From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1237AC2D0C7 for ; Wed, 11 Dec 2019 02:56:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E779E2077B for ; Wed, 11 Dec 2019 02:56:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727749AbfLKC4l (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Dec 2019 21:56:41 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:61544 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727859AbfLKC4l (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Dec 2019 21:56:41 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098409.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id xBB2ppmP050587 for ; Tue, 10 Dec 2019 21:56:40 -0500 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2wthkh417e-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 10 Dec 2019 21:56:39 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 11 Dec 2019 02:56:34 -0000 Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.160]) by b06avi18878370.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id xBB2uXPa45809956 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 11 Dec 2019 02:56:33 GMT Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id C211EA405F; Wed, 11 Dec 2019 02:56:33 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F485A405B; Wed, 11 Dec 2019 02:56:33 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.214.111]) by b06wcsmtp001.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 11 Dec 2019 02:56:33 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: Ramifications of INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING From: Mimi Zohar To: Matthias Gerstner , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 21:56:32 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20191204135715.GB11974@f195.suse.de> References: <20191204135715.GB11974@f195.suse.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19121102-0016-0000-0000-000002D3AA74 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19121102-0017-0000-0000-00003335C513 Message-Id: <1576032992.4579.122.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.95,18.0.572 definitions=2019-12-10_08:2019-12-10,2019-12-10 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 lowpriorityscore=0 malwarescore=0 clxscore=1015 priorityscore=1501 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 bulkscore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 impostorscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-1910280000 definitions=main-1912110025 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Hi Matthias, On Wed, 2019-12-04 at 14:57 +0100, Matthias Gerstner wrote: > I was able to still get things to work by building my own custom kernel > with the custom CA being built into the kernel which is a lot of more > effort, however, and a scenario we can't easily support for our > customers. > > I can understand the reasoning of that new option, that trusting > arbitrary platform certificates shipped with the hardware might not be a > good idea. I wonder, however, whether moving these certificates from > .secondary_trusted_keys to .platform doesn't also affect other > components than just IMA? > > I would be interested in your view on this and any advice. The pre-boot keys were probably also being used to verify 3rd party kernel modules.  If the kernel was built with CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE, the customer could insert their key post build.[1]  This would obviously require the kernel to be resigned. I agree there needs to be a simpler way of including a customer key, without requiring them to resign the kernel.  Do you have some thoughts? Mimi [1] c4c361059585 ("KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling")