From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, linux_dti@icloud.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, kristen@linux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/20] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 10:58:53 +0100 Message-ID: <20190205095853.GJ21801@zn.tnic> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190129003422.9328-7-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 04:34:08PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote: > From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> > > text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets temporary s/the // > PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel code > from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains the > ability to write onto kernel memory. Eww, sneaky. That would be a really nasty attack. > Moreover, since remote TLBs are not flushed after the temporary PTEs are > removed, the time-window in which the code is writable is not limited if > the fixmap PTEs - maliciously or accidentally - are cached in the TLB. > To address these potential security hazards, we use a temporary mm for > patching the code. > > Finally, text_poke() is also not conservative enough when mapping pages, > as it always tries to map 2 pages, even when a single one is sufficient. > So try to be more conservative, and do not map more than needed. > > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> > Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> > Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> > Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> > Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 2 - > arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- > arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 - > 3 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h > index 50ba74a34a37..9da8cccdf3fb 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h > @@ -103,8 +103,6 @@ enum fixed_addresses { > #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT > FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP, > #endif > - FIX_TEXT_POKE1, /* reserve 2 pages for text_poke() */ > - FIX_TEXT_POKE0, /* first page is last, because allocation is backward */ Two fixmap slots less - good riddance. :) > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MID > FIX_LNW_VRTC, > #endif > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c > index ae05fbb50171..76d482a2b716 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include <linux/stop_machine.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/kdebug.h> > +#include <linux/mmu_context.h> > #include <asm/text-patching.h> > #include <asm/alternative.h> > #include <asm/sections.h> > @@ -683,41 +684,102 @@ __ro_after_init unsigned long poking_addr; > > static void *__text_poke(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len) > { > + bool cross_page_boundary = offset_in_page(addr) + len > PAGE_SIZE; > + temporary_mm_state_t prev; > + struct page *pages[2] = {NULL}; > unsigned long flags; > - char *vaddr; > - struct page *pages[2]; > - int i; > + pte_t pte, *ptep; > + spinlock_t *ptl; > + pgprot_t prot; > > /* > - * While boot memory allocator is runnig we cannot use struct > - * pages as they are not yet initialized. > + * While boot memory allocator is running we cannot use struct pages as > + * they are not yet initialized. > */ > BUG_ON(!after_bootmem); > > if (!core_kernel_text((unsigned long)addr)) { > pages[0] = vmalloc_to_page(addr); > - pages[1] = vmalloc_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE); > + if (cross_page_boundary) > + pages[1] = vmalloc_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE); > } else { > pages[0] = virt_to_page(addr); > WARN_ON(!PageReserved(pages[0])); > - pages[1] = virt_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE); > + if (cross_page_boundary) > + pages[1] = virt_to_page(addr + PAGE_SIZE); > } > - BUG_ON(!pages[0]); > + BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1])); checkpatch fires a lot for this patchset and I think we should tone down the BUG_ON() use. WARNING: Avoid crashing the kernel - try using WARN_ON & recovery code rather than BUG() or BUG_ON() #116: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:711: + BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1])); While the below BUG_ON makes sense, this here could be a WARN_ON or so. Which begs the next question: AFAICT, nothing looks at text_poke*()'s retval. So why are we even bothering returning something? > + > local_irq_save(flags); > - set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0, page_to_phys(pages[0])); > - if (pages[1]) > - set_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1, page_to_phys(pages[1])); > - vaddr = (char *)fix_to_virt(FIX_TEXT_POKE0); > - memcpy(&vaddr[(unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK], opcode, len); > - clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE0); > - if (pages[1]) > - clear_fixmap(FIX_TEXT_POKE1); > - local_flush_tlb(); > - sync_core(); > - /* Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but > - that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs. */ > - for (i = 0; i < len; i++) > - BUG_ON(((char *)addr)[i] != ((char *)opcode)[i]); > + > + /* > + * The lock is not really needed, but this allows to avoid open-coding. > + */ > + ptep = get_locked_pte(poking_mm, poking_addr, &ptl); > + > + /* > + * This must not fail; preallocated in poking_init(). > + */ > + VM_BUG_ON(!ptep); > + > + /* > + * flush_tlb_mm_range() would be called when the poking_mm is not > + * loaded. When PCID is in use, the flush would be deferred to the time > + * the poking_mm is loaded again. Set the PTE as non-global to prevent > + * it from being used when we are done. > + */ > + prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL); So _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_NX as this is pagetable page, AFAICT. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-01-29 0:34 [PATCH v2 00/20] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()" Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-31 11:29 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-31 22:19 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-01 0:08 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-01 0:25 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-04 14:28 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] fork: provide a function for copying init_mm Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-05 8:53 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-05 9:03 ` Nadav Amit 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-05 9:18 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 0:39 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 5:18 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-11 18:04 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 19:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-11 19:18 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 22:47 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-12 18:23 ` Nadav Amit 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-05 9:58 ` Borislav Petkov [this message] 2019-02-05 11:31 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-02-05 12:35 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-05 13:25 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-02-05 17:54 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-05 13:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] x86/kgdb: avoid redundant comparison of patched code Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] x86/ftrace: set trampoline pages as executable Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] x86/kprobes: instruction pages initialization enhancements Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-11 18:22 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 19:36 ` Nadav Amit 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-11 18:29 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 18:45 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 19:01 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 19:09 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 19:10 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 19:27 ` Nadav Amit 2019-02-11 19:42 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 20:32 ` Nadav Amit 2019-03-07 15:10 ` [PATCH] x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has() Borislav Petkov 2019-03-07 16:43 ` hpa 2019-03-07 17:02 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-03-07 7:29 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Borislav Petkov 2019-03-07 16:53 ` hpa 2019-03-07 17:06 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-03-07 20:02 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-03-07 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-11 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] Add set_alias_ function and x86 implementation Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-11 19:09 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-11 19:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2019-02-11 22:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-12 0:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-19 11:04 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-19 21:28 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2019-02-20 16:07 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] vmalloc: New flags for safe vfree on special perms Rick Edgecombe 2019-02-19 12:48 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-02-19 19:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P 2019-02-20 16:14 ` Borislav Petkov 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] modules: Use vmalloc special flag Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] bpf: " Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] x86/ftrace: " Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] x86/kprobes: " Rick Edgecombe 2019-01-29 0:34 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] x86/alternative: comment about module removal races Rick Edgecombe
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