From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 74075C433F5 for ; Fri, 6 May 2022 16:09:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1443604AbiEFQMv convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 May 2022 12:12:51 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44540 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1443647AbiEFQMn (ORCPT ); Fri, 6 May 2022 12:12:43 -0400 Received: from jabberwock.ucw.cz (jabberwock.ucw.cz [46.255.230.98]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EEE4A6FA2E; Fri, 6 May 2022 09:08:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: by jabberwock.ucw.cz (Postfix, from userid 1017) id CF2A51C0BA6; Fri, 6 May 2022 18:08:09 +0200 (CEST) Date: Fri, 6 May 2022 18:08:08 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: Evan Green Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , dlunev@google.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, rjw@rjwysocki.net, gwendal@chromium.org, jarkko@kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Hao Wu , James Morris , Jason Gunthorpe , Len Brown , Matthew Garrett , Peter Huewe , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , "Serge E. Hallyn" , axelj , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation Message-ID: <20220506160807.GA1060@bug> References: <20220504232102.469959-1-evgreen@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT In-Reply-To: <20220504232102.469959-1-evgreen@chromium.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Hi! > We are exploring enabling hibernation in some new scenarios. However, > our security team has a few requirements, listed below: > 1. The hibernate image must be encrypted with protection derived from > both the platform (eg TPM) and user authentication data (eg > password). > 2. Hibernation must not be a vector by which a malicious userspace can > escalate to the kernel. Can you (or your security team) explain why requirement 2. is needed? On normal systems, trusted userspace handles kernel upgrades (for example), so it can escalate to kernel priviledges. Best regards, Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html