From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3126AC433F5 for ; Sat, 11 Dec 2021 09:50:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230241AbhLKJuh (ORCPT ); Sat, 11 Dec 2021 04:50:37 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org ([145.40.68.75]:60336 "EHLO ams.source.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230243AbhLKJuh (ORCPT ); Sat, 11 Dec 2021 04:50:37 -0500 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AC89AB80025; Sat, 11 Dec 2021 09:50:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 456E6C004DD; Sat, 11 Dec 2021 09:50:29 +0000 (UTC) Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2021 10:50:26 +0100 From: Christian Brauner To: Stefan Berger Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 13/16] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Message-ID: <20211211095026.i2gvqjy4df3sxq42@wittgenstein> References: <20211208221818.1519628-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> <20211208221818.1519628-14-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> <20211209191109.o3x7nynnm52zhygz@wittgenstein> <0ab33fbc-8438-27b6-ff4c-0321bfc73855@linux.ibm.com> <20211210113244.odv2ibrifz2jzft5@wittgenstein> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 08:57:11AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: > > On 12/10/21 06:32, Christian Brauner wrote: > > On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 07:57:02PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > On 12/9/21 14:11, Christian Brauner wrote: > > > > From 1f03dc427c583d5e9ebc9ebe9de77c3c535bbebe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > > > From: Christian Brauner > > > > Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 20:07:02 +0100 > > > > Subject: [PATCH] !!!! HERE BE DRAGONS - UNTESTED !!!! > > > > > > > > --- > > > > security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > > > > 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c > > > > index 583462b29cb5..d5b302b925b8 100644 > > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c > > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c > > > > @@ -317,10 +317,14 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) > > > > static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > > > > size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) > > > > { > > > > - struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns(); > > > > + struct ima_namespace *ns; > > > > + struct user_namespace *user_ns; > > > > char *data; > > > > ssize_t result; > > > > + user_ns = ima_filp_private(filp); > > > > + ns = user_ns->ima_ns > > > > + > > > > if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) > > > > datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1; > > > > @@ -373,26 +377,51 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { > > > > }; > > > > #endif > > > > +static struct user_namespace *ima_filp_private(struct file *filp) > > > > +{ > > > > + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY > > > > + struct seq_file *seq; > > > > + > > > > + seq = filp->private_data; > > > > + return seq->private; > > > > +#endif > > > > + } > > > > + return filp->private_data; > > > > +} > > > > + > > > > /* > > > > * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file > > > > */ > > > > static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) > > > > { > > > > - struct ima_namespace *ns = get_current_ns(); > > > > + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); > > > > > > Do we have to take a reference on the user namespace assuming one can open > > > the file, pass the fd down the hierarchy, and then the user namespace with > > > the opened file goes away? Or is there anything else that keeps the user > > > namespace alive? > > No, we don't. When ima_policy_open() is called we do current_user_ns() > > but that will be guaranteed to be identical to filp->f_cred->user_ns. > > And f_cred is a reference that has been taken when the vfs allocated a > > struct file for this .open call so won't go away until the last fput. > > > > My proposal is also too complicated, I think. > > (The booster is giving me the same side-effects as my second shot so > > this looks like two good days of fever and headache. So I'll use that as > > an excuse. :)) > > > > Your patch series as it stands has a bit of a security issue with those > > get_current_ns() calls across differnet file/seq_file operations. > > > > You have to make an architectural decision, I think. I see two sensible > > options: > > 1. The relevant ima_ns that .open/.read/.write operate on is always taken > > to be the ima_ns of the filesystem's userns, i.e. > > sb->s_user_ns->ima_ns. > > This - but I'm not an ima person - makes the most sense to me and the > > semantics are straightforward. If I write to a file to alter some > > policy then I expect the ima namespace of the user namespace to be > > affected that the securityfs instance was mounted in. > > 2. The relevant ima_ns that .open/.read/.write operate on is always > > taken to be the one of the opener. I don't really like that as that > > gets weird if for some complicated reason the caller is not located > > in the userns the filesystem was mounted in (weird mount propagation > > scenario or sm). It also feels strange to operate on an ima_ns that's > > different from s_user_ns->ima_ns in a securityfs instance. > > We have this situation because one can setns() to another mount namespaces > but the data shown by SecurityFS lives in a user namespace, right? And now > we need to decide whether to affect the data in the user namespace  that did > the open (option 2) or to which the SecurityFS belongs to (option 1). If we > were to open a regular file it would be option 1, so we should