From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2DA6FC3A5A3 for ; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 00:27:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B54B20856 for ; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 00:27:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726250AbfH1A1k (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Aug 2019 20:27:40 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:40020 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726077AbfH1A1k (ORCPT ); Tue, 27 Aug 2019 20:27:40 -0400 Received: from nramas-ThinkStation-P520.corp.microsoft.com (unknown [131.107.147.154]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2CAFB20B7187; Tue, 27 Aug 2019 17:27:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 2CAFB20B7187 From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, kgoldman@us.ibm.com, nramas@linux.microsoft.com Subject: [PATCH 0/1] KEYS: Measure keys in trusted keyring Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 17:27:34 -0700 Message-Id: <20190828002735.31025-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Created using linux v5.3.0-rc5 Motive: Motive behind this patch set is to measure the public keys in the trusted keyring. If CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is enabled then the trusted keys keyring is secondary_trusted_keys. Otherwise, the trusted keys keyring is builtin_trusted_keys. Measurement of the trusted keys is an addition to the existing IMA measurements and not a replacement for it. The measurement is enabled through the configuration value CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_TRUSTED_KEYS. This configuration is turned OFF by default and have to opted in by the kernel builder. Background: Currently IMA measures file hashes and .ima signatures. IMA signatures are validated against keys in ".ima" keyring. If the kernel is built with CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY enabled, then all keys in ".ima" keyring must be signed by a key in ".builtin_trusted_keys" or ".secondary_trusted_keys" keyrings. On systems with CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY enabled, measuring keys in the trusted keyring provides a mechanism to attest that the client's system binaries are indeed signed by signers that chain to known trusted keys. Without this patch set, to attest the clients one needs to maintain an "allowed list" of file hashes of all versions of all client binaries that are deployed on the clients in the enterprise. That is a huge operational challenge in a large scale environment of clients with heterogenous builds. This also limits scalability and agility of rolling out frequent client binary updates. Current patch: This patch set to measure the public keys in the trusted keys keyring is disabled by default and can be enabled with CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_TRUSTED_KEYS. When this configuration is enabled, during boot IMA enumerates keys in the trusted keys keyring and measures them in the IMA log. Questions and concerns raised by reviewers on this patch set: Question 1: Is "Signed with a trusted key" equal to "Trusted file"? Doesn't the service need the hashes of the system files to determine whether a file is trusted or not? "Signed with a trusted key" does not equal "Trusted" Answer: Agree "Signed with a trusted key" may not equal "Trusted". To address this, the attesting service can maintain a small manageable set of bad hashes (a "Blocked list") and a list of trusted keys expected in client's trusted keys keyring. Using this data, the service can detect the presence of "Disallowed (untrusted) version of client binaries". Question 2: Providing more data to the service (such as the keys in trusted keyring) empowers the service to deny access to clients (block clients). IMA walks a fine line in enforcing and measuring file integrity. This patchset breaches that fine line and in doing so brings back the fears of trusted computing. Answer: Any new measurement we add in IMA will provide more data to service and can enable it to deny access to clients. It is not clear why this patch set would breach the fine line between measuring and enforcing. Since this patch set is disabled by default and enabled through CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_TRUSTED_KEYS, only those enterprises that require this new measurement can opt-in for it. Since it is disabled by default, it does not restrict the autonomy of independent users who are unaffected by attestation. Question 3: IMA log already contains a pointer to the IMA keys used for signature verification. Why does the service need to care what keys were used to sign (install) the IMA keys? What is gained by measuring the keys in the trusted keyring? Answer: To attest the clients using the current IMA log, service needs to maintain hashes of all the deployed versions of all the system binaries for their enterprise. This will introduce a very high operational overhead in a large scale environment of clients with heterogenous builds. This limits scalability and agility of rolling out frequent client binary updates. On the other hand, with the current patch set, we will have IMA validate the file signature on the clients and the service validate that the IMA keys were installed using trusted keys. This provides a chain of trust: => IMA Key validates file signature on the client => Key in the trusted keyring attests IMA key on the client => Attestation service attests the trusted keys reported by the client in the IMA log This approach, therefore, would require the service to maintain a manageble set of trusted keys that it receives from a trusted source. And, verify if the clients only have keys from that set of trusted keys. Question 4: Where will the attestation service receive the keys to validate against? Answer: Attestation service will receive the keys from a trusted source such as the enterprise build services that provides the client builds. The service will use this set of keys to verify that the keys reported by the clients in the IMA log contains only keys from this trusted list. Question 5: What is changing in the IMA log through this patch set? Answer: This patch set does not remove any data that is currently included in the IMA log. It only adds more data to the IMA log - the data on keys in the trusted keyring Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (1): KEYS: Measure keys in trusted keyring certs/system_keyring.c | 15 ++++++ include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 ++ include/linux/key.h | 21 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 14 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/keyring.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 201 insertions(+) -- 2.17.1