[PATCH v2 0/7] crypto: add eddsa support for x509

[PATCH v2 0/7] crypto: add eddsa support for x509

[Hongbo Li]

From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>

This series of patches add support for x509 cert signed by eddsa,
which is described in RFC8032 [1], currently ed25519 only.

Curve25519 is an elliptic curve used for key agreement(ECDH).
It is a Montgomery curve.

Edwards25519 is a twisted Edwards curve and birationally equivalent
to Curve25519, the birational maps are described in rfc7748 section 4.1.[2]
Ed25519 is a Digital Signature Algorithm over Edwards25519.

The kernel's curve25519 code is used for ECDH, such as set_secret(),
generate_public_key() and compute_shared_secret(), these are useless
for eddsa, and can not be reused, eddsa do the verification on the
given public key and signature.

According to RFC8032 section 4 [3], there're two variants: PureEdDSA and
HashEdDSA. These patches support PureEdDSA which named Ed25519.

Patch1 fix a memory leak bug in sm2.

Patch2 fix a mpi_resize bug, this bug will cause eddsa verification failed.

Patch3 exports some mpi common functions.

Patch4 makes x509 layer support eddsa.

Patch5 moves some common code in sm2 to separate files. These code is also
       used by eddsa.

Patch6 is the implementation of eddsa verification according to RFC8032
       section 5.1.7 [4].

Patch7 adds test vector for eddsa.

Test by the following script:

keyctl newring test @u

while :; do
    certfile="cert.der"

    openssl req \
            -x509 \
            -newkey ED25519 \
            -keyout key.pem \
            -days 365 \
            -subj '/CN=test' \
            -nodes \
            -outform der \
            -out ${certfile} 2>/dev/null

    exp=0
    id=$(keyctl padd asymmetric testkey %keyring:test < "${certfile}")
    rc=$?
    if [ $rc -ne $exp ]; then
        case "$exp" in
            0) echo "Error: Could not load ed25519 certificate $certfile!";
        esac
        exit 1
    else
        case "$rc" in
            0) printf "load ed25519 cert keyid: %-10s\n" $id;
        esac
    fi
done

Best Regards
Hongbo

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7748#section-4.1
[3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032#section-4
[4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7

v1->v2:
  -fix the warning "warning: no previous prototype"
   reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
  -add more comments about these patches

Hongbo Li (7):
  crypto: fix a memory leak in sm2
  lib/mpi: use kcalloc in mpi_resize
  lib/mpi: export some common function
  x509: add support for eddsa
  crypto: move common code in sm2 to ec_mpi.c and ec_mpi.h
  crypto: ed25519 cert verification
  crypto: add eddsa test vector

 crypto/Kconfig                            |  15 +
 crypto/Makefile                           |   4 +
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c       |  73 ++++-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c |  14 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  |   4 +-
 crypto/ec_mpi.c                           |  82 ++++++
 crypto/ec_mpi.h                           |  37 +++
 crypto/eddsa.c                            | 326 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/sm2.c                              | 104 +------
 crypto/testmgr.c                          |   6 +
 crypto/testmgr.h                          |  32 +++
 include/linux/oid_registry.h              |   1 +
 lib/mpi/mpi-add.c                         |   4 +-
 lib/mpi/mpiutil.c                         |   2 +-
 14 files changed, 591 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/ec_mpi.c
 create mode 100644 crypto/ec_mpi.h
 create mode 100644 crypto/eddsa.c

-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH v2 1/7] crypto: fix a memory leak in sm2

[Hongbo Li]

From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>

SM2 module alloc ec->Q in sm2_set_pub_key(), when doing alg test in
test_akcipher_one(), it will set public key for every test vector,
and don't free ec->Q. This will cause a memory leak.

This patch alloc ec->Q in sm2_ec_ctx_init().

Fixes: ea7ecb66440b ("crypto: sm2 - introduce OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
---
 crypto/sm2.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/sm2.c b/crypto/sm2.c
index b21addc3ac06..db8a4a265669 100644
--- a/crypto/sm2.c
+++ b/crypto/sm2.c
@@ -79,10 +79,17 @@ static int sm2_ec_ctx_init(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec)
 		goto free;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+	ec->Q = mpi_point_new(0);
+	if (!ec->Q)
+		goto free;
+
 	/* mpi_ec_setup_elliptic_curve */
 	ec->G = mpi_point_new(0);
-	if (!ec->G)
+	if (!ec->G) {
+		mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
 		goto free;
+	}
 
 	mpi_set(ec->G->x, x);
 	mpi_set(ec->G->y, y);
@@ -91,6 +98,7 @@ static int sm2_ec_ctx_init(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec)
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	ec->n = mpi_scanval(ecp->n);
 	if (!ec->n) {
+		mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
 		mpi_point_release(ec->G);
 		goto free;
 	}
@@ -386,27 +394,15 @@ static int sm2_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
 	MPI a;
 	int rc;
 
