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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, ross.philipson@oracle.com,
	dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
	kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 22:54:36 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1645070085-14255-4-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1645070085-14255-1-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

Initial bits to bring in Secure Launch functionality. Add Kconfig
options for compiling in/out the Secure Launch code.

Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 9f5bd41..3f69aeb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1983,6 +1983,40 @@ config EFI_MIXED
 
 	   If unsure, say N.
 
+config SECURE_LAUNCH
+	bool "Secure Launch support"
+	default n
+	depends on X86_64 && X86_X2APIC
+	help
+	   The Secure Launch feature allows a kernel to be loaded
+	   directly through an Intel TXT measured launch. Intel TXT
+	   establishes a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
+	   where the CPU measures the kernel image. This feature then
+	   continues the measurement chain over kernel configuration
+	   information and init images.
+
+config SECURE_LAUNCH_ALT_DLME_AUTHORITY
+	bool "Secure Launch Alternate DLME Authority PCR"
+	default n
+	depends on SECURE_LAUNCH
+	help
+	   As the DLME environment, Secure Launch by default measures
+	   the configuration information as the DLME Authority into
+	   PCR18. This feature allows separating these measurements
+	   into the TCG DRTM specification PCR (PCR.DLME_AUTHORITY),
+	   PCR19.
+
+config SECURE_LAUNCH_ALT_DLME_DETAIL
+	bool "Secure Launch Alternate DLME Detail PCR"
+	default n
+	depends on SECURE_LAUNCH
+	help
+	   As the DLME environment, Secure Launch by default measures
+	   the image data like any external initrd as a DRTM Detail
+	   into PCR17. This feature allows separating these
+	   measurements into the Secure Launch's Detail PCR
+	   (PCR.DLME_DETAIL), PCR20.
+
 source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
 
 config KEXEC
-- 
1.8.3.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-18 15:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-17  3:54 [PATCH v5 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2022-02-17  3:54 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2022-02-23 17:45 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Dave Hansen
2022-02-25 18:57   ` Daniel P. Smith

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