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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 09/11] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 13:33:27 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210505113329.1410943-5-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210505112935.1410679-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

System administrators can require that all accessed files have a signature
by specifying appraise_type=imasig in a policy rule.

Currently, IMA signatures satisfy this requirement. Appended signatures may
also satisfy this requirement, but are not applicable as IMA signatures.
IMA/appended signatures ensure data source authentication for file content
and prevent any change. EVM signatures instead ensure data source
authentication for file metadata. Given that the digest or signature of the
file content must be included in the metadata, EVM signatures provide the
same file data guarantees of IMA signatures, as well as providing file
metadata guarantees.

This patch lets systems protected with EVM signatures pass appraisal
verification if the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the
policy. This facilitates deployment in the scenarios where only EVM
signatures are available.

The patch makes the following changes:

file xattr types:
security.ima: IMA_XATTR_DIGEST/IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG
security.evm: EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG

execve(), mmap(), open() behavior (with appraise_type=imasig):
before: denied (file without IMA signature, imasig requirement not met)
after: allowed (file with EVM portable signature, imasig requirement met)

open(O_WRONLY) behavior (without appraise_type=imasig):
before: allowed (file without IMA signature, not immutable)
after: denied (file with EVM portable signature, immutable)

In addition, similarly to IMA signatures, this patch temporarily allows
new files without or with incomplete metadata to be opened so that content
can be written.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 6d0983a97711..23af45d8ac58 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -242,12 +242,16 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		hash_start = 1;
 		fallthrough;
 	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
-		if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
-			*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
-			*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
-			break;
+		if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) {
+			if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+				*cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+				*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+				break;
+			}
+			clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+		} else {
+			set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
 		}
-		clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
 		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
 				iint->ima_hash->length)
 			/*
@@ -417,6 +421,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 		cause = "missing-HMAC";
 		goto out;
 	case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE:
+		set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
 		fallthrough;
 	case INTEGRITY_FAIL:		/* Invalid HMAC/signature. */
 		cause = "invalid-HMAC";
@@ -461,9 +466,12 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 				status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
 		}
 
-		/* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */
+		/*
+		 * Permit new files with file/EVM portable signatures, but
+		 * without data.
+		 */
 		if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE &&
-		    xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) {
+		    test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) {
 			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
 		}
 
@@ -581,6 +589,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
+	} else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) {
+		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG);
 	}
 	if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) {
 		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-05 11:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-05 11:29 [PATCH v6 00/11] evm: Improve usability of portable signatures Roberto Sassu
2021-05-05 11:29 ` [PATCH v6 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2021-05-05 11:29 ` [PATCH v6 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal Roberto Sassu
2021-05-05 11:29 ` [PATCH v6 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2021-05-11 13:41   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-11 14:12     ` Roberto Sassu
2021-05-11 19:53       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-05 11:29 ` [PATCH v6 04/11] evm: Introduce evm_status_revalidate() Roberto Sassu
2021-05-11 13:42   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-05 11:33 ` [PATCH v6 05/11] evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors Roberto Sassu
2021-05-07 13:31   ` [RESEND][PATCH " Roberto Sassu
2021-05-11 13:42     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-05 11:33 ` [PATCH v6 06/11] evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures Roberto Sassu
2021-05-05 11:33 ` [PATCH v6 07/11] evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooks Roberto Sassu
2021-05-05 11:33 ` [PATCH v6 08/11] evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata Roberto Sassu
2021-05-11 14:11   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-11 14:21     ` Roberto Sassu
2021-05-11 14:40       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-11 14:54         ` Roberto Sassu
2021-05-11 20:00           ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-05 11:33 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2021-05-05 11:33 ` [PATCH v6 10/11] ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback Roberto Sassu
2021-05-11 22:12   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-12 10:55     ` Roberto Sassu
2021-05-05 11:33 ` [PATCH v6 11/11] ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised Roberto Sassu

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