-	ec->Q = mpi_point_new(0);
-	if (!ec->Q)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	/* include the uncompressed flag '0x04' */
-	rc = -ENOMEM;
 	a = mpi_read_raw_data(key, keylen);
 	if (!a)
-		goto error;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	mpi_normalize(a);
 	rc = sm2_ecc_os2ec(ec->Q, a);
 	mpi_free(a);
-	if (rc)
-		goto error;
-
-	return 0;
 
-error:
-	mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
-	ec->Q = NULL;
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH v2 2/7] lib/mpi: use kcalloc in mpi_resize

[Hongbo Li]

From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>

We should set the additional space to 0 in mpi_resize().
So use kcalloc() instead of kmalloc_array().

In lib/mpi/ec.c:
/****************
 * Resize the array of A to NLIMBS. the additional space is cleared
 * (set to 0) [done by m_realloc()]
 */
int mpi_resize(MPI a, unsigned nlimbs)

Like the comment of kernel's mpi_resize(), the additional space
need to set to 0, but when a->d is not NULL, it does not set.

The kernel's mpi lib is from libgcrypt, the mpi resize in libgcrypt
is _gcry_mpi_resize() which set the additional space to 0.

This bug may cause mpi api which use mpi_resize() get wrong result
under the condition of using the additional space without initiation.
If this condition is not met, the bug would not be triggered.
Currently in kernel, rsa, sm2 and dh use mpi lib, and they works well,
so the bug is not triggered in these cases. 

add_points_edwards() use the additional space directly, so it will
get a wrong result, and lead to a failed eddsa verification.

Fixes: cdec9cb5167a ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)")
Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
---
 lib/mpi/mpiutil.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
index 3c63710c20c6..e6c4b3180ab1 100644
--- a/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
+++ b/lib/mpi/mpiutil.c
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int mpi_resize(MPI a, unsigned nlimbs)
 		return 0;	/* no need to do it */
 
 	if (a->d) {
-		p = kmalloc_array(nlimbs, sizeof(mpi_limb_t), GFP_KERNEL);
+		p = kcalloc(nlimbs, sizeof(mpi_limb_t), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!p)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		memcpy(p, a->d, a->alloced * sizeof(mpi_limb_t));
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH v2 3/7] lib/mpi: export some common function

[Hongbo Li]

From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>

Export mpi_add_ui() and mpi_sub() that are used by the following
eddsa patch.

Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
---
 lib/mpi/mpi-add.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpi-add.c b/lib/mpi/mpi-add.c
index 2cdae54c1bd0..d34c6c1c6fab 100644
--- a/lib/mpi/mpi-add.c
+++ b/lib/mpi/mpi-add.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ void mpi_add_ui(MPI w, MPI u, unsigned long v)
 	w->nlimbs = wsize;
 	w->sign   = wsign;
 }
-
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_add_ui);
 
 void mpi_add(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v)
 {
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ void mpi_sub(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v)
 	mpi_add(w, u, vv);
 	mpi_free(vv);
 }
-
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_sub);
 
 void mpi_addm(MPI w, MPI u, MPI v, MPI m)
 {
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH v2 4/7] x509: add support for eddsa

[Hongbo Li]

From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>

This patch make x509 support eddsa(currently ed25519). According to
RFC8032 section 5.1.7[1], the digest is not on the original message,
but on a special formated message string:
	SHA512(dom2(F, C) || R || A || PH(M))

[1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7

Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c       | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 14 ++++-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  |  4 +-
 include/linux/oid_registry.h              |  1 +
 4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 4fefb219bfdc..c1236a8fb38e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -251,8 +251,8 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
 }
 
 #if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2)
-static int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
-				  struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey)
+static int sm2_cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
+				      struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey)
 {
 	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static int cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
 	return ret;
 }
 #else
-static inline int cert_sig_digest_update(
+static inline int sm2_cert_sig_digest_update(
 	const struct public_key_signature *sig,
 	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm_pkey)
 {
@@ -305,6 +305,58 @@ static inline int cert_sig_digest_update(
 }
 #endif /* ! IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM2) */
 
