From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54905C04AB1 for ; Mon, 13 May 2019 17:53:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22F9321537 for ; Mon, 13 May 2019 17:53:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="O5I4PGBL" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731933AbfEMRw5 (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 May 2019 13:52:57 -0400 Received: from mail-qt1-f196.google.com ([209.85.160.196]:38397 "EHLO mail-qt1-f196.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728290AbfEMRwy (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 May 2019 13:52:54 -0400 Received: by mail-qt1-f196.google.com with SMTP id d13so8666308qth.5; Mon, 13 May 2019 10:52:53 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to :user-agent; bh=LDbQfP6zFs00yM0BuuWdblWsKRTzaG/CBEDU7dZNmDs=; b=O5I4PGBL5IzNYv6Bq/wm2zwG3SzvtCI2bDBMnnKtCWU0zVguqAGvTiJ9H4ctz0WqRh 4KziU4mHqSiT3VK5ukyN08yx59j3RYqONk0TPJLRrMIXEAFhx35GId04T+JshsoNnNXs ubteBEW//t4bbkFCBV5zGY67+Z6gdacDMWmER+n0KV1C46NO4T8LVDx7O/LTqgpKk3EJ xuNhwFmg9f0Qq3EjrwraZaKcniI9ZyalKzUU0B/hmBBgZ4L3ykSSTJ/+D4rs+avO+7g5 pZY4bZBPBUyq0Eh6vkpBM4qHmbmPulnD4CwSjneTocgEfWVvfhzQZlV21f/srvzi1Wlg lSNg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:content-transfer-encoding :in-reply-to:user-agent; bh=LDbQfP6zFs00yM0BuuWdblWsKRTzaG/CBEDU7dZNmDs=; b=BijamBKAfPXojnU2tMM113PwHjGmPEPcP65nJgGQeOhVnsh4Lm7cKDp6eELCzqPVoH QcZ2/zxpaWRFXNktdn78kfKCFQ4WqFaKTyDtcSAsmwPibGPdbpgTTznNtHf/QGabOo59 8xCchLRKMBMre2sH8oe1+cfjvuzSExyxWFPYKeu35d8vYN7eyxPGS1Fi2EjVkk0s62mS vQezI4zTbZcHKaAyEjpV3SUkgiEy4BP4A72LyrA/lGCyxgB4+bjiTDos+CdXqBV1aNVs uV1EpFmrc7jDA71BPALQ2vOcWywkbw+tzrLLxciW7Y4vwca1EGLYgLHv+7tFmH/p2+sK ZoDw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUtMBycQ5wMd8FHjW3jD4vcTNMhSOEt9gTqW2hwZ4o1j0f/Qx/K EU2a2eopI9mV5j4kdyQ8alA= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxQ4jtZobe2yh+82a4z1VRak83xYjV5aZ6fxvr1TTTEUQbtS1OcsUXJPViceQ5Ph2wxhZcB9g== X-Received: by 2002:a0c:9679:: with SMTP id 54mr12480342qvy.168.1557769972483; Mon, 13 May 2019 10:52:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from rani.riverdale.lan ([2001:470:1f07:5f3::b55f]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id t124sm7183371qkh.29.2019.05.13.10.52.52 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 13 May 2019 10:52:52 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 13 May 2019 13:52:50 -0400 From: Arvind Sankar To: Arvind Sankar Cc: Roberto Sassu , Rob Landley , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, initramfs@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] initramfs: add support for xattrs in the initial ram disk Message-ID: <20190513175250.GC69717@rani.riverdale.lan> References: <20190512194322.GA71658@rani.riverdale.lan> <3fe0e74b-19ca-6081-3afe-e05921b1bfe6@huawei.com> <4f522e28-29c8-5930-5d90-e0086b503613@landley.net> <20190513172007.GA69717@rani.riverdale.lan> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20190513172007.GA69717@rani.riverdale.lan> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 01:20:08PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote: > On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 02:47:04PM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > On 5/13/2019 11:07 AM, Rob Landley wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 5/13/19 2:49 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > >> On 5/12/2019 9:43 PM, Arvind Sankar wrote: > > >>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 05:05:48PM +0000, Rob Landley wrote: > > >>>> On 5/12/19 7:52 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > >>>>> On Sun, 2019-05-12 at 11:17 +0200, Dominik Brodowski wrote: > > >>>>>> On Thu, May 09, 2019 at 01:24:17PM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > > >>>>>>> This proposal consists in marshaling pathnames and xattrs in a file called > > >>>>>>> .xattr-list. They are unmarshaled by the CPIO parser after all files have > > >>>>>>> been extracted. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Couldn't this parsing of the .xattr-list file and the setting of the xattrs > > >>>>>> be done equivalently by the initramfs' /init? Why is kernel involvement > > >>>>>> actually required here? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> It's too late.  The /init itself should be signed and verified. > > >>>> > > >>>> If the initramfs cpio.gz image was signed and verified by the extractor, how is > > >>>> the init in it _not_ verified? > > >>>> > > >>>> Ro > > >>> > > >>> Wouldn't the below work even before enforcing signatures on external > > >>> initramfs: > > >>> 1. Create an embedded initramfs with an /init that does the xattr > > >>> parsing/setting. This will be verified as part of the kernel image > > >>> signature, so no new code required. > > >>> 2. Add a config option/boot parameter to panic the kernel if an external > > >>> initramfs attempts to overwrite anything in the embedded initramfs. This > > >>> prevents overwriting the embedded /init even if the external initramfs > > >>> is unverified. > > >> > > >> Unfortunately, it wouldn't work. IMA is already initialized and it would > > >> verify /init in the embedded initial ram disk. > How does this work