From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0DC6FC433F8 for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2020 14:40:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D776620719 for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2020 14:40:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="Lg4IwShA" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728852AbgG0OJO (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Jul 2020 10:09:14 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:53186 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729576AbgG0OJN (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Jul 2020 10:09:13 -0400 Received: from sequoia.work.tihix.com (162-237-133-238.lightspeed.rcsntx.sbcglobal.net [162.237.133.238]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7CA6520B4908; Mon, 27 Jul 2020 07:09:12 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 7CA6520B4908 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1595858953; bh=RI9OjMpT7wMC5gT81EsD8X2qDIaOFyrvt8WWKKu6l9g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=Lg4IwShAgGT6iQ+2TqIuqm/DwHEFPecAPRo2UL+8av/4jOYMji9G6XcVdjrkcxdz3 Iu4ThfYyoxzhOsm2qxVQ/cU+L3quvtWwBIK9lhZqTD8MqApjNqtVOFe9/PluQHniAt 3dIncUce+myctKw6bhLWuEqVvc1CZUzlVRrL8tio= From: Tyler Hicks To: Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , Tushar Sugandhi , Nayna Jain , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 0/2] ima: Fix keyrings race condition and other key related bugs Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 09:08:29 -0500 Message-Id: <20200727140831.64251-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Nayna pointed out that the "keyrings=" option in an IMA policy rule should only be accepted when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/336cc947-1f70-0286-6506-6df3d1d23a1d@linux.vnet.ibm.com/ While fixing this, the compiler warned me about the potential for the ima_keyrings pointer to be NULL despite it being used, without a check for NULL, as the destination address for the strcpy() in ima_match_keyring(). It also became apparent that there was not adequate locking around the use of the pre-allocated buffer that ima_keyrings points to. The kernel keyring has a lock (.sem member of struct key) that ensures only one key can be added to a given keyring at a time but there's no protection against adding multiple keys to different keyrings at the same time. The first patch in this series fixes both ima_keyrings related issues by parsing the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at policy load time rather than deferring the parsing to policy check time. Once that fix is in place, the second patch can enforce that CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS must be enabled in order to use "func=KEY_CHECK" or "keyrings=" options in IMA policy. The new "keyrings=" value handling is done in a generic manner that can be reused by other options in the future. This seems to make sense as "appraise_type=" has similar style (though it doesn't need to be fully parsed at this time) and using "|" as an alternation delimiter is becoming the norm in IMA policy. This series is based on commit 311aa6aafea4 ("ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime") in next-integrity. Tyler Tyler Hicks (2): ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 142 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1