+static int eddsa_cert_sig_digest_update(const struct public_key *pub,
+					const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
+	struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
+	int key_size, ret = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(pub->pkey_algo, "eddsa-25519"))
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free;
+	}
+
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+	/* RFC8032 section 5.1.7
+	 * step 2. SHA512(dom2(F, C) || R || A || PH(M))
+	 */
+	key_size = 32;
+	if (sig->s_size != key_size * 2 ||
+	    pub->keylen != key_size) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto free;
+	}
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto free;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, sig->s, key_size);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto free;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pub->key, key_size);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto free;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sig->data, sig->data_size, sig->digest);
+
+free:
+	kfree(desc);
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * Verify a signature using a public key.
  */
@@ -358,11 +410,16 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
 	if (ret)
 		goto error_free_key;
 
-	if (sig->pkey_algo && strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 &&
-	    sig->data_size) {
-		ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
-		if (ret)
-			goto error_free_key;
+	if (sig->pkey_algo && sig->data_size) {
+		if (strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) {
+			ret = sm2_cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
+			if (ret)
+				goto error_free_key;
+		} else if (strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "eddsa") == 0) {
+			ret = eddsa_cert_sig_digest_update(pkey, sig);
+			if (ret)
+				goto error_free_key;
+		}
 	}
 
 	sg_init_table(src_sg, 2);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 6d003096b5bc..3f60c57d8d76 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -258,6 +258,9 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 	case OID_SM2_with_SM3:
 		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sm3";
 		goto sm2;
+	case OID_ed25519:
+		ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
+		goto eddsa;
 	}
 
 rsa_pkcs1:
@@ -280,6 +283,11 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "x962";
 	ctx->algo_oid = ctx->last_oid;
 	return 0;
+eddsa:
+	ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "eddsa";
+	ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";
+	ctx->algo_oid = ctx->last_oid;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -302,7 +310,8 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 	if (strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") == 0) {
+	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo, "eddsa") == 0) {
 		/* Discard the BIT STRING metadata */
 		if (vlen < 1 || *(const u8 *)value != 0)
 			return -EBADMSG;
@@ -517,6 +526,9 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
 			return -ENOPKG;
 		}
 		break;
+	case OID_ed25519:
+		ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "eddsa-25519";
+		break;
 	default:
 		return -ENOPKG;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 3d45161b271a..a8fd3682695f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -131,7 +131,9 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 	ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
 	if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
 	    (strncmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
-	     strcmp(cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
+	     strcmp(cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0) &&
+	    (strncmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, "eddsa-", 6) != 0 ||
+	     strcmp(cert->sig->pkey_algo, "eddsa") != 0))
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index cc64d9419746..d84bb867a1f9 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ enum OID {
 
 	OID_certAuthInfoAccess,		/* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */
 	OID_sha1,			/* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */
+	OID_ed25519,			/* 1.3.101.112 */
 	OID_id_ansip384r1,		/* 1.3.132.0.34 */
 	OID_sha256,			/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */
 	OID_sha384,			/* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2 */
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH v2 5/7] crypto: move common code in sm2 to ec_mpi.c and ec_mpi.h

[Hongbo Li]

From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>

Some structs and functions in sm2 are common codes, and could be
used by the following eddsa patch. So move them to common files:
ec_mpi.c and ec_mpi.h.

Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
---
 crypto/Kconfig  |  4 ++
 crypto/Makefile |  1 +
 crypto/ec_mpi.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/ec_mpi.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/sm2.c    | 98 ++-----------------------------------------------
 5 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/ec_mpi.c
 create mode 100644 crypto/ec_mpi.h

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 4a0d1876aadb..75ae7d3f6f92 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -265,6 +265,9 @@ config CRYPTO_ECRDSA
 	  standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). Only signature verification
 	  is implemented.
 
+config CRYPTO_EC_MPI
+	tristate
+
 config CRYPTO_SM2
 	tristate "SM2 algorithm"
 	select CRYPTO_SM3
@@ -272,6 +275,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SM2
 	select CRYPTO_MANAGER
 	select MPILIB
 	select ASN1
+	select CRYPTO_EC_MPI
 	help
 	  Generic implementation of the SM2 public key algorithm. It was
 	  published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China.
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 10526d4559b8..8afb39359776 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CURVE25519) += curve25519-generic.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_EC_MPI) += ec_mpi.o
 
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
diff --git a/crypto/ec_mpi.c b/crypto/ec_mpi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a537e6fc713f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ec_mpi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * EC MPI common functions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, Alibaba Group.
+ * Authors: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mpi.h>
+#include "ec_mpi.h"
+
+int ec_mpi_ctx_init(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec, const struct ecc_domain_parms *ecp)
+{
+	MPI p, a, b;
+	MPI x, y;
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	p = mpi_scanval(ecp->p);
+	a = mpi_scanval(ecp->a);
+	b = mpi_scanval(ecp->b);
+	if (!p || !a || !b)
+		goto free_p;
+
+	x = mpi_scanval(ecp->g_x);
+	y = mpi_scanval(ecp->g_y);
+	if (!x || !y)
+		goto free;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+	ec->Q = mpi_point_new(0);
+	if (!ec->Q)
+		goto free;
+
+	/* mpi_ec_setup_elliptic_curve */
+	ec->G = mpi_point_new(0);
+	if (!ec->G) {
+		mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
+		goto free;
+	}
+
+	mpi_set(ec->G->x, x);
+	mpi_set(ec->G->y, y);
+	mpi_set_ui(ec->G->z, 1);
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	ec->n = mpi_scanval(ecp->n);
+	if (!ec->n) {
+		mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
+		mpi_point_release(ec->G);
+		goto free;
+	}
+
+	ec->h = ecp->h;
+	ec->name = ecp->desc;
+	mpi_ec_init(ec, ecp->model, ecp->dialect, 0, p, a, b);
+
+	rc = 0;
+
+free:
+	mpi_free(x);
+	mpi_free(y);
+free_p:
+	mpi_free(p);
+	mpi_free(a);
+	mpi_free(b);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ec_mpi_ctx_init);
+
+void ec_mpi_ctx_deinit(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec)
+{
+	mpi_ec_deinit(ec);
+
+	memset(ec, 0, sizeof(*ec));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ec_mpi_ctx_deinit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>");
diff --git a/crypto/ec_mpi.h b/crypto/ec_mpi.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e1f6d3aaeef9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/ec_mpi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * EC MPI common structs.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2020, Alibaba Group.
+ * Authors: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mpi.h>
+
+struct ecc_domain_parms {
+	const char *desc;           /* Description of the curve.  */
+	unsigned int nbits;         /* Number of bits.  */
+	unsigned int fips:1; /* True if this is a FIPS140-2 approved curve */
+
+	/* The model describing this curve.  This is mainly used to select
+	 * the group equation.
+	 */
+	enum gcry_mpi_ec_models model;
+
+	/* The actual ECC dialect used.  This is used for curve specific
+	 * optimizations and to select encodings etc.
+	 */
+	enum ecc_dialects dialect;
+
+	const char *p;              /* The prime defining the field.  */
+	const char *a, *b;          /* The coefficients.  For Twisted Edwards
+				     * Curves b is used for d.  For Montgomery
+				     * Curves (a,b) has ((A-2)/4,B^-1).
+				     */
+	const char *n;              /* The order of the base point.  */
+	const char *g_x, *g_y;      /* Base point.  */
+	unsigned int h;             /* Cofactor.  */
+};
+
+int ec_mpi_ctx_init(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec, const struct ecc_domain_parms *ecp);
+void ec_mpi_ctx_deinit(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec);
diff --git a/crypto/sm2.c b/crypto/sm2.c
index db8a4a265669..ea1676ba1a9a 100644
--- a/crypto/sm2.c
+++ b/crypto/sm2.c
@@ -9,42 +9,17 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/mpi.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
 #include <crypto/akcipher.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/sm3_base.h>
 #include <crypto/rng.h>
 #include <crypto/sm2.h>
+#include "ec_mpi.h"
 #include "sm2signature.asn1.h"
 
 #define MPI_NBYTES(m)   ((mpi_get_nbits(m) + 7) / 8)
 
-struct ecc_domain_parms {
-	const char *desc;           /* Description of the curve.  */
-	unsigned int nbits;         /* Number of bits.  */
-	unsigned int fips:1; /* True if this is a FIPS140-2 approved curve */
-
-	/* The model describing this curve.  This is mainly used to select
-	 * the group equation.
-	 */
-	enum gcry_mpi_ec_models model;
-
-	/* The actual ECC dialect used.  This is used for curve specific
-	 * optimizations and to select encodings etc.
-	 */
-	enum ecc_dialects dialect;
-
-	const char *p;              /* The prime defining the field.  */
-	const char *a, *b;          /* The coefficients.  For Twisted Edwards
-				     * Curves b is used for d.  For Montgomery
-				     * Curves (a,b) has ((A-2)/4,B^-1).
-				     */
-	const char *n;              /* The order of the base point.  */
-	const char *g_x, *g_y;      /* Base point.  */
-	unsigned int h;             /* Cofactor.  */
-};
-
 static const struct ecc_domain_parms sm2_ecp = {
 	.desc = "sm2p256v1",
 	.nbits = 256,
@@ -60,73 +35,6 @@ static const struct ecc_domain_parms sm2_ecp = {
 	.h = 1
 };
 
