Linux-Integrity Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / Atom feed
From: ndesaulniers@google.com
To: jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: natechancellor@gmail.com, ebiggers@google.com,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warning
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2018 13:31:26 -0700
Message-ID: <20181011203126.15338-1-ndesaulniers@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1539274203.2623.56.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

by swapping h2 and h3.

security/keys/trusted.c:146:17: warning: passing an object that
undergoes default
      argument promotion to 'va_start' has undefined behavior [-Wvarargs]
        va_start(argp, h3);
                       ^
security/keys/trusted.c:126:37: note: parameter of type 'unsigned
char' is declared here
unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
                               ^

Specifically, it seems that both the C90 (4.8.1.1) and C11 (7.16.1.4)
standards explicitly call this out as undefined behavior:

The parameter parmN is the identifier of the rightmost parameter in
the variable parameter list in the function definition (the one just
before the ...). If the parameter parmN is declared with ... or with a
type that is not compatible with the type that results after
application of the default argument promotions, the behavior is
undefined.

Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/41
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
---
 security/keys/trusted.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index b69d3b1777c2..d425b2b839af 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
  */
 static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 			unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
-			unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
+			unsigned char h2, unsigned char *h3, ...)
 {
 	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	struct sdesc *sdesc;
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
 	}
 
-	c = h3;
+	c = h2;
 	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 	if (!ret)
 		ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 				  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
-				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h3, 1, &c, 0, 0);
 out:
 	kzfree(sdesc);
 	return ret;
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
 	if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
 		/* no pcr info specified */
 		ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-				   sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+				   sess.enonce, cont, td->nonceodd,
 				   sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 				   td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
 				   sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0,
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
 	} else {
 		/* pcr info specified */
 		ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-				   sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+				   sess.enonce, cont, td->nonceodd,
 				   sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 				   td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
 				   pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t),
@@ -608,12 +608,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
 		return ret;
 	}
 	ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
-			   enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+			   enonce1, cont, nonceodd, sizeof(uint32_t),
 			   &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 	ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
-			   enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+			   enonce2, cont, nonceodd, sizeof(uint32_t),
 			   &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
-- 
2.19.0.605.g01d371f741-goog

  reply index

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-09 22:11 undefined behavior (-Wvarargs) in security/keys/trusted.c#TSS_authhmac() Nick Desaulniers
2018-10-11 16:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-10-11 16:10   ` James Bottomley
2018-10-11 20:31     ` ndesaulniers [this message]
2018-10-12  1:50       ` [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warning Nathan Chancellor
2018-10-12 16:55         ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-10-12 17:03           ` Nathan Chancellor
2018-10-12 12:29       ` Denis Kenzior
2018-10-12 15:05         ` James Bottomley
2018-10-12 15:13           ` Denis Kenzior
2018-10-12 15:22             ` James Bottomley
2018-10-12 15:44               ` Denis Kenzior
2018-10-12 15:46                 ` James Bottomley
2018-10-12 15:53                   ` Denis Kenzior
2018-10-12 16:01                     ` James Bottomley
2018-10-12 17:14                       ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-10-12 15:25             ` James Bottomley
2018-10-12 17:05             ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-10-12 17:17               ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-10-12 17:27               ` Denis Kenzior
2018-10-12 18:39                 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-10-12 17:02         ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-10-12 17:15           ` Denis Kenzior
2018-10-15  9:26       ` David Laight
2018-10-15  9:26         ` David Laight
2018-10-15 21:53         ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-10-16  8:13           ` David Laight
2018-10-16  8:13             ` David Laight
2018-10-22 23:43             ` [PATCH v2] " ndesaulniers
2018-10-23  0:00               ` Nathan Chancellor
2018-10-24  8:36               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-29 17:54                 ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-02-11 18:36                   ` Nick Desaulniers
2019-02-12 23:12                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-02-14 10:52                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publically to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20181011203126.15338-1-ndesaulniers@google.com \
    --to=ndesaulniers@google.com \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiggers@google.com \
    --cc=jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=natechancellor@gmail.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

Linux-Integrity Archive on lore.kernel.org

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/0 linux-integrity/git/0.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 linux-integrity linux-integrity/ https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity \
		linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org linux-integrity@archiver.kernel.org
	public-inbox-index linux-integrity


Newsgroup available over NNTP:
	nntp://nntp.lore.kernel.org/org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity


AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/ public-inbox