From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05ADFC47E49 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D99F020856 for ; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2408353AbfJXDru (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:50 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:5614 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2406598AbfJXDru (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:50 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098417.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9O3lEpS003830 for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:48 -0400 Received: from e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.98]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vu13h5a0u-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 23 Oct 2019 23:47:48 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 24 Oct 2019 04:47:42 +0100 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9O3legK42139724 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:40 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92E69AE053; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:40 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9DB9AE051; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:37 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.40.192.65]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 03:47:37 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v9 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima policy rules Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 22:47:11 -0500 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102403-0008-0000-0000-000003267A28 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102403-0009-0000-0000-00004A45AB8D Message-Id: <20191024034717.70552-3-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-24_02:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910240033 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org PowerNV system use a Linux-based bootloader, which relies on the IMA subsystem to enforce different secure boot modes. Since the verification policy may differ based on the secure boot mode of the system, the policies must be defined at runtime. This patch implements arch-specific support to define IMA policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system. This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT config is enabled. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/ima.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 56ea0019b616..c795039bdc73 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -938,6 +938,7 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT prompt "Enable secure boot support" bool depends on PPC_POWERNV + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY help Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index e2a54fa240ac..e8eb2955b7d5 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),) obj-y += ucall.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d88913dc0da7 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + */ + +#include +#include + +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(); +} + +/* + * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems. + * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values. + * The "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" option allows the known good signature + * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature. + * + * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible, the IMA + * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE + * is not enabled. + */ +static const char *const secure_rules[] = { + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", +#endif + NULL +}; + +/* + * Returns the relevant IMA arch-specific policies based on the system secure + * boot state. + */ +const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) +{ + if (is_ppc_secureboot_enabled()) + return secure_rules; + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 1c37f17f7203..6d904754d858 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); #endif -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) +#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \ + || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); #else -- 2.20.1