-static int sm2_ec_ctx_init(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec)
-{
-	const struct ecc_domain_parms *ecp = &sm2_ecp;
-	MPI p, a, b;
-	MPI x, y;
-	int rc = -EINVAL;
-
-	p = mpi_scanval(ecp->p);
-	a = mpi_scanval(ecp->a);
-	b = mpi_scanval(ecp->b);
-	if (!p || !a || !b)
-		goto free_p;
-
-	x = mpi_scanval(ecp->g_x);
-	y = mpi_scanval(ecp->g_y);
-	if (!x || !y)
-		goto free;
-
-	rc = -ENOMEM;
-
-	ec->Q = mpi_point_new(0);
-	if (!ec->Q)
-		goto free;
-
-	/* mpi_ec_setup_elliptic_curve */
-	ec->G = mpi_point_new(0);
-	if (!ec->G) {
-		mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
-		goto free;
-	}
-
-	mpi_set(ec->G->x, x);
-	mpi_set(ec->G->y, y);
-	mpi_set_ui(ec->G->z, 1);
-
-	rc = -EINVAL;
-	ec->n = mpi_scanval(ecp->n);
-	if (!ec->n) {
-		mpi_point_release(ec->Q);
-		mpi_point_release(ec->G);
-		goto free;
-	}
-
-	ec->h = ecp->h;
-	ec->name = ecp->desc;
-	mpi_ec_init(ec, ecp->model, ecp->dialect, 0, p, a, b);
-
-	rc = 0;
-
-free:
-	mpi_free(x);
-	mpi_free(y);
-free_p:
-	mpi_free(p);
-	mpi_free(a);
-	mpi_free(b);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-static void sm2_ec_ctx_deinit(struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec)
-{
-	mpi_ec_deinit(ec);
-
-	memset(ec, 0, sizeof(*ec));
-}
-
 /* RESULT must have been initialized and is set on success to the
  * point given by VALUE.
  */
@@ -416,14 +324,14 @@ static int sm2_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
 {
 	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	return sm2_ec_ctx_init(ec);
+	return ec_mpi_ctx_init(ec, &sm2_ecp);
 }
 
 static void sm2_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
 {
 	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
-	sm2_ec_ctx_deinit(ec);
+	ec_mpi_ctx_deinit(ec);
 }
 
 static struct akcipher_alg sm2 = {
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: ed25519 cert verification

[Hongbo Li]

From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>

This patch adds the support of eddsa(currently ed25519) verification
which is described in RFC8032 section 5.1.7 [1].

[1]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7

Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
---
 crypto/Kconfig  |  11 ++
 crypto/Makefile |   3 +
 crypto/eddsa.c  | 326 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 340 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 crypto/eddsa.c

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 75ae7d3f6f92..6463c85c8416 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -268,6 +268,17 @@ config CRYPTO_ECRDSA
 config CRYPTO_EC_MPI
 	tristate
 
+config CRYPTO_EDDSA
+	tristate "EDDSA (ed25519) algorithm"
+	select CRYPTO_ECC
+	select CRYPTO_EC_MPI
+	select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
+	select ASN1
+	help
+	  Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ed25519) is a variant
+	  of Schnorr's signature system with (possibly twisted) Edwards curves.
+	  Only signature verification is implemented.
+
 config CRYPTO_SM2
 	tristate "SM2 algorithm"
 	select CRYPTO_SM3
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 8afb39359776..2bbdfada893c 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsa.o
 ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsasignature.asn1.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA) += ecdsa_generic.o
 
