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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	<casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	<reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 5/6] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 18:19:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210421161925.968825-6-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210421161925.968825-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

This patch changes the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with
the LSM infrastructure, in preparation for moving IMA and EVM to that
infrastructure.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
 include/linux/evm.h               | 17 ++++++++++-------
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 17 +++++++++++------
 security/security.c               |  7 +++----
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 8cad46bcec9d..b6c4092426f3 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 				 struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
 extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 				       const char *xattr_name);
-extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-				   const struct xattr *xattr_array,
-				   struct xattr *evm);
+extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				   const struct qstr *qstr,
+				   struct xattr *xattrs, void *fs_data);
 extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name);
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
 extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname);
@@ -102,11 +102,14 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-					  const struct xattr *xattr_array,
-					  struct xattr *evm)
+static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+					  const struct qstr *qstr,
+					  struct xattr *xattrs, void *fs_data)
 {
-	return 0;
+	if (!xattrs || !xattrs->name)
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
 static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 84a9b7a69b1f..336a421e2e5a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
 
@@ -706,23 +707,27 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 /*
  * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
  */
-int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-				 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
-				 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
+int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr,
+			    struct xattr *xattrs, void *fs_data)
 {
 	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
+	struct xattr *evm_xattr = lsm_find_xattr_slot(xattrs);
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
-	    !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+	if (!xattrs || !xattrs->name)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
+	    !evm_protected_xattr(xattrs->name))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!xattr_data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
+	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2ab67fa4422e..ee5b9caccc40 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1027,7 +1027,7 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
 {
 	struct xattr *new_xattrs;
-	struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
+	struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *xattr;
 	struct security_hook_list *P;
 	int ret, max_new_xattrs = 0;
 
@@ -1082,9 +1082,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	evm_xattr = lsm_xattr;
-	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr);
-	if (ret)
+	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, fs_data);
+	if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		goto out;
 	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
 out:
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-04-21 16:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-21 16:19 [PATCH v2 0/6] evm: Prepare for moving to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2021-04-21 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] xattr: Complete constify ->name member of "struct xattr" Roberto Sassu
2021-04-21 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free() Roberto Sassu
2021-04-21 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] security: Pass xattrs allocated by LSMs to the inode_init_security hook Roberto Sassu
2021-04-21 22:43   ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-22 13:46     ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-22 15:46       ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-22 16:12         ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-22 21:39           ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-21 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] security: Support multiple LSMs implementing " Roberto Sassu
2021-04-21 23:09   ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-21 16:19 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2021-04-21 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr Roberto Sassu

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