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From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 13/30] evm: add post set acl hook
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2022 17:30:23 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220929153041.500115-14-brauner@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220929153041.500115-1-brauner@kernel.org>

The security_inode_post_setxattr() hook is used by security modules to
update their own security.* xattrs. Consequently none of the security
modules operate on posix acls. So we don't need an additional security
hook when post setting posix acls.

However, the integrity subsystem wants to be informed about posix acl
changes and specifically evm to update their hashes when the xattrs
change. The callchain for evm_inode_post_setxattr() is:

-> evm_inode_post_setxattr()
   -> evm_update_evmxattr()
      -> evm_calc_hmac()
         -> evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()

and evm_cacl_hmac_or_hash() walks the global list of protected xattr
names evm_config_xattrnames. This global list can be modified via
/sys/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs. The write to "evm_xattrs" is
restricted to security.* xattrs and the default xattrs in
evm_config_xattrnames only contains security.* xattrs as well.

So the actual value for posix acls is currently completely irrelevant
for evm during evm_inode_post_setxattr() and frankly it should stay that
way in the future to not cause the vfs any more headaches. But if the
actual posix acl values matter then evm shouldn't operate on the binary
void blob and try to hack around in the uapi struct anyway. Instead it
should then in the future add a dedicated hook which takes a struct
posix_acl argument passing the posix acls in the proper vfs format.

For now it is sufficient to make evm_inode_post_set_acl() a wrapper
around evm_inode_post_setxattr() not passing any actual values down.
This will still cause the hashes to be updated as before.

Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
---

Notes:
    /* v2 */
    unchanged
    
    /* v3 */
    Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
    
    /* v4 */
    unchanged

 include/linux/evm.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 86139be48992..117ac01b2432 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 {
 	return evm_inode_set_acl(mnt_userns, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
 }
+static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
+					  const char *acl_name,
+					  struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0);
+}
 extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 				   const struct xattr *xattr_array,
 				   struct xattr *evm);
@@ -131,6 +137,13 @@ static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
+					  const char *acl_name,
+					  struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
 static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 					  const struct xattr *xattr_array,
 					  struct xattr *evm)
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-29 15:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-29 15:30 [PATCH v4 00/30] acl: add vfs posix acl api Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 10/30] selinux: implement get, set and remove acl hook Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 19:15   ` Paul Moore
2022-09-30  8:38     ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 12/30] integrity: implement get and set " Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 19:14   ` Paul Moore
2022-09-30  3:19     ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-30 14:11       ` Paul Moore
2022-09-30  8:11     ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2022-09-30  1:44   ` [PATCH v4 13/30] evm: add post " Mimi Zohar
2022-09-30  2:51     ` Mimi Zohar
2022-09-30  8:44     ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-30 11:48       ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-04  7:04         ` Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 15/30] acl: add vfs_set_acl() Christian Brauner
2022-09-29 15:30 ` [PATCH v4 25/30] evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change() Christian Brauner

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