+eddsa_generic-y += eddsa.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_EDDSA) += eddsa_generic.o
+
 crypto_acompress-y := acompress.o
 crypto_acompress-y += scompress.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ACOMP2) += crypto_acompress.o
diff --git a/crypto/eddsa.c b/crypto/eddsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e9eec5574b67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/eddsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * EDDSA generic algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mpi.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <crypto/ecdh.h>
+#include <crypto/curve25519.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
+#include "ec_mpi.h"
+
+struct eddsa_ctx {
+	enum OID algo_oid;
+	struct mpi_ec_ctx ec_ctx;
+};
+
+static MPI p58;
+static MPI seven;
+static MPI m1;
+
+static const struct ecc_domain_parms ed25519_domain_params = {
+	.desc = "ed25519",
+	.nbits = 256,
+	.fips = 0,
+	.model = MPI_EC_EDWARDS,
+	.dialect = ECC_DIALECT_ED25519,
+	.p = "0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFED",
+	.a = "-0x01",
+	.b = "-0x2DFC9311D490018C7338BF8688861767FF8FF5B2BEBE27548A14B235ECA6874A",
+	.n = "0x1000000000000000000000000000000014DEF9DEA2F79CD65812631A5CF5D3ED",
+	.g_x = "0x216936D3CD6E53FEC0A4E231FDD6DC5C692CC7609525A7B2C9562D608F25D51A",
+	.g_y = "0x6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666658",
+	.h = 8,
+};
+
+static void reverse_buffer(u8 *buffer, u32 length)
+{
+	u32 tmp, i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < length / 2; i++) {
+		tmp = buffer[i];
+		buffer[i] = buffer[length - 1 - i];
+		buffer[length - 1 - i] = tmp;
+	}
+}
+
+static int eddsa_encode_x_y(MPI x, MPI y, u8 *buf, u32 key_size)
+{
+	memcpy(buf, y->d, key_size);
+	if (mpi_test_bit(x, 0))
+		buf[key_size - 1] |= 0x80;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecc_eddsa_encodepoint(MPI_POINT point, struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec,
+				 MPI x, MPI y, u8 *buf, u32 key_size)
+{
+	if (mpi_ec_get_affine(x, y, point, ec))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return eddsa_encode_x_y(x, y, buf, key_size);
+}
+
+/* Recover X from Y and SIGN (which actually is a parity bit).  */
+static int eddsa_recover_x(MPI x, MPI y, int sign, struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec)
+{
+	MPI u, v, v3, t;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (ec->dialect != ECC_DIALECT_ED25519)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	u = mpi_new(0);
+	v = mpi_new(0);
+	v3 = mpi_new(0);
+	t = mpi_new(0);
+
+	/* Compute u and v */
+	/* u = y^2 */
+	mpi_mulm(u, y, y, ec->p);
+	/* v = b*y^2 */
+	mpi_mulm(v, ec->b, u, ec->p);
+	/* u = y^2-1 */
+	mpi_sub_ui(u, u, 1);
+	/* v = b*y^2+1 */
+	mpi_add_ui(v, v, 1);
+
+	/* Compute sqrt(u/v) */
+	/* v3 = v^3 */
+	mpi_powm(v3, v, mpi_const(MPI_C_THREE), ec->p);
+	/* t = v3 * v3 * u * v = u * v^7 */
+	mpi_powm(t, v, seven, ec->p);
+	mpi_mulm(t, t, u, ec->p);
+	/* t = t^((p-5)/8) = (u * v^7)^((p-5)/8)  */
+	mpi_powm(t, t, p58, ec->p);
+	/* x = t * u * v^3 = (u * v^3) * (u * v^7)^((p-5)/8) */
+	mpi_mulm(t, t, u, ec->p);
+	mpi_mulm(x, t, v3, ec->p);
+
+	/* Adjust if needed. */
+	/* t = v * x^2 */
+	mpi_mulm(t, x, x, ec->p);
+	mpi_mulm(t, t, v, ec->p);
+	/* -t == u ? x = x * sqrt(-1) */
+	mpi_sub(t, ec->p, t);
+	if (!mpi_cmp(t, u)) {
+		mpi_mulm(x, x, m1, ec->p);
+		/* t = v * x^2 */
+		mpi_mulm(t, x, x, ec->p);
+		mpi_mulm(t, t, v, ec->p);
+		/* -t == u ? x = x * sqrt(-1) */
+		mpi_sub(t, ec->p, t);
+		if (!mpi_cmp(t, u))
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Choose the desired square root according to parity */
+	if (mpi_test_bit(x, 0) != !!sign)
+		mpi_sub(x, ec->p, x);
+
+	mpi_free(t);
+	mpi_free(v3);
+	mpi_free(v);
+	mpi_free(u);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecc_eddsa_decodepoint(const u8 *pk, int key_size,
+				 struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec, MPI_POINT result)
+{
+	MPI y;
+	u8 *rawmpi;
+	int sign, ret = 0;
+
+	rawmpi = kmalloc(key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rawmpi)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(rawmpi, pk, key_size);
+	reverse_buffer(rawmpi, key_size);
+
+	sign = !!(rawmpi[0] & 0x80);
+	rawmpi[0] &= 0x7f;
+
+	y = mpi_read_raw_data(rawmpi, key_size);
+	if (!y) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	mpi_normalize(y);
