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From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
Date: Mon, 09 Mar 2020 15:08:23 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1583791703.6009.3.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1583762386.3429.6.camel@HansenPartnership.com>

On Mon, 2020-03-09 at 06:59 -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Sun, 2020-03-08 at 00:00 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 04, 2020 at 06:27:42PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in
> > > the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys.  For compatibility
> > > with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B
> > > quantities representing the public and private parts of the
> > > key.  However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the
> > > ASN.1 format.
> > > 
> > > The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus
> > > the exported key can be used by userspace tools
> > > (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine).  The
> > > format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of
> > > having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format
> > > includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in
> > > each time.
> > > 
> > > This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format,
> > > so keys with passwords but no policy.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley
> > > <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> > 
> > Not yet sure but I get
> > 
> > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001 hash=sha1
> > pcrinfo=03000001 6768033e216468247bd031a0a2d9876d79818f8f" @u
> > add_key: No such device
> 
> What's the last hex string?  Is there supposed to be a command
> preceding it (like blobauth since there's 40 hex chars?).
> 
> > After applying 1/6-4/6.
> 
> As you guessed for most of the rebases I've been testing the whole
> set of patches.  Let me wind back to 4/6 and have a look.
> 
> > At this point I'm assuming that I've made mistake somewhere, which
> > is entirely possible.
> 
> Heh, don't bet on it, I should be able to reconstruct the environment
> today and try it out.

OK, I got the environment constructed, and everything seems to work
fine for me.

However, there is still a problem with the patch.  It appears in going
from v4->v5 two additional patches got folded into this one:

[PATCH v4 5/9] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly
 interoperable
[PATCH v4 6/9] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys

I'll see if I can disentangle them otherwise the commit log saying we
don't add policy is completely wrong.

James


  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-09 22:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-05  2:27 [PATCH v7 0/6] TPM 2.0 trusted keys with attached policy James Bottomley
2020-03-05  2:27 ` [PATCH v7 1/6] lib: add ASN.1 encoder James Bottomley
2020-03-05 16:20   ` James Bottomley
2020-03-06 19:10   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-05  2:27 ` [PATCH v7 2/6] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2020-03-05  2:27 ` [PATCH v7 3/6] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations James Bottomley
2020-03-06 19:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-05  2:27 ` [PATCH v7 4/6] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2020-03-06 20:03   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-07 22:00   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-03-09 13:59     ` James Bottomley
2020-03-09 22:08       ` James Bottomley [this message]
2020-03-05  2:27 ` [PATCH v7 5/6] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2020-03-05  2:27 ` [PATCH v7 6/6] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley

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