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From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
To: longman@redhat.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	kuba@kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, sumit.garg@linaro.org,
	jsnitsel@redhat.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	ebiggers@google.com, crecklin@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] KEYS: Read keys to internal buffer & then copy to userspace
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 19:30:56 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <20200325.193056.1153970692429454819.davem@davemloft.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200322011125.24327-1-longman@redhat.com>

From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2020 21:11:23 -0400

> The current security key read methods are called with the key semaphore
> held.  The methods then copy out the key data to userspace which is
> subjected to page fault and may acquire the mmap semaphore. That can
> result in circular lock dependency and hence a chance to get into
> deadlock.
> 
> To avoid such a deadlock, an internal buffer is now allocated for getting
> out the necessary data first. After releasing the key semaphore, the
> key data are then copied out to userspace sidestepping the circular
> lock dependency.
> 
> The keyutils test suite was run and the test passed with these patchset
> applied without any falure.

Who will integrate these changes?

  parent reply index

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-22  1:11 Waiman Long
2020-03-22  1:11 ` [PATCH v8 1/2] KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore Waiman Long
2020-03-22  1:11 ` [PATCH v8 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read Waiman Long
2020-03-26  2:30 ` David Miller [this message]
2020-03-26 18:12 ` [PATCH v8 0/2] KEYS: Read keys to internal buffer & then copy to userspace David Howells
2020-03-26 22:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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