+	mpi_set(result->y, y);
+	mpi_free(y);
+
+	ret = eddsa_recover_x(result->x, result->y, sign, ec);
+	mpi_set_ui(result->z, 1);
+out:
+	kfree(rawmpi);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int eddsa_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct eddsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec = &ctx->ec_ctx;
+	struct gcry_mpi_point sb, ka;
+	MPI s = NULL;
+	MPI k = NULL;
+	u8 sig[CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 2],digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	u8 *buf;
+	u32 key_size;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (ctx->algo_oid != OID_ed25519)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	key_size = CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	if (!ec->Q || req->src_len != key_size * 2)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	sg_copy_to_buffer(req->src, sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->src_len),
+			  sig, req->src_len);
+
+	sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src,
+			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
+					    req->src_len + req->dst_len),
+			   digest, req->dst_len, req->src_len);
+
+	reverse_buffer(digest, SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	k = mpi_read_raw_data(digest, SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	reverse_buffer(sig + key_size, key_size);
+	s = mpi_read_raw_data(sig + key_size, key_size);
+
+	mpi_point_init(&sb);
+	mpi_point_init(&ka);
+
+	mpi_ec_mul_point(&sb, s, ec->G, ec);
+	mpi_ec_mul_point(&ka, k, ec->Q, ec);
+	mpi_sub(ka.x, ec->p, ka.x);
+	mpi_ec_add_points(&sb, &sb, &ka, ec);
+
+	buf = kmalloc(key_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = ecc_eddsa_encodepoint(&sb, ec, s, k, buf, key_size);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (memcmp(buf, sig, key_size))
+		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+out:
+	mpi_point_free_parts(&sb);
+	mpi_point_free_parts(&ka);
+	mpi_free(k);
+	mpi_free(s);
+	kfree(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int eddsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
+			     unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct eddsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct mpi_ec_ctx *ec = &ctx->ec_ctx;
+	const u8 *pk = key;
+
+	if (ctx->algo_oid != OID_ed25519)
+		return -ENOPKG;
+
+	if (keylen != CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return ecc_eddsa_decodepoint(pk, keylen, ec, ec->Q);
+}
+
+static u32 eddsa_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct eddsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (ctx->algo_oid == OID_ed25519)
+		return CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int eddsa_25519_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct eddsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->algo_oid = OID_ed25519;
+	p58 = mpi_scanval("0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFD");
+	if (!p58)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	m1 = mpi_scanval("2B8324804FC1DF0B2B4D00993DFBD7A72F431806AD2FE478C4EE1B274A0EA0B0");
+	if (!m1)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	seven = mpi_set_ui(NULL, 7);
+
+	return ec_mpi_ctx_init(&ctx->ec_ctx, &ed25519_domain_params);
+}
+
+static void eddsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct eddsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ec_mpi_ctx_deinit(&ctx->ec_ctx);
+	mpi_free(p58);
+	mpi_free(seven);
+	mpi_free(m1);
+}
+
+
+static struct akcipher_alg eddsa_25519 = {
+	.verify = eddsa_verify,
+	.set_pub_key = eddsa_set_pub_key,
+	.max_size = eddsa_max_size,
+	.init = eddsa_25519_init_tfm,
+	.exit = eddsa_exit_tfm,
+	.base = {
+		.cra_name = "eddsa-25519",
+		.cra_driver_name = "eddsa-25519-generic",
+		.cra_priority = 100,
+		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct eddsa_ctx),
+	},
+};
+
+static int eddsa_mod_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_akcipher(&eddsa_25519);
+}
+
+static void eddsa_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_akcipher(&eddsa_25519);
+}
+
+module_init(eddsa_mod_init);
+module_exit(eddsa_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("eddsa");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("eddsa-generic");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("EDDSA generic algorithm");
-- 
2.27.0

