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From: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
To: "zohar@linux.ibm.com" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	BARVAUX Didier <Didier.BARVAUX@viveris.fr>
Cc: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Subject: [PATCH v3 3/4] IMA: add a policy option to restrict xattr hash algorithms on appraisal
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 10:23:35 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210727102307.552052-4-simon.thoby@viveris.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210727102307.552052-1-simon.thoby@viveris.fr>

This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option "appraise_hash=",
that restricts the hash algorithms accepted for the extended attribute
security.ima when appraising.

When a policy rule uses the 'appraise_hash' option, appraisal of a
file referenced by that rule will now fail if the digest algorithm
employed to hash the file was not one of those explicitly listed
in the option. In its absence, any hash algorithm compiled in the
kernel will be accepted.

For example, on a system where SELinux is properly deployed, the rule
  appraise func=BPRM_CHECK obj_type=iptables_exec_t appraise_hash=sha256,sha384
will block the execution of iptables if the xattr security.ima of its
executables were not hashed with either sha256 or sha384.

Signed-off-by: Simon Thoby <simon.thoby@viveris.fr>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  6 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 070779e8d836..365e4c91719e 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Description:
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [template=] [permit_directio]
-				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=]
+				[appraise_flag=] [keyrings=] [appraise_hash=]
 		  base:
 			func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 			        [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ Description:
 			label:= [selinux]|[kernel_info]|[data_label]
 			data_label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data.
 			For example, "selinux" to measure critical data for SELinux.
+			appraise_hash:= comma-separated list of hash algorithms
+			For example, "sha256,sha512" to only accept to appraise
+			files where the security.ima xattr was hashed with one
+			of these two algorithms.
 
 		  default policy:
 			# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 344b5b0dc1a1..a7f110cbbff0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 	struct ima_template_desc *template;
 };
 
+
 /*
  * sanity check in case the kernels gains more hash algorithms that can
  * fit in an unsigned int
@@ -962,7 +963,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag,
 	Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
-	Opt_label, Opt_err
+	Opt_label, Opt_appraise_hash, Opt_err
 };
 
 static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -1000,6 +1001,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
 	{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
 	{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
+	{Opt_appraise_hash, "appraise_hash=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -1125,7 +1127,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				     IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
 				     IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
 				     IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
-				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
+				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_HASH))
 			return false;
 
 		break;
@@ -1137,7 +1139,7 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				     IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
 				     IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
 				     IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
-				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
+				     IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_HASH))
 			return false;
 
 		break;
@@ -1187,6 +1189,27 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static unsigned int ima_parse_appraise_hash(char *arg)
+{
+	unsigned int res = 0;
+	char *token;
+
+	while ((token = strsep(&arg, ",")) != NULL) {
+		int idx = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, token);
+
+		if (idx < 0) {
+			pr_err("unknown hash algorithm \"%s\", ignoring",
+			       token);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Add the hash algorithm to the 'allowed' bitfield */
+		res |= (1U << idx);
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1204,6 +1227,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	entry->uid_op = &uid_eq;
 	entry->fowner_op = &uid_eq;
 	entry->action = UNKNOWN;
+	entry->allowed_hashes = 0;
 	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 		int token;
@@ -1556,6 +1580,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 						 &(template_desc->fields),
 						 &(template_desc->num_fields));
 			entry->template = template_desc;
+			break;
+		case Opt_appraise_hash:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_hash", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->allowed_hashes) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->allowed_hashes = ima_parse_appraise_hash(args[0].from);
+			if (!entry->allowed_hashes) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			entry->flags |= IMA_VALIDATE_HASH;
+
 			break;
 		case Opt_err:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
@@ -1714,6 +1755,25 @@ static void ima_show_rule_opt_list(struct seq_file *m,
 		seq_printf(m, "%s%s", i ? "|" : "", opt_list->items[i]);
 }
 
+static void ima_policy_show_appraise_hash(struct seq_file *m,
+					  unsigned int allowed_hashes)
+{
+	int idx;
+	bool first = true;
+
+	for (idx = 0; idx < HASH_ALGO__LAST; idx++) {
+		if (!(allowed_hashes & (1U << idx)))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!first)
+			seq_puts(m, ",");
+		first = false;
+
+		seq_puts(m, hash_algo_name[idx]);
+	}
+
+}
+
 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
@@ -1825,6 +1885,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, " ");
 	}
 
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_HASH) {
+		seq_puts(m, "appraise_hash=");
+		ima_policy_show_appraise_hash(m, entry->allowed_hashes);
+		seq_puts(m, " ");
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
 			switch (i) {
-- 
2.31.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-07-27 10:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-27 10:23 [PATCH v3 0/4] IMA: restrict the accepted digest algorithms for the security.ima xattr THOBY Simon
2021-07-27 10:23 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms THOBY Simon
2021-07-27 14:04   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-27 10:23 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] IMA: add support to restrict the hash algorithms used for file appraisal THOBY Simon
2021-07-27 15:29   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-07-27 10:23 ` THOBY Simon [this message]
2021-07-27 16:24   ` [PATCH v3 3/4] IMA: add a policy option to restrict xattr hash algorithms on appraisal Mimi Zohar
2021-07-27 10:23 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK THOBY Simon
2021-07-27 11:24   ` THOBY Simon

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