From: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-secuirty-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, vgoyal@redhat.com,
nayna@linux.ibm.com, nramas@microsoft.com, prsriva@microsoft.com,
Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/5 v4] added LSM hook to call ima_buffer_check
Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 15:25:22 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190503222523.6294-5-prsriva02@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190503222523.6294-1-prsriva02@gmail.com>
From: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
add a LAM hook for kexec_cmldine args to be made available to
other LSMs.
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
include/linux/security.h | 3 +++
kernel/kexec_internal.h | 4 +++-
security/security.c | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a240a3fc5fc4..f18562c1eb24 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1672,6 +1672,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+ int (*buffer_check)(const void *buff, int size, const char *eventname);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1945,6 +1947,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx;
struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx;
struct hlist_head inode_getsecctx;
+ struct hlist_head buffer_check;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
struct hlist_head unix_stream_connect;
struct hlist_head unix_may_send;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 49f2685324b0..8dece6da0dda 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname);
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1188,6 +1189,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+static inline void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
+{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_internal.h b/kernel/kexec_internal.h
index 48aaf2ac0d0d..9f967fbb5aa0 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_internal.h
+++ b/kernel/kexec_internal.h
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image, struct kexec_segment *segment);
void kimage_terminate(struct kimage *image);
int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kimage *image,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
-
+int kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name(char **outbuf, int kernel_fd,
+ const char *cmdline_ptr,
+ unsigned long cmdline_len);
extern struct mutex kexec_mutex;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cbb1a295a3..2b575a40470e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -754,6 +754,12 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
}
+void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
+{
+ call_void_hook(buffer_check, buff, size, eventname);
+ return ima_buffer_check(buff, size, eventname);
+}
+
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
--
2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-03 22:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-03 22:25 [PATCH 0/5 v4] Kexec cmdline bufffer measure Prakhar Srivastava
2019-05-03 22:25 ` [PATCH 1/5 v4] added a new ima policy func buffer_check, and ima hook to measure the buffer hash into ima Prakhar Srivastava
2019-05-06 12:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-03 22:25 ` [PATCH 2/5 v4] add the buffer to the xattr Prakhar Srivastava
2019-05-06 12:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-03 22:25 ` [PATCH 3/5 v4] add kexec_cmdline used to ima Prakhar Srivastava
2019-05-03 22:25 ` Prakhar Srivastava [this message]
2019-05-03 22:25 ` [PATCH 5/5 v4] removed the LSM hook made available, and renamed the ima_policy to be KEXEC_CMDLINE Prakhar Srivastava
2019-05-06 12:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-05-06 12:12 ` [PATCH 0/5 v4] Kexec cmdline bufffer measure Mimi Zohar
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