9 OSBPyqqim2IdYRtdQFIEyy2fzVtY/Vq9MwU3Jngf6/fjS6Z38hRGtcegh99WZyvLSm aWkuGylJdngUC4YlL6U49VhosDHd1xpTt5qV56rc= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id woy7T4AMZn2a; Tue, 14 May 2019 16:54:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [153.66.254.194] (unknown [50.35.68.20]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9FDBB8EE0ED; Tue, 14 May 2019 16:54:13 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1557878054; bh=j9GFywY1HLyNTdpWDqU6DRZqFaBO1GawDh8yt+cMaqU=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=dZV9RO/IA1wL58RbfktzvhF4K1xZl/4zGz3TLRxcm5GlTLjC8covABFSucBWREaS9 OSBPyqqim2IdYRtdQFIEyy2fzVtY/Vq9MwU3Jngf6/fjS6Z38hRGtcegh99WZyvLSm aWkuGylJdngUC4YlL6U49VhosDHd1xpTt5qV56rc= Message-ID: <1557878052.2873.6.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk From: James Bottomley To: Rob Landley , Andy Lutomirski Cc: Arvind Sankar , LKML , Linux API , Linux FS Devel , linux-integrity , initramfs@vger.kernel.org Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 16:54:12 -0700 In-Reply-To: <4da3dbda-bb76-5d71-d5c5-c03d98350ab0@landley.net> References: <20190512194322.GA71658@rani.riverdale.lan> <3fe0e74b-19ca-6081-3afe-e05921b1bfe6@huawei.com> <4f522e28-29c8-5930-5d90-e0086b503613@landley.net> <1557861511.3378.19.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <4da3dbda-bb76-5d71-d5c5-c03d98350ab0@landley.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.26.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Tue, 2019-05-14 at 18:39 -0500, Rob Landley wrote: > On 5/14/19 2:18 PM, James Bottomley wrote: > > > I think Rob is right here. If /init was statically built into > > > the kernel image, it has no more ability to compromise the kernel > > > than anything else in the kernel. What's the problem here? > > > > The specific problem is that unless you own the kernel signing key, > > which is really untrue for most distribution consumers because the > > distro owns the key, you cannot build the initrd statically into > > the kernel. You can take the distro signed kernel, link it with > > the initrd then resign the combination with your key, provided you > > insert your key into the MoK variables as a trusted secure boot > > key, but the distros have been unhappy recommending this as > > standard practice. > > > > If our model for security is going to be to link the kernel and the > > initrd statically to give signature protection over the aggregate > > then we need to figure out how to execute this via the distros. If > > we accept that the split model, where the distro owns and signs the > > kernel but the machine owner builds and is responsible for the > > initrd, then we need to explore split security models like this > > proposal. > > You can have a built-in and an external initrd? The second extracts > over the first? (I know because once upon a time conflicting files > would append. It sounds like the desired behavior here is O_EXCL fail > and move on.) Technically yes, because the first initrd could find the second by some predefined means, extract it to a temporary directory and do a pivot_root() and then the second would do some stuff, find the real root and do a pivot_root() again. However, while possible, wouldn't it just add to the rendezvous complexity without adding any benefits? even if the first initrd is built and signed by the distro and the second is built by you, the first has to verify the second somehow. I suppose the second could be tar extracted, which would add xattrs, if that's the goal? James