From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 67AE4C11D3D for ; Thu, 27 Feb 2020 16:21:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3794C246B9 for ; Thu, 27 Feb 2020 16:21:49 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="LQWzBd8J"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="LQWzBd8J" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730133AbgB0QVs (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Feb 2020 11:21:48 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:46820 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729856AbgB0QVs (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Feb 2020 11:21:48 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1EBE8EE181; Thu, 27 Feb 2020 08:21:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1582820507; bh=DEC6D3c+XzaY2vmgky+CH/RlcOWdux9P6+Rv8E5By4M=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=LQWzBd8J4oaclLIga36Asb1W9wF8lSjALahe+iuBayNUTO4Y8DDIJCvQE2jBSXbze Bsks4p9pH0YZMFpB/r5hlQFItu3WtOGgV+wX4VVncOAkogpMeWR+v8Wfgzhca8NUTc ixkyQx7/EDqiuNdz0Lf/3FLhCDv2aQSPE7IKyaKQ= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id X35b6physd5r; Thu, 27 Feb 2020 08:21:47 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4D61E8EE079; Thu, 27 Feb 2020 08:21:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1582820507; bh=DEC6D3c+XzaY2vmgky+CH/RlcOWdux9P6+Rv8E5By4M=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=LQWzBd8J4oaclLIga36Asb1W9wF8lSjALahe+iuBayNUTO4Y8DDIJCvQE2jBSXbze Bsks4p9pH0YZMFpB/r5hlQFItu3WtOGgV+wX4VVncOAkogpMeWR+v8Wfgzhca8NUTc ixkyQx7/EDqiuNdz0Lf/3FLhCDv2aQSPE7IKyaKQ= Message-ID: <1582820506.18445.3.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations From: James Bottomley To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2020 08:21:46 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20200227161949.GD5140@linux.intel.com> References: <20200130101812.6271-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200130101812.6271-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200225164850.GB15662@linux.intel.com> <1582765091.4245.33.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20200227161949.GD5140@linux.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.26.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Thu, 2020-02-27 at 18:19 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 04:58:11PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > > On Tue, 2020-02-25 at 18:48 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 11:18:09AM +0100, James Bottomley wrote: > > > > In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec > > > > actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and > > > > use > > > > the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't > > > > require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted > > > > keys is > > > > a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing > > > > in > > > > of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we > > > > should > > > > allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the > > > > 'blobauth' > > > > parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain > > > > text > > > > passwords for the keys. > > > > > > > > so before > > > > > > > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 > > > > blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" > > > > > > > > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a > > > > new > > > > directly supplied password: > > > > > > > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello > > > > keyhandle=81000001" > > > > > > > > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a > > > > direct > > > > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the > > > > discriminator > > > > for which form is input. > > > > > > > > Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The > > > > TPM > > > > 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty > > > > authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently > > > > passing > > > > in > > > > 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but > > > > the > > > > Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this > > > > patch > > > > makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley > > > ip.c > > > > om> > > > > > > Should have a fixes tag. > > > > I made all the other changes, but I'm not sure what to identify in > > the > > fixes tag. The problem is the code I updated was simply carried > > over > > unaltered from TPM 1.2 > > > > You could certainly argue that commit > > > > commit 0fe5480303a1657b328a0a389f8d99249d9961f5 > > Author: Jarkko Sakkinen > > Date: Fri Jun 26 22:28:26 2015 +0300 > > > > keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips > > > > Should have updated the blobauth handling ... is that the one you'd > > like fixes: to identify? > > What I'm thinking is to have fixes tag w/o cc to stable. I'm not > sure at this point whether we want to backport this but it still > makes sense to tag it. Ok, I'll add that commit as the fixes; it certainly makes no sense to backport this change before the above commit. James