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From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Damian Tometzki <linux_dti@icloud.com>,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dock, Deneen T" <deneen.t.dock@intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/20] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching
Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 16:39:19 -0800
Message-ID: <162C6C29-CD81-46FE-9A54-6ED05A93A9CB@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190129003422.9328-6-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

> On Jan 28, 2019, at 4:34 PM, Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
> 
> To prevent improper use of the PTEs that are used for text patching, we
> want to use a temporary mm struct. We initailize it by copying the init
> mm.
> 
> The address that will be used for patching is taken from the lower area
> that is usually used for the task memory. Doing so prevents the need to
> frequently synchronize the temporary-mm (e.g., when BPF programs are
> installed), since different PGDs are used for the task memory.
> 
> Finally, we randomize the address of the PTEs to harden against exploits
> that use these PTEs.
> 
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
> Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       |  3 +++
> arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h |  2 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c        |  3 +++
> arch/x86/mm/init_64.c                | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> init/main.c                          |  3 +++
> 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index 40616e805292..e8f630d9a2ed 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -1021,6 +1021,9 @@ static inline void __meminit init_trampoline_default(void)
> 	/* Default trampoline pgd value */
> 	trampoline_pgd_entry = init_top_pgt[pgd_index(__PAGE_OFFSET)];
> }
> +
> +void __init poking_init(void);
> +
> # ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
> void __meminit init_trampoline(void);
> # else
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
> index f8fc8e86cf01..a75eed841eed 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
> @@ -39,5 +39,7 @@ extern void *text_poke_kgdb(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
> extern int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs);
> extern void *text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler);
> extern int after_bootmem;
> +extern __ro_after_init struct mm_struct *poking_mm;
> +extern __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
> 
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_TEXT_PATCHING_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> index 12fddbc8c55b..ae05fbb50171 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
> @@ -678,6 +678,9 @@ void *__init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
> 	return addr;
> }
> 
> +__ro_after_init struct mm_struct *poking_mm;
> +__ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
> +
> static void *__text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
> {
> 	unsigned long flags;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
> index bccff68e3267..125c8c48aa24 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
> @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
> #include <asm/init.h>
> #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
> #include <asm/setup.h>
> +#include <asm/text-patching.h>
> 
> #include "mm_internal.h"
> 
> @@ -1383,6 +1384,41 @@ unsigned long memory_block_size_bytes(void)
> 	return memory_block_size_probed;
> }
> 
> +/*
> + * Initialize an mm_struct to be used during poking and a pointer to be used
> + * during patching.
> + */
> +void __init poking_init(void)
> +{
> +	spinlock_t *ptl;
> +	pte_t *ptep;
> +
> +	poking_mm = copy_init_mm();
> +	BUG_ON(!poking_mm);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Randomize the poking address, but make sure that the following page
> +	 * will be mapped at the same PMD. We need 2 pages, so find space for 3,
> +	 * and adjust the address if the PMD ends after the first one.
> +	 */
> +	poking_addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
> +		poking_addr += (kaslr_get_random_long("Poking") & PAGE_MASK) %
> +			(TASK_SIZE - TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE - 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +	if (((poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE) & ~PMD_MASK) == 0)
> +		poking_addr += PAGE_SIZE;

Further thinking about it, I think that allocating the virtual address for
poking from user address-range is problematic. The user can set watchpoints
on different addresses, cause some static-keys to be enabled/disabled, and
monitor the signals to derandomize the poking address.

Andy, I think you were pushing this change. Can I go back to use a vmalloc’d
address instead, or do you have a better solution? I prefer not to
save/restore DR7, of course.


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-29  0:34 [PATCH v2 00/20] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()" Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-31 11:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-31 22:19     ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-01  0:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-01  0:25         ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-04 14:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] fork: provide a function for copying init_mm Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-05  8:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-05  9:03     ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-05  9:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11  0:39   ` Nadav Amit [this message]
2019-02-11  5:18     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11 18:04       ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 19:07         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11 19:18           ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 22:47             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12 18:23               ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-05  9:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-05 11:31     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-05 12:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-05 13:25         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-05 17:54         ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-05 13:29       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] x86/kgdb: avoid redundant comparison of patched code Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] x86/ftrace: set trampoline pages as executable Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] x86/kprobes: instruction pages initialization enhancements Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-11 18:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 19:36     ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-11 18:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 18:45     ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 19:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 19:09         ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 19:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 19:27             ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 19:42               ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 20:32                 ` Nadav Amit
2019-03-07 15:10                   ` [PATCH] x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has() Borislav Petkov
2019-03-07 16:43                     ` hpa
2019-03-07 17:02                       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-03-07  7:29                 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Borislav Petkov
2019-03-07 16:53                   ` hpa
2019-03-07 17:06                     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-03-07 20:02                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-07 20:25                         ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-11 18:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] Add set_alias_ function and x86 implementation Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-11 19:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 19:27     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-02-11 22:59     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12  0:01       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-19 11:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-19 21:28     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-02-20 16:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] vmalloc: New flags for safe vfree on special perms Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-19 12:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-19 19:42     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-02-20 16:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] modules: Use vmalloc special flag Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] bpf: " Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] x86/ftrace: " Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] x86/kprobes: " Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] x86/alternative: comment about module removal races Rick Edgecombe

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