Re: [PATCH v6 15/17] ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>]

On Sat, Dec 11, 2021 at 11:05:10AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Sat, 2021-12-11 at 09:29 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 02:47:34PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability to
> > > allow
> > > read/write IMA policy without CAP_SYS_ADMIN but with CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Denis Semakin <denis.semakin@huawei.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> > > ---
> > >  include/linux/capability.h      | 6 ++++++
> > >  security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +-
> > >  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h
> > > b/include/linux/capability.h
> > > index 65efb74c3585..991579178f32 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> > > @@ -270,6 +270,12 @@ static inline bool
> > > checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
> > >  		ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> > >  }
> > >  
> > > +static inline bool mac_admin_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
> > > +{
> > > +	return ns_capable(ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) ||
> > > +		ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> > > +}
> > > +
> > >  /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
> > >  int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
> > >  			   const struct dentry *dentry,
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> > > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> > > index a136d14f29ec..090ee85bfa3a 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> > > @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode,
> > > struct file *filp)
> > >  #else
> > >  		if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
> > >  			return -EACCES;
> > > -		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > +		if (!mac_admin_ns_capable(user_ns))
> > 
> > Sorry if I'm missing something.  But I'm looking at your tree's
> > version of ima_update_policy() and failing to see where it adds
> > extra capability checks.  Note that any unprivileged user can
> > unshare a user namespace, map its hostuid to nsuid 0, and pass
> > ns_capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN).
> > 
> > Likewise, a host uid 0 process which does not have CAP_MAC_ADMIN
> > can create a new user namespace, map hostuid 0 to nsuid 0, and
> > have CAP_MAC_ADMIN against the new userns.
> > 
> > Somewhere you need to be checking for privilege against either
> > the parent ns or the init_user_ns.  I'm not seeing where that's
> > being done.  Can you point me to it?
> 
> I think you're thinking of my patches, which used a single ima log for
> everything.  With Stefan's patches, each namespace gets its own log and
> starts out with and empty "do nothing" policy.  However, whatever
> policy was active in the parent namespace is still run for activities
> in  the child, so any activity the parent requires to be
> measured/audited/appraised etc still happens, but all entries are made
> in the parent.

Oh.  Stefan had previously said that one motivation was to do less logging
in the hostns, so I assumed that a child ns policy could make it so the
parent ns policy was no longer applied.  If that's not the case, and not
planned, then that makes this a lot simpler.