From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, linux_dti@icloud.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, kristen@linux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 03/20] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 12:29:48 +0100 Message-ID: <20190131112948.GE6749@zn.tnic> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190129003422.9328-4-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> > Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 03/20] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Subject needs a verb: "Add a temporary... " On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 04:34:05PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote: > From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > > Sometimes we want to set a temporary page-table entries (PTEs) in one of s/a // Also, drop the "we" and make it impartial and passive: "Describe your changes in imperative mood, e.g. "make xyzzy do frotz" instead of "[This patch] makes xyzzy do frotz" or "[I] changed xyzzy to do frotz", as if you are giving orders to the codebase to change its behaviour." > the cores, without allowing other cores to use - even speculatively - > these mappings. There are two benefits for doing so: > > (1) Security: if sensitive PTEs are set, temporary mm prevents their use > in other cores. This hardens the security as it prevents exploding a exploding or exploiting? Or exposing? :) > dangling pointer to overwrite sensitive data using the sensitive PTE. > > (2) Avoiding TLB shootdowns: the PTEs do not need to be flushed in > remote page-tables. Those belong in the code comments below, explaining what it is going to be used for. > To do so a temporary mm_struct can be used. Mappings which are private > for this mm can be set in the userspace part of the address-space. > During the whole time in which the temporary mm is loaded, interrupts > must be disabled. > > The first use-case for temporary PTEs, which will follow, is for poking > the kernel text. > > [ Commit message was written by Nadav ] > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> > Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> > Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> > Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> > Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h > index 19d18fae6ec6..cd0c29e494a6 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h > @@ -356,4 +356,36 @@ static inline unsigned long __get_current_cr3_fast(void) > return cr3; > } > > +typedef struct { Why does it have to be a typedef? That prev.prev below looks unnecessary, instead of just using prev. > + struct mm_struct *prev; Why "prev"? > +} temporary_mm_state_t; That's kinda long - it is longer than the function name below. temp_mm_state_t not enough? > + > +/* > + * Using a temporary mm allows to set temporary mappings that are not accessible > + * by other cores. Such mappings are needed to perform sensitive memory writes > + * that override the kernel memory protections (e.g., W^X), without exposing the > + * temporary page-table mappings that are required for these write operations to > + * other cores. > + * > + * Context: The temporary mm needs to be used exclusively by a single core. To > + * harden security IRQs must be disabled while the temporary mm is ^ , > + * loaded, thereby preventing interrupt handler bugs from override the s/override/overriding/ > + * kernel memory protection. > + */ > +static inline temporary_mm_state_t use_temporary_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) > +{ > + temporary_mm_state_t state; > + > + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); > + state.prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm); > + switch_mm_irqs_off(NULL, mm, current); > + return state; > +} > + > +static inline void unuse_temporary_mm(temporary_mm_state_t prev) > +{ > + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); > + switch_mm_irqs_off(NULL, prev.prev, current); > +} > + > #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMU_CONTEXT_H */ > -- > 2.17.1 > -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-01-29 0:34 [PATCH v2 00/20] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()" Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-31 11:29 ` Borislav Petkov [this message] 2019-01-31 22:19 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-01 0:08 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-01 0:25 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-04 14:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] fork: provide a function for copying init_mm Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-05 8:53 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-05 9:03 ` Nadav Amit 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-05 9:18 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 0:39 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 5:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-11 18:04 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 19:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-11 19:18 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 22:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-12 18:23 ` Nadav Amit 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-05 9:58 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-05 11:31 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-02-05 12:35 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-05 13:25 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-02-05 17:54 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-05 13:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] x86/kgdb: avoid redundant comparison of patched code Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] x86/ftrace: set trampoline pages as executable Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] x86/kprobes: instruction pages initialization enhancements Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-11 18:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 19:36 ` Nadav Amit 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-11 18:29 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 18:45 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 19:01 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 19:09 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 19:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 19:27 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 19:42 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 20:32 ` Nadav Amit 2019-03-07 15:10 ` [PATCH] x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has() Borislav Petkov 2019-03-07 16:43 ` hpa 2019-03-07 17:02 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-03-07 7:29 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Borislav Petkov 2019-03-07 16:53 ` hpa 2019-03-07 17:06 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-03-07 20:02 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-07 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-11 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] Add set_alias_ function and x86 implementation Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-11 19:09 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 19:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2019-02-11 22:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-12 0:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-19 11:04 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-19 21:28 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2019-02-20 16:07 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] vmalloc: New flags for safe vfree on special perms Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-19 12:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-19 19:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2019-02-20 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] modules: Use vmalloc special flag Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] bpf: " Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] x86/ftrace: " Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] x86/kprobes: " Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] x86/alternative: comment about module removal races Rick Edgecombe
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