[PATCH v2 7/7] crypto: add eddsa test vector

[Hongbo Li]

From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>

This patch adds the test vector for ed25519.
The test vector is from RFC8032 section 7.1 [1]

[1]https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8032#section-7.1

Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
---
 crypto/testmgr.c |  6 ++++++
 crypto/testmgr.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 10c5b3b01ec4..498d1866ef77 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -4938,6 +4938,12 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.suite = {
 			.akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
 		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "eddsa-25519",
+		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.akcipher = __VECS(eddsa_25519_tv_template)
+		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)",
 		.test = alg_test_aead,
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 34e4a3db3991..11807a308ef9 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -1144,6 +1144,38 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec ecrdsa_tv_template[] = {
 	},
 };
 
+/*
+ * EDDSA test vectors.
+ * From RFC8032 section 7.1
+ */
+static const struct akcipher_testvec eddsa_25519_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+	.key =
+	"\x3d\x40\x17\xc3\xe8\x43\x89\x5a\x92\xb7\x0a\xa7\x4d\x1b\x7e\xbc"
+	"\x9c\x98\x2c\xcf\x2e\xc4\x96\x8c\xc0\xcd\x55\xf1\x2a\xf4\x66\x0c",
+	.key_len = 32,
+	/*
+	 * RFC8032 section 5.1.7. m is SHA512(dom2(F, C) || R || A || PH(M))
+	 * M is 0x72
+	 */
+	.m =
+	"\xa2\x71\xdf\x0d\x2b\x0d\x03\xbd\x17\xb4\xed\x9a\x4b\x6a\xfd\xdf"
+	"\x2e\x73\x28\x7f\xd6\x30\xf1\xa1\x37\xd8\x7c\xe8\x73\xa5\x91\xcc"
+	"\x31\xb6\xdd\x85\x2a\x98\xb5\xdd\x12\x26\xfe\x99\x3d\x82\x28\x27"
+	"\x8c\xeb\xa2\x1f\x80\xb8\xfc\x95\x98\x6a\x70\xd7\x1e\xdf\x3f\xaf",
+	.m_size = 64,
+	.c =
+	"\x92\xa0\x09\xa9\xf0\xd4\xca\xb8\x72\x0e\x82\x0b\x5f\x64\x25\x40"
+	"\xa2\xb2\x7b\x54\x16\x50\x3f\x8f\xb3\x76\x22\x23\xeb\xdb\x69\xda"
+	"\x08\x5a\xc1\xe4\x3e\x15\x99\x6e\x45\x8f\x36\x13\xd0\xf1\x1d\x8c"
+	"\x38\x7b\x2e\xae\xb4\x30\x2a\xee\xb0\x0d\x29\x16\x12\xbb\x0c\x00",
+	.c_size = 64,
+	.algo = OID_ed25519,
+	.public_key_vec = true,
+	.siggen_sigver_test = true,
+	}
+};
+
 /*
  * PKCS#1 RSA test vectors. Obtained from CAVS testing.
  */
-- 
2.27.0

Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] crypto: fix a memory leak in sm2

[Tianjia Zhang]

Hi Herbert, Hongbo,

On 5/27/21 9:53 PM, Hongbo Li wrote:
> From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
> 
> SM2 module alloc ec->Q in sm2_set_pub_key(), when doing alg test in
> test_akcipher_one(), it will set public key for every test vector,
> and don't free ec->Q. This will cause a memory leak.
> 
> This patch alloc ec->Q in sm2_ec_ctx_init().
> 
> Fixes: ea7ecb66440b ("crypto: sm2 - introduce OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm")
> Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
> Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
> ---
>   crypto/sm2.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
>   1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 

Patch 1/7 is an independent bugfix patch. If possible, consider applying 
it first.

The commit message header should start with: crypto: sm2 -

Also added:

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+

Best regards,
Tianjia

Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] crypto: fix a memory leak in sm2

[hongbo li]

Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> 于2021年5月28日周五 下午2:27写道：
>
> Hi Herbert, Hongbo,
>
> On 5/27/21 9:53 PM, Hongbo Li wrote:
> > From: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
> >
> > SM2 module alloc ec->Q in sm2_set_pub_key(), when doing alg test in
> > test_akcipher_one(), it will set public key for every test vector,
> > and don't free ec->Q. This will cause a memory leak.
> >
> > This patch alloc ec->Q in sm2_ec_ctx_init().
> >
> > Fixes: ea7ecb66440b ("crypto: sm2 - introduce OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm")
> > Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <herberthbli@tencent.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
> > ---
> >   crypto/sm2.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
> >   1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> >
>
> Patch 1/7 is an independent bugfix patch. If possible, consider applying
> it first.
>
> The commit message header should start with: crypto: sm2 -
>
> Also added:
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
>
> Best regards,
> Tianjia

OK, will send this patch later.

Regards,
Hongbo