probably not > break that existing semantic and also choose option 1 unless there one > wasn't allowed to choose the user namespace the SecurityFS files belonged to > then it should be option 2 but then we have file descriptor passing where > 'being allowed' can change depending on who is reading/writing a file... Is A general remark that's always worth repeating: under no circumstances should the object that you're operating on change from .open to .read/.write. Consider the following very rough sketch: pid = fork(): if (pid == 0) { // create USERNS1 unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER); // write an idmapping for getuid() to userns 0 mount("", "/sys/kernel/security", "securityfs", [...]); int fd_ima = open("/sys/kernel/security/some_ima_file", O_WRONLY); // Send fd_ima to parent via SCM_RIGHTS } // Receive fd_ima from child. write(fd_ima, "SET_OPTION_ON_INIT_USER_NS", ...); That example above is an instant security issue if the ima_ns changed depending on the caller since it means you could open a file in an unprivileged userns and then funnel it to a random process in init_user_ns that you control via SCM_RIGHTS and have it do the write() and instead of USERNS1->ima_ns you'd suddenly have changed init_user_ns->ima_ns. And this is what your previous patch with these multiple get_current_ns() calls allowed. So the write in the example above must operate on USERNS1->ima_ns. Now, both option 1 and 2 will ensure that the ima_ns that is operated on is always the same across .open/.read/.write: 1. securityfs->sb->s_user_ns->ima_ns this is trivially guaranteed because the filesystem's user namespace doesn't change no matter where you access that filesystem from. 2. securityfs_file->f_cred->user_ns->ima_ns this is guaranteed because f_cred stashes the openers credentials. What I fundamentally dislike about option 2 (f_cred) is - and I tried to say that in my prior mail - that what ima_ns is operated on depends on the userns of the process that called .open, i.e. the contents in securityfs change depending on the opener's userns. And I think that is fundamentally sloppy semantics. The contents of a filesystem should generally not depend on the caller if it can be avoided. We have a few instances where this is the case (e.g. some procfs sysctls) but especially for securityfs this does not make sense. > there anything that would prevent us from setns()'ing to that target user > namespace so that we would now see that of a user namespace that we are not > allowed to see? If you're really worried about someone being able to access a securityfs instance whose userns doesn't match the userns the securityfs instance was mounted in there are multiple ways to fix it. The one that I tend to prefer is: >From e0ff6a8dcc573763568e685dd70d1547efd68df9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Brauner Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 11:47:37 +0100 Subject: !!!! HERE BE DRAGONS - COMPLETELY UNTESTED !!!! securityfs: only allow access to securityfs from within same namespace Limit opening of securityfs files to callers located in the same namespace. --- security/inode.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index eaccba7017d9..9eaf757c08cb 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -80,6 +80,35 @@ static struct file_system_type fs_type = { .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT, }; +static int securityfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, + struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + int err; + + err = generic_permission(&init_user_ns, inode, mask); + if (!err) { + if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != current_user_ns()) + err = -EACCES; + } + + return err; +} + +const struct inode_operations securityfs_dir_inode_operations = { + .permission = securityfs_permission, + .lookup = simple_lookup, +}; + +const struct file_operations securityfs_dir_operations = { + .permission = securityfs_permission, + .open = dcache_dir_open, + .release = dcache_dir_close, + .llseek = dcache_dir_lseek, + .read = generic_read_dir, + .iterate_shared = dcache_readdir, + .fsync = noop_fsync, +}; + /** * securityfs_create_dentry - create a dentry in the securityfs filesystem * @@ -167,8 +196,8 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode, inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); inode->i_private = data; if (S_ISDIR(mode)) { - inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations; - inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations; + inode->i_op = &securityfs_dir_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &securityfs_dir_operations; inc_nlink(inode); inc_nlink(dir); } else if (S_ISLNK(mode)) { -- 2.30.2 > > Following man page of setns: > > "   User namespaces >               A process reassociating itself with a user namespace must >               have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the target user >               namespace.  (This necessarily implies that it is only >               possible to join a descendant user namespace.)  Upon >               successfully joining a user namespace, a process is >               granted all capabilities in that namespace, regardless of >               its user and group IDs." > > > So if we choose option 1 maybe we have to test for this capability upon > every read/write from/to a file? > In general, never do permission checking at read/write time unless the read/write fundamentally depends on what is read or written. Clean semantics will do permission checking once at open time. If you really really need to do permission checking at .read/.write time you need to use f_cred possibly calling override_creds/revert_creds() while doing so but simply don't do it.