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From: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com
Cc: dvyukov@google.com, ebiggers@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	keescook@chromium.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 15:20:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220224142025.2587-1-pvorel@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210322154207.6802-2-zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Hi Mimi, Tetsuo, Kees, all,

FYI this commit merged as 92063f3ca73a ("integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized")
is the reason for openSUSE distro installer going back from lsm= to deprecated
security= when filling default grub parameters because security=apparmor or
security=selinux does not break boot when used with ima_policy=tcb, unlike
using lsm.

@Kees, @Mimi sure, people who use ima_policy=tcb will just remove lsm parameter
or add "integrity" to it but I wonder whether there could be "integrity"
automatic inclusion when using ima_policy=tcb. Although the point of lsm= (and
CONFIG_LSM) is to have *ordered* list of enabled LSMs and it wouldn't be clear
on which place.

Kind regards,
Petr

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-24 14:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-22 15:42 [PATCH 1/2] ima: don't access a file's integrity status before an IMA policy is loaded Mimi Zohar
2021-03-22 15:42 ` [PATCH 2/2] integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized Mimi Zohar
2021-03-22 16:52   ` Eric Biggers
2021-03-22 18:02     ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-24 14:20   ` Petr Vorel [this message]
2022-02-24 17:32     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-02-24 17:42       ` Petr Vorel
2022-02-24 18:51         ` Casey Schaufler
2022-02-25 19:58           ` Mimi Zohar
2022-02-28 13:44             ` Petr Vorel
2022-02-28 16:48               ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-22 16:51 ` [PATCH 1/2] ima: don't access a file's integrity status before an IMA policy is loaded Eric Biggers
2021-03-22 18:02   ` Mimi Zohar

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