today then? Is it actually the case that initramfs > just cannot be used on an IMA-enabled system, or it can but it leaves > the initramfs unverified and we're trying to fix that? I had assumed the > latter. Oooh, it's done not by starting IMA appraisal later, but by loading a default policy to ignore initramfs? > > > > > > So you made broken infrastructure that's causing you problems. Sounds unfortunate. > > > > The idea is to be able to verify anything that is accessed, as soon as > > rootfs is available, without distinction between embedded or external > > initial ram disk. > > > > Also, requiring an embedded initramfs for xattrs would be an issue for > > systems that use it for other purposes. > > > The embedded initramfs can do other things, it just has to do > the xattr stuff in addition, no? > > > > >> The only reason why > > >> opening .xattr-list works is that IMA is not yet initialized > > >> (late_initcall vs rootfs_initcall). > > > > > > Launching init before enabling ima is bad because... you didn't think of it? > > > > No, because /init can potentially compromise the integrity of the > > system. > > > How? The /init in the embedded initramfs is part of a trusted kernel > image that has been verified by the bootloader. > > > > >> Allowing a kernel with integrity enforcement to parse the CPIO image > > >> without verifying it first is the weak point. > > > > > > If you don't verify the CPIO image then in theory it could have anything in it, > > > yes. You seem to believe that signing individual files is more secure than > > > signing the archive. This is certainly a point of view. > > > > As I wrote above, signing the CPIO image would be more secure, if this > > option is available. However, a disadvantage would be that you have to > > sign the CPIO image every time a file changes. > > > > > > >> However, extracted files > > >> are not used, and before they are used they are verified. At the time > > >> they are verified, they (included /init) must already have a signature > > >> or otherwise access would be denied. > > > > > > You build infrastructure that works a certain way, the rest of the system > > > doesn't fit your assumptions, so you need to change the rest of the system to > > > fit your assumptions. > > > > Requiring file metadata to make decisions seems reasonable. Also > > mandatory access controls do that. The objective of this patch set is to > > have uniform behavior regardless of the filesystem used. > > > > > > >> This scheme relies on the ability of the kernel to not be corrupted in > > >> the event it parses a malformed CPIO image. > > > > > > I'm unaware of any buffer overruns or wild pointer traversals in the cpio > > > extraction code. You can fill up all physical memory with initramfs and lock the > > > system hard, though. > > > > > > It still only parses them at boot time before launching PID 1, right? So you > > > have a local physical exploit and you're trying to prevent people from working > > > around your Xbox copy protection without a mod chip? > > > > What do you mean exactly? > > > > > > >> Mimi suggested to use > > >> digital signatures to prevent this issue, but it cannot be used in all > > >> scenarios, since conventional systems generate the initial ram disk > > >> locally. > > > > > > So you use a proprietary init binary you can't rebuild from source, and put it > > > in a cpio where /dev/urandom is a file with known contents? Clearly, not > > > exploitable at all. (And we update the initramfs.cpio but not the kernel because > > > clearly keeping the kernel up to date is less important to security...) > > > > By signing the CPIO image, the kernel wouldn't even attempt to parse it, > > as the image would be rejected by the boot loader if the signature is > > invalid. > > > If it were signed yes, but you just said that it isn't possible to sign > it in all cases (if initramfs is generated locally). I actually didn't > follow that bit -- if initramfs is generated locally, and it isn't > possible to sign locally, where would the IMA hashes for the contents of > the initramfs come from? Is the idea that each file within the initramfs > would be an existing, signed, file, but you could locally create an initramfs > with some subset of those unmodified files? Even assuming this is the > case, isn't the eventual intention to also appraise directories, to > prevent holes where files might be moved around/deleted/renamed etc, so > this problem would resurface anyway? > Also eventually we need to check special nodes like device nodes etc to > make sure they haven't been tampered with, as in Rob's urandom > suggestion? > > > > > Whatever happened to https://lwn.net/Articles/532778/ ? Modules are signed > > > in-band in the file, but you need xattrs for some reason? > > > > Appending just the signature would be possible. It won't work if you > > have multiple metadata for the same file. > > > > Also appending the signature alone won't solve the parsing issue. Still, > > the kernel has to parse something that could be malformed. > > > > Roberto > > > > > > >> Roberto > > > > > > Rob > > > > > > > -- > > HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063 > > Managing Director: Bo PENG, Jian LI, Yanli SHI