From: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc>
To: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Cc: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
kernel@pengutronix.de, "David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Steffen Trumtrar" <s.trumtrar@pengutronix.de>,
"Jan Luebbe" <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>,
"David Gstir" <david@sigma-star.at>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
"Franck LENORMAND" <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>,
"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
"Andreas Rammhold" <andreas@rammhold.de>,
"Tim Harvey" <tharvey@gateworks.com>,
"Matthias Schiffer" <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
Date: Fri, 06 May 2022 12:52:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <49e1738c55c73819ee0e2cac0be74d81@walle.cc> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220506062553.1068296-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Am 2022-05-06 08:25, schrieb Ahmad Fatoum:
> Series applies on top of v5.18-rc5. Would be great if this could make
> it
> into v5.19.
>
> v8 was here:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/09e2552c-7392-e1da-926b-53c7db0b118d@pengutronix.de
>
> Changelog is beneath each individual patch. Compared to v8, only code
> change is checking whether CAAM can support blobbing at init-time as
> apparently some Layerscape SoCs are available in a non-E(ncryption)
> variant that doesn't do AES. Previously, adding trusted keys on such
> SoCs would return an error with a cryptic error message.
>
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP
> core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique
> never-disclosed device-specific key.
>
> There has been multiple discussions on how to represent this within the
> kernel:
>
> The Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) is an IP
> core
> built into many newer i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>
> Its blob mechanism can AES encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique
> never-disclosed device-specific key. There has been multiple
> discussions on how to represent this within the kernel:
>
> - [RFC] crypto: caam - add red blobifier
> Steffen implemented[1] a PoC sysfs driver to start a discussion on
> how to
> best integrate the blob mechanism.
> Mimi suggested that it could be used to implement trusted keys.
> Trusted keys back then were a TPM-only feature.
>
> - security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support based on CAAM.
> Udit Agarwal added[2] a new "secure" key type with the CAAM as
> backend.
> The key material stays within the kernel only.
> Mimi and James agreed that this needs a generic interface, not
> specific
> to CAAM. Mimi suggested trusted keys. Jan noted that this could
> serve as
> basis for TEE-backed keys.
>
> - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type
> Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. This
> time
> it uses CAAM "black blobs" instead of "red blobs", so key material
> stays
> within the CAAM and isn't exposed to kernel in plaintext.
> James voiced the opinion that there should be just one user-facing
> generic
> wrap/unwrap key type with multiple possible handlers.
> David suggested trusted keys.
>
> - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
> Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends
> with
> one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM.
> This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13
>
> This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as
> yet another
> trusted key backend.
>
> The CAAM bits are based on Steffen's initial patch from 2015. His work
> had been
> used in the field for some years now, so I preferred not to deviate
> too much from it.
>
> This series has been tested with dmcrypt[5] on an i.MX6Q/DL and an
> i.MX8M[6].
>
> Looking forward to your feedback.
For the whole series:
Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E)
-michael
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-06 10:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-06 6:25 [PATCH v9 0/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] KEYS: trusted: allow use of TEE as backend without TCG_TPM support Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 2/7] KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] crypto: caam - determine whether CAAM supports blob encap/decap Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-09 12:39 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2022-05-09 13:04 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-11 9:16 ` Pankaj Gupta
2022-05-11 9:21 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-11 9:21 ` Michael Walle
2022-05-11 9:48 ` Horia Geantă
2022-05-11 9:59 ` Michael Walle
2022-05-11 10:28 ` Horia Geantă
2022-05-11 11:54 ` Michael Walle
2022-05-12 7:07 ` Horia Geantă
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 4/7] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 5/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 6/7] doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-06 6:25 ` [PATCH v9 7/7] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-TRUSTED-CAAM Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-07 19:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-07 19:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-11 10:48 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-11 15:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-05-11 17:13 ` Michael Walle
2022-05-06 10:52 ` Michael Walle [this message]
2022-05-11 10:47 ` [PATCH v9 0/7] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2022-05-11 11:29 ` Michael Walle
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