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From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	linux_dti@icloud.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
	kristen@linux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com,
	Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/20] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:34:07 -0800
Message-ID: <20190129003422.9328-6-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190129003422.9328-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>

To prevent improper use of the PTEs that are used for text patching, we
want to use a temporary mm struct. We initailize it by copying the init
mm.

The address that will be used for patching is taken from the lower area
that is usually used for the task memory. Doing so prevents the need to
frequently synchronize the temporary-mm (e.g., when BPF programs are
installed), since different PGDs are used for the task memory.

Finally, we randomize the address of the PTEs to harden against exploits
that use these PTEs.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       |  3 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c        |  3 +++
 arch/x86/mm/init_64.c                | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 init/main.c                          |  3 +++
 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 40616e805292..e8f630d9a2ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1021,6 +1021,9 @@ static inline void __meminit init_trampoline_default(void)
 	/* Default trampoline pgd value */
 	trampoline_pgd_entry = init_top_pgt[pgd_index(__PAGE_OFFSET)];
 }
+
+void __init poking_init(void);
+
 # ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
 void __meminit init_trampoline(void);
 # else
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
index f8fc8e86cf01..a75eed841eed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h
@@ -39,5 +39,7 @@ extern void *text_poke_kgdb(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len);
 extern int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void *text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, void *handler);
 extern int after_bootmem;
+extern __ro_after_init struct mm_struct *poking_mm;
+extern __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TEXT_PATCHING_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 12fddbc8c55b..ae05fbb50171 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -678,6 +678,9 @@ void *__init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
 	return addr;
 }
 
+__ro_after_init struct mm_struct *poking_mm;
+__ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr;
+
 static void *__text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index bccff68e3267..125c8c48aa24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <asm/init.h>
 #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/text-patching.h>
 
 #include "mm_internal.h"
 
@@ -1383,6 +1384,41 @@ unsigned long memory_block_size_bytes(void)
 	return memory_block_size_probed;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Initialize an mm_struct to be used during poking and a pointer to be used
+ * during patching.
+ */
+void __init poking_init(void)
+{
+	spinlock_t *ptl;
+	pte_t *ptep;
+
+	poking_mm = copy_init_mm();
+	BUG_ON(!poking_mm);
+
+	/*
+	 * Randomize the poking address, but make sure that the following page
+	 * will be mapped at the same PMD. We need 2 pages, so find space for 3,
+	 * and adjust the address if the PMD ends after the first one.
+	 */
+	poking_addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
+		poking_addr += (kaslr_get_random_long("Poking") & PAGE_MASK) %
+			(TASK_SIZE - TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE - 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	if (((poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE) & ~PMD_MASK) == 0)
+		poking_addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to trigger the allocation of the page-tables that will be
+	 * needed for poking now. Later, poking may be performed in an atomic
+	 * section, which might cause allocation to fail.
+	 */
+	ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, &ptl);
+	BUG_ON(!ptep);
+	pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP
 /*
  * Initialise the sparsemem vmemmap using huge-pages at the PMD level.
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index e2e80ca3165a..f5947ba53bb4 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -496,6 +496,8 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void)
 
 void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
 
+void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
+
 bool initcall_debug;
 core_param(initcall_debug, initcall_debug, bool, 0644);
 
@@ -730,6 +732,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
 	taskstats_init_early();
 	delayacct_init();
 
+	poking_init();
 	check_bugs();
 
 	acpi_subsystem_init();
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply index

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-29  0:34 [PATCH v2 00/20] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()" Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-31 11:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-31 22:19     ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-01  0:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-01  0:25         ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-04 14:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] fork: provide a function for copying init_mm Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-05  8:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-05  9:03     ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-29  0:34 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2019-02-05  9:18   ` [PATCH v2 05/20] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11  0:39   ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11  5:18     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11 18:04       ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 19:07         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11 19:18           ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 22:47             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12 18:23               ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-05  9:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-05 11:31     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-05 12:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-05 13:25         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-05 17:54         ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-05 13:29       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] x86/kgdb: avoid redundant comparison of patched code Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] x86/ftrace: set trampoline pages as executable Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] x86/kprobes: instruction pages initialization enhancements Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-11 18:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 19:36     ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-11 18:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 18:45     ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 19:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 19:09         ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 19:10           ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 19:27             ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-11 19:42               ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 20:32                 ` Nadav Amit
2019-03-07 15:10                   ` [PATCH] x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has() Borislav Petkov
2019-03-07 16:43                     ` hpa
2019-03-07 17:02                       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-03-07  7:29                 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Borislav Petkov
2019-03-07 16:53                   ` hpa
2019-03-07 17:06                     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-03-07 20:02                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-03-07 20:25                         ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-11 18:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] Add set_alias_ function and x86 implementation Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-11 19:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-11 19:27     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-02-11 22:59     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12  0:01       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-19 11:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-19 21:28     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-02-20 16:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] vmalloc: New flags for safe vfree on special perms Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-19 12:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-02-19 19:42     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-02-20 16:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] modules: Use vmalloc special flag Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] bpf: " Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] x86/ftrace: " Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] x86/kprobes: " Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-29  0:34 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] x86/alternative: comment about module removal races Rick